1. Interpretation of a juristic act is clearly binding upon the objective meaning which the parties gave to the act of representation. In a case where there is a conflict of opinion on the interpretation of a juristic act between the parties, such interpretation shall be reasonably interpreted in accordance with logical and empirical rules by comprehensively taking into account the contents of the juristic act, the motive and background leading up to the juristic act, the purpose to be achieved by the juristic act, the genuine intent of the parties, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da1142, Apr. 29, 1994; 201Da5134, Dec. 27, 2011). Furthermore, exemption and mitigation of liability or liability does not necessarily require an express declaration of intent, but it should be recognized even in a case where it can be deemed as exemption and reduction of liability or liability by the obligee’s interpretation of any act or declaration of intent, but for such recognition, it shall be determined to strictly apply the interpretation of the obligee’s act or declaration of intent in accordance with the contents of the pertinent legal relationship (see, e.g.4, 20105Da50105, Oct.

2. Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted reveals the following circumstances.

A. A. Around June 2006, M Co., Ltd. opened the name of "afford L building contractors' council composed of persons who paid part payments from among the buyers of the instant commercial building," and "afford the instant commercial building on or around September 30, 2006 by leasing the instant commercial building with the delegation of the Han River Industry Development Co., Ltd. and the NAEra Co., Ltd., which is its executor, around September 30, 2006, but closed due to business deterioration around February 27, 2007.

B. Meanwhile, through an agreement with the General Assembly of November 27, 2005 and the City Mayor's event on May 27, 2006, L building contractors agreed to raise a total of KRW 9 billion for the opening expenses for the management and revitalization of the instant shopping district. Of them, approximately KRW 3 billion was decided to withdraw the opening charges amounting to 2% of the parcelling-out price.

C. Accordingly, the opening charges paid by the buyers were approximately KRW 1.2 billion. Among them, 124,186,955 won, which was not used by M Co., Ltd. and stored by LA contractor Council, was delivered to the Defendant on July 29, 2007 upon the establishment of the Defendant.

D. On August 24, 2007, the Defendant: (a) entered into a lease agreement with N Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “N”) under which N Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “N”) wishes to lease the instant commercial building as KRW 5 billion; (b) the lease period of ten years; and (c) three percent of the total monthly sales of monthly rent (hereinafter “the instant lease agreement”). The Plaintiff (Appointed Party) and the designated parties (hereinafter “Plaintiff, etc.”) filed a claim against the Defendant for the allocation of the deposit and monthly rent under the instant lease agreement, and confirmed the Defendant’s act of entering into the instant lease agreement.

E. Among the contents of the instant lease agreement, “the Defendant shall resolve all legal and factual issues with the present lessee prior to the date of N’s commencement of business (Article 4), and each sectional owner and the Defendant shall deliver the instant commercial building to N and maintain adequate conditions for the lessee’s use of the commercial building (Article 7).” Accordingly, N from October 1, 2007 to January 21, 2008, sent a certificate of demand for removal of existing facilities and delivery of the instant commercial building from October 1 to January 21, 2008.

F. From October 1, 2007 to May 21, 2009, the Defendant spent expenses exceeding KRW 3.1 billion to deliver the instant commercial building to N (hereinafter “instant expenses”).

G. On December 12, 2007, the notice for the general meeting issued by the Defendant to individual sectional owners (Evidence B No. 12) includes the following: "I will incur an inevitable situation where the exclusive use of a deposit is inevitable due to problems related to the change of the use of facilities, the repair line construction, and the pre-existing lessee's interests for the revitalization of the deposit. It also includes the fact that I will pay the opening charges, business promotion expenses, and management expenses in consideration of equity and feasibility of each sectional ownership, but I will want to use the unpaid amount only for the corresponding amount from the advance payment and the return rate of return." Further, the defendant has received the consent for "I will use the unpaid amount first of all the pre-paid amount from the individual sectional owners and share of expenses and share of the exclusive use of the deposit", and D will also pay the remaining amount of the pre-paid deposit to the defendant at the expense of 0% of the pre-existing lessee's deposit and submit the advance notice to the defendant.

