[2] Where a person who requests the disclosure of information requests the public institution to disclose information by selecting the disclosure method by means of delivery of a copy or output of the information, whether the public institution which received the request for disclosure has discretion to choose the disclosure method (negative)

[3] Criteria for determining whether the disclosure of information under Article 7 (1) 6 (c) of the Official Information Disclosure Act constitutes "information deemed necessary for the public interest"

[4] The case holding that the information received by a public official at a meeting, such as a meeting or conference, in personal capacity without relation to his/her duties does not constitute "information that is deemed necessary for the public interest" under Article 7 (1) 6 (c) of the Official Information Disclosure Act

[5] The case holding that information on the account number of a financial institution traded by a corporation, etc. falls under the information which, if disclosed, could seriously harm legitimate interests of the corporation, etc.

Article 6 (1) of the Official Information Disclosure Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") provides that "All citizens shall have the right to request the disclosure of information." The term in this context includes not only natural persons but also legal entities, but also unincorporated associations and foundations. On the other hand, since the right to request the disclosure of information is specific rights protected by law, the right to request the disclosure of information to a public institution by the claimant and the refusal disposition is itself an infringement of legal interests (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du6425, Mar. 11, 2003).

The judgment of the court below that included the same purport is just, and there is no error of law by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations or by misapprehending the legal principles as to the standing or legal interest as otherwise alleged in the ground

2. As to discretion on the selection of information disclosure method

In full view of the provisions of Articles 2(2), 3, 5, and 8(1) of the Act, Article 14 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, and Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act (attached Form 1), where a person who requests disclosure of information requests a public institution to disclose information by selecting the method of disclosure by means of delivery of copies or printed copies of the information, the public institution which received the request for disclosure shall disclose information according to the method of disclosure chosen by the applicant for disclosure of information unless it does not fall under the grounds for restricting the delivery of copies or copied copies of the information under Article 8(2) of the Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Du2918, Mar. 11, 2003).

The lower court rejected the Defendants’ assertion that public institutions have the discretion to choose disclosure of the instant information by means of the delivery of copies or printed materials, on the grounds that: (a) the Plaintiff requested the Defendants to disclose the instant information by means of the delivery of copies or printed materials; (b) the Defendants, insofar as it does not prove that there exist the grounds prescribed in Article 8(2) of the Act, should disclose the instant information in accordance with the method of disclosure chosen by the Plaintiff; (c) the instant information is obvious that it is not a “unknownly known matter; and (d) there is no data to deem that there is a concern that considerable hindrance to normal performance of duties due to excessive claims.”

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to discretion in the choice of information disclosure method, as otherwise alleged in the ground

3. As to public officials’ information

A. Article 7(1)6 of the Act provides that one of the information subject to non-disclosure refers to "personal identification information that can identify a specific person by the name, resident registration number, etc. included in the relevant information (hereinafter referred to as "personal identification information"), and Article 7(1)6 of the Act provides that "information that is prepared or acquired by a public institution and deemed necessary for the public interest or for the protection of rights of an individual" is excluded from "information that is recognized as necessary for the public interest or for the protection of rights of an individual." Whether disclosure constitutes "information that is recognized as necessary for the public interest" should be determined on an individual basis by comparing and comparing public interests such as the protection of privacy of an individual protected by non-disclosure and the guarantee of citizens' right to know, the participation of citizens in government affairs, and the transparency of government administration (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du642

B. Of the instant information, the lower court determined that the Defendants’ refusal to disclose the said information constitutes “information that is deemed necessary for the public interest,” among personal information that could identify the participants of the event included in the evidence related to various events, such as holding meetings and holding events held by the Defendants (hereinafter referred to as “information on the participants of the event”). Therefore, it was unlawful for the Defendants to refuse to disclose the information.

However, it is reasonable to view that the above information does not constitute "information that is deemed necessary for the public interest when a public official attends an event in connection with his/her official duties," even if it is recognized that the above information does not constitute "information that is deemed necessary for the public interest," since the resident registration number of the above public official and the information where the public official attends an event in his/her personal qualification without connection with his/her official duties in view of the privacy protection of the public official, it is not desirable to disclose the above information, and since it cannot be said that the interest protected by the disclosure is superior to the interest protected by the private disclosure of the above information, it does not constitute "information that is deemed necessary for the public interest (see Supreme Court Decisions 2001Du724, Mar. 11, 2003; 2003Du8050, Dec. 12,

Nevertheless, the court below held that all the information on a public official attending an event constitutes "information deemed necessary for the public interest." In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on information subject to non-disclosure under Article 7 (1) 6 of the Act, or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations on whether a public official who attends an event is present in his/her personal qualification without relation to his/her duties.

C. Of the instant information, the lower court determined that the Defendants’ refusal to disclose the said information was unlawful on the following grounds: (a) the information pertaining to an individual who is a public official, among the personal information that could identify the final recipient of the said money and valuables (hereinafter referred to as “information on the recipient of money and valuables”) included in the evidence of disbursement related to the money and valuables paid under the pretext of the gift or case for the cooperation in corrective public relations, the concern for the citizens of needy relationship or immigration, and other similar names; and (b) the information constitutes “information that is deemed necessary for the public interest.”

However, even if disclosure of information received by a public official in relation to his/her duties among the information received by a money or valuables constitutes "information deemed necessary for the public interest