1. “A soldier or police officer wounded while on duty (including illness in the line of duty)” as referred to in Article 4(1)6 of the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Services to the State refers to the injury or disease of a soldier or police officer during education and training or in the performance of duty. Therefore, in order to be different from the above provision, there should be a proximate causal relation between education and training or in the performance of duty and the injury or disease, and the causal relation between the injury and the injury should be proved by the party asserting the causal relation (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Du5617, Sept. 23, 2003, etc.). However, the causal relation should not be necessarily proved by medical or natural science, and it should be judged that there is a proximate causal relation between education and training or in the performance of duty and the injury or disease when considering the overall circumstances, even if it is presumed that there is a proximate causal relation between the injury and disease in the line of duty, etc.

2. After finding facts based on the evidence adopted, the lower court determined that the proximate causal relationship between the Plaintiff’s military service and the mental fission cannot be acknowledged on the ground that the Plaintiff’s mental fission appears to have been caused or aggravated due to the Plaintiff’s physical and genetic talent, etc., but it is difficult to presume that the Plaintiff’s mental fission was caused or aggravated beyond the natural progress during military service.

However, according to the facts and records duly established by the court below, the plaintiff was suffering from the 1963 military illness on June 21, 196 and was classified as a person for active service because of no mental problem. The plaintiff was in the military on March 19, 1984, and worked as a driver on July 19, 1984. The plaintiff was discharged from the military hospital 1 to 1500, and was discharged from the military hospital 1 to 2000. The plaintiff was discharged from the military hospital 1 to 300,000, and it was hard to view that the plaintiff was discharged from the military hospital 1 to 300,000 after 196. The plaintiff was discharged from the military hospital 1 to 30,000, and there was no other special circumstance that the plaintiff had been discharged from the military hospital 1 to 19,000,0000, and there was no other special circumstance that the plaintiff was able to attend the military hospital 1 to 9.

Examining this in light of the aforementioned legal principles, first of all, the Plaintiff’s mental fission appears to have been under stressed to the extent that it was difficult for the Plaintiff to properly adapt to the closed military life, which is subject to strict regulations and control, unlike the general society after entering the military, and there is no mental patient among the Plaintiff’s family members, and there is no special circumstance that may lead to the outbreak of mental fission except the stress he was in military service. Mental fission is likely to occur even through psychological or social and cultural factors, and in particular, even if an individual with weak mental disorder suffers environmental stress, it is a disease that may occur even if the Plaintiff had been under adequate treatment at the time of showing symptoms of mental fission, and it appears that at least would have not been aggravated as of the present time if the Plaintiff had been under adequate treatment, it would have not been under serious conditions. Ultimately, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff’s mental fission was aggravated only due to stress caused by a lack of adaptation to the new environment during military service.

Nevertheless, the lower court determined that the Plaintiff’s mental fission is not deemed to have been caused or aggravated due to the Plaintiff’s education and training or performance of duty as a soldier. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on proximate causal relationship between the Plaintiff’s disease, education and training or performance of duty, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation in the grounds of

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Sang-hoon (Presiding Justice)