H. Meanwhile, the Defendant, on behalf of the individual sectional owners, has been provided with KRW 6 million and office monthly as subsidies from N in return for performing all business related to the lease of the commercial building of this case on behalf of the individual sectional owners, but there is no data agreed to receive separate fees, such as fees, from individual sectional owners.

3. Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is determined as follows.

A. Since the instant shopping mall paid by the Defendant appears to be an essential cost for delivering the instant shopping mall to the N pursuant to the instant lease agreement, barring any particular circumstance, individual sectional owners including the Plaintiff, etc., who is a joint lessor of the instant shopping mall, and the executor, etc. shall bear the burden, except in extenuating circumstances.

C. For the following reasons, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff, etc. should bear life-saving expenses exceeding the amount equivalent to the shares of each party.

(1) First, in light of the contents of the above notice sent by the Defendant to individual sectional owners, the Defendant appears to have tried to preferentially appropriate part of the pre-paid expenses of this case from the additional collection of the pre-paid premium. However, in any case of the above notice, there is no indication that the pre-paid owner should not separately claim the pre-paid expenses in addition to the pre-paid charges. On the other hand, the purport of the notice as seen earlier is to indicate that the final pre-paid portion of the pre-paid expenses should be ultimately borne by the individual sectional owners, and the pre-paid portion that is not appropriated from the pre-paid portion of the pre-paid portion in the pre-paid portion in the pre-paid portion is to be shared by the pre-paid portion in the lease deposit of the individual sectional owners.

In light of these circumstances, it is difficult to view that the Defendant agreed not to bear the expenses for the surrender of this case, in addition to the expenses for the opening of the Plaintiff, etc.

(2) In addition, considering the circumstances where the Defendant’s unpaid premium that the Defendant may walk additionally from individual sectional owners significantly less than KRW 1.8 billion, while the instant name tag exceeds KRW 3.1 billion, it is more difficult to deem that the Defendant agreed to bear the instant name tag without claiming the payment from individual sectional owners, even without paying the price separately from the individual sectional owners.

(3) In addition, as long as the obligation to pay the opening contribution and the obligation to pay the opening contribution of this case are clearly separate obligations, as recognized by the lower court, with respect to individual sectional owners who paid the opening contribution in the statement of accounts of earnings on January 5, 2009, even though the Defendant had not received the direct payment from individual sectional owners, it cannot be viewed that the Defendant has paid the opening contribution as well as the portion of the opening contribution that was not delivered, and as to individual sectional owners who did not pay the opening contribution, it cannot be viewed as different merely because the Defendant deducteds the opening contribution from the unpaid deposit, etc. for the individual sectional owners.

(4) In full view of the above circumstances, it is reasonable to view that individual sectional owners including the plaintiff et al. and the defendant have made an express or implied agreement to share the expenses in the lease deposit to cover the expenses in relation to the payment of the opening expenses in addition to the amount of the opening expenses additionally paid by the defendant from individual sectional owners who did not pay the opening expenses. It is reasonable to view that there was an express or implied agreement to share the expenses in the lease deposit by all individual sectional owners in relation to the remaining opening expenses.

4. Nevertheless, the court below determined that (1) the defendant did not claim the amount corresponding to the pre-paid opening contribution from individual sectional owners who already paid the opening contribution with the plaintiff et al., and that (2) the non-paid opening contribution should be deducted from the deposit and monthly rent of individual sectional owners who failed to pay the opening contribution, and that (3) the non-paid contribution should not be deducted from or offset against the deposit, etc. of the plaintiff and the designated parties who already paid the opening contribution, and (2) The court below determined that the non-paid contribution should be deducted from the agreed opening contribution, excluding the unpaid opening contribution which has already been deducted from the agreed opening contribution.

Therefore, this judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation of legal act and failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal

5. Therefore, the part of the lower judgment against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee In-bok

Justices Kim In-bok, Counsel for the defendant

Justices Go Young-young