2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff, including the part resulting from the supplementary participation.

(a) Application for approval of the plaintiff's general industrial complex plan;

1) On April 10, 2013, pursuant to Article 8 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Simplification of Authorization and Permission Procedures for Industrial Complexes (hereinafter “Industrial Complex Fire-Fighting Act”), the Plaintiff filed an application with the Defendant for approval of the plan for the Kim Young-gu General Industrial Complex (hereinafter “the instant industrial complex”) with respect to the industrial complex and the project implementer’s application for the designation of the forest located in the 86-10mm2 (the area was changed to 206,163m2) in the Dobong-si forest area in the city of Kimhae-si.

2) On April 12, 2013, the Defendant publicly announced the holding of a joint briefing session on the instant industrial complex plan, and notified the Plaintiff of the holding on April 17, 2013. The said joint briefing session was held on April 23, 2013 and September 17, 2013, but all of it was omitted.

3) On November 28, 2013, the Defendant requested the relevant agencies and departments to hold consultations regarding the instant industrial complex, and thereafter, the relevant agencies and departments submitted a plan for consultation and measures.

(b) Approval or disposition of factory establishment and building permission for the intervenor;

1) On August 19, 201, the Intervenor joining the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as the “ Intervenor”) filed an application with the Defendant for approval to establish a factory equivalent to 5,861 square meters of building area (3,948 square meters of manufacturing facilities 1,913 square meters of manufacturing facilities) on the ground of a square of 13,945 square meters in total of 116-3 forest and 123 forest and 13,945 square meters of forest land in the city of Kimhae-si. On October 5, 2012, the Defendant approved the establishment (hereinafter referred to as the “Industrial Cluster Act”) under the Industrial Cluster Development and Factory Establishment Act (Amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; hereinafter referred to as the “Industrial Cluster Act”).

2) On January 16, 2014, an intervenor thereafter filed an application with the Defendant for a building permit to construct four factories of general steel bars/refluent concrete structure on one parcel, other than 4,471.5m2, on the land of 116-3 forest land in the Yan-si, the land subject to the disposition of approval for the establishment of the said factory, which is the land subject to the disposition of approval for the establishment of the said factory, and the Defendant filed an application for the said building permit on February 17, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as the “instant building permit”).

3) On January 23, 2014, prior to granting the instant building permit, the Defendant sought the Plaintiff’s opinion on the building activity permit since the Intervenor’s application for building permit was located within the instant business complex. On January 28, 2014, the Plaintiff presented an opinion that the Intervenor’s building act should not be permitted on the ground that it is inconsistent with the instant industrial complex plan.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, 2, 3, Eul evidence 1, 2, Eul evidence 4, Eul evidence 4-5, 6, 7, 9, 10, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the lawsuit of this case is lawful

(a) A captain;

1) Plaintiff’s assertion

According to Article 12(1) of the Industrial Sites and Development Act and Article 14(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, a person who intends to construct a building in an industrial complex shall obtain permission, and the competent administrative agency shall hear the opinions of the project operator, and pursuant to Article 6-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act, the above act shall conform to the industrial complex development plan and not interfere with the development project. However, the Intervenor’s construction act is likely to go against and interfere with the industrial complex development plan of this case, without considering the Plaintiff’s opinion that the application for the above building permit should not be rejected, the Defendant issued the building permit of this case. Accordingly, the building permit of this case must be revoked illegally.

2) The main defense of the Defendant and the Intervenor

A) According to Article 13-2(1)15 of the Industrial Cluster Act, if the intervenor obtained the approval of factory establishment from the defendant, the person who has already obtained the permission under the related Acts and subordinate statutes at the time of the announcement of industrial complex pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Industrial Cluster Act can continue to implement the act of permission after reporting to the competent administrative agency. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s application for permission of construction is merely a report on the constructive construction permission at the time of the previous approval of factory establishment, and it cannot be deemed a new disposition merely because the report on the matters for which permission had already been granted was accepted normally. Ultimately, the Plaintiff cannot dispute the construction permission of this case because it is not a disposition, and it can only dispute the approval of factory establishment.

B) Even if the construction permit of this case is recognized as disposal, the Plaintiff applied for the approval of the industrial complex plan of this case to the Defendant at the time of the construction permit of this case, and the industrial complex plan of this case was not approved, and thus, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed a legal project operator. Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed as a legal interest in dispute over the construction permit

C) Therefore, the instant lawsuit is unlawful and dismissed.

(b) Markets:

1) Determination as to whether the instant building permit was disposed of

A) Article 13-2(1) of the Industrial Cluster Act provides that the matters about authorization, permission, etc. for the relevant factory and access road site shall be deemed to have been consulted with the head of the relevant administrative agency at the time of approving factory establishment. Article 13-2(4) of the same Act and Articles 6 and 7-3 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provide that a person who intends to be deemed to obtain constructive authorization, permission, etc. shall submit documents related to authorization, etc. in addition to a business plan at the time of applying for approval for factory establishment, and Article 13-2(1)15 of the same Act provides that a person who intends to obtain constructive authorization, permission, etc

The purpose of the Industrial Cluster Act is to protect the rights and interests of the people by simplificationing the counter and simplification the procedure with the competent administrative agency having jurisdiction over approval for factory establishment in relation to the constructive matters of authorization and permission. As such, the Industrial Cluster Act provides that any person who intends to obtain constructive effect, such as authorization and permission, while applying for approval for factory establishment, shall submit an application and required documents that are mandatory to submit in the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes. Accordingly, according to the aforementioned relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, the constructive effect of authorization and permission arises only when submitting documents on constructive matters of authorization and permission at the time of the disposition of approval for factory establishment and consultation with the head of the relevant administrative agency after consultation with the head of the relevant administrative agency. In cases where an application for approval for factory establishment was not made due to the lack of an application for constructive matters of authorization and permission, such as building permission, etc., even if the approval for factory establishment was obtained, it cannot be deemed that the permission for factory establishment is deemed to have been deemed to have been granted separately. Moreover, even if the effect of authorization and permission has occurred due to the disposition of approval for factory establishment.

B) Based on the foregoing, the instant case is examined. The facts that the intervenor filed an application for a building permit on the land above approved on October 5, 2012 after receiving the approval for the establishment of a factory on January 16, 2014 are as seen earlier, and comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the pleadings in the entries in Eul evidence 1, Eul evidence 6-1 through 16, Eul evidence 5, and Eul evidence, the facts that the intervenor must undergo deliberation upon the application for the building permit from the head of the relevant administrative agency on January 16, 2014 can be acknowledged after the intervenor filed the said application.

According to the above facts, at the time when the defendant approved the above factory establishment to the intervenor, the defendant did not consult with the head of the relevant administrative agency regarding the matters regarding the building permit regarding the above factory, and so long, it cannot be deemed that the building permit is deemed as the approval disposition for factory establishment.

Therefore, it cannot be deemed that the instant building permit is merely a notification of the construction permit already deemed as having been granted, and it should be deemed a disposition that has an effect on the Intervenor’s specific rights and obligations.

C) Therefore, the main defense of the Defendant and the Intervenor against this is not acceptable.

2) Determination as to standing to sue

A) Even a third party, who is not the other party to an administrative disposition, has a legal interest in seeking the revocation of the administrative disposition, standing to sue is recognized. The legal interest here refers to cases where there is a direct and specific interest protected by the law based on the pertinent disposition. However, it does not include cases where it is an indirect or factual interest, such as an abstract, average, general profit common to the general public as a result of the protection of public interest, or a case where it is merely an indirect or factual, economic, or interested interest (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Nu1454, Sept. 26, 1995; 2002Du1656, Jun. 11, 2002)

According to Article 12(1) of the Industrial Sites Act and Article 14(1)1 and (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, a person who intends to construct a building in an industrial complex shall obtain permission from a Mayor, etc., and when the Mayor is designated as an operator of an industrial complex development project pursuant to Article 16 of the same Act, the head of the Si shall hear the opinions of the project operator in advance. In light of the purport of the aforementioned relevant statutes, a person who is not designated as the operator of an industrial complex development project cannot be deemed as having a direct and specific legal interest to

B) We examine the instant case. According to Articles 8(2), 14(1), and 15(1) and (2) of the Fire-Fighting Procedure Act, where private enterprises, etc. request the designation of an industrial complex, a designating authority shall establish an industrial complex plan including the same matters as the case where the designating authority establishes an industrial complex plan, and apply for approval thereof to the designating authority. If the designating authority is a market, it shall approve the industrial complex plan after deliberation by the local industrial complex planning deliberation committee and publicly notify the result in the Official Gazette or Official Gazette. Such public announcement of approval of the industrial complex plan is deemed public announcement of the designation of an industrial complex

On April 10, 2013, the Plaintiff filed an application for approval of the industrial complex plan of this case with the Defendant on April 10, 2013, and according to the evidence Nos. 9 and 11, the Defendant filed an application for deliberation with the Gyeongnam-do Committee for Deliberation on Local Industrial Complex Planning to determine whether to approve the industrial complex plan of this case on February 17, 2014, which was after the construction permission of this case, on July 22, 2014, and thereafter, the said local industrial complex plan deliberation committee was held, but the approval of the industrial complex plan of this case was rejected on October 14, 2014.

According to the above facts, the defendant at the time of the building permit of this case did not have publicly announced the approval of the industrial complex plan of this case to the plaintiff, and the reason that the plaintiff requested the designation of the industrial complex pursuant to Article 8 of the Industrial Complex Fire Services Act cannot be deemed to have acquired the status of the project operator. Thus, the plaintiff cannot be deemed to be the operator of the industrial

C) Therefore, it is difficult to see that the Plaintiff has a legal interest in dispute over the construction permit of this case. Thus, the lawsuit of this case is unlawful, and the defendant and the intervenor pointing this out are with merit.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, since the lawsuit of this case is unlawful, it is decided to dismiss it. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Lee Jae-hwan

Judges Kim Jong-young

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.