[상표등록무효][공1985.4.15(750), 474]
A. Where both a registered trademark and a cited trademark are acquired well-known, whether the application of Article 9(1)9 of the Trademark Act with respect to the above registered trademark is excluded
(b)where it is possible to think of two or more names and concepts in a single trademark, the criteria for determining whether the trademark and other trademarks are attached to the trademark;
A. Even if the registered trademark of this case was known to the general public prior to its registration, it would be possible to block the registration of the cited trademark or any other trademark identical or similar to the cited trademark as a well-known trademark, and may be a ground for nullifying the registered trademark of this case, and it cannot be a ground for excluding or exempting the application of Article 9(1)9 of the Trademark Act as to the registered trademark of this case.
B. If two or more names, concepts can be thought in one trademark, one of them, and the concept is not identical or similar to the name, concept, and even if not, if the other name, concept is deemed similar to the name, concept, and concept of another's trademark, the two trademarks should be interpreted as similar.
Article 9 of the Trademark Act
(b) Supreme Court Decision 83Hu67 delivered on November 13, 1984; 83Hu70 delivered on November 13, 1984
Attorney Park Jae-il, Counsel for the defendant-appellant
Patent Attorney Kim Il-sik, Attorney Lee Jae-hoon, Counsel for the defendant-appellant
Korean Intellectual Property Trial Office No. 88 dated January 18, 1984 (party) No. 1981
The original adjudication shall be reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the Korean Intellectual Property Trial Office.
The grounds of appeal by claimant's representative are examined.
According to the original decision, the court below recognized the fact that the cited mark is used for the product of the kind of fruit that a claimant widely manufactures and sells to the general consumers as well as the trade name and trademark since September 1, 1945, and on the other hand, the trademark of this case continues to be used for 18 years until July 29, 1976, which is the trade name of the claimant for the trial, and it is obvious that the trademark of this case is widely known to the general consumers as well as the trademark of this case including the quoted mark in its composition, and it can be seen that the trademark of this case is a trademark of this case including the trademark of the respondent's own trade name, and since the trademark of this case is used for the product of this case as a trade name and trademark, it is hard to see that the trademark of this case is a trademark of this case, "the trademark of this case," which is a trademark of this case, in violation of the concept of "the trademark of this case," and the trademark of this case, "the trademark of this case," which is an expression of "the composition of both parties".
However, the purport of Article 9(1)9 and Article 46 subparag. 1 of the Trademark Act provides that a trademark used on goods identical with or similar to a well-known trademark shall not be registered, and a trademark registered in violation of this provision shall be invalidated by a trial, if the mark used for any goods is widely known to the consumers as a trademark, then the other party may cause confusion as to the release of the identical or similar trademark, and if the trademark is used on the same goods or similar goods, the other party may cause confusion as to the release of the goods, thereby preventing the other party from causing confusion as to the release of the goods, and protecting the interests of the well-known trademark users. Thus, as seen in the judgment of the court below, even if the registered trademark in this case was widely known to the general public prior to its registration, it may prevent the trademark from being cited as a well-known trademark or any other trademark identical or similar to the cited trademark, and the registration in this case may not be a ground for nullifying the application of Article 9(1)9 of the Trademark Act as to the trademark in this case.
In addition, in determining the similarity of trademarks compared, it shall not be said that the two trademarks compared to the two trademarks should be determined on the basis of whether they might cause mistake or confusion as to the origin of goods by objectively, comprehensively, and separately observing the appearance, name, and concept of the trademark, but it is not always the name, concept, and each constituent part of the trademark, but it may be simply the name, concept, and the two or more names or concepts among the constituent parts may be simply combined with each other at the time when it is not recognized that the separate observation of each constituent part is inseparably indivisible to such a degree that it is natural and unreasonable. In addition, if two or more names or concepts can be thought from one trademark, one of them shall be interpreted as similar to the concept, concept, and concept of another person's trademark.
In this case, since goods marked by two trademarks are all the same fruits, etc., and the trademark of this case is written in the letter, the term "culme" in this case is not an integral combination to the extent that it is very indivisible to observe and observe by separating the name, concept, or the "culme" from the "culme" and the "culme" in the transaction, so the actual transaction that respects the simple and swiftness can be called as "culme" or "culme party" in the simple manner. Further, the term "culme" is a part indicating the manufacturer of the fruit, which is the designated goods, and the actual condition of this transaction is the product selection and purchase of goods in the name of the manufacturer. In consideration of the fact that the "culme" in the trademark composition, the term "culme" in the name of the manufacturer, etc., appears to be the most easily necessary part of the trademark composition, which is the essential part to be taken into consideration from the general consumers.
Therefore, as long as the title, concept, and concept of the cited mark have occurred, and as seen earlier, the title, and concept of the cited mark are "Considerationed," the two trademarks are similar with each other. Nevertheless, the original decision of the court below which determined that the trademark of this case is a separate trademark which is not similar, and thus, does not constitute a trademark which cannot be registered under Article 9 (1) 9 of the Trademark Act, is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the similarity of trademarks and the invalidation of the registered trademark, and it is obvious that such illegality has influenced the result of the trial decision, and therefore, the appeal pointing this out is justified.
Therefore, the original adjudication is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.
Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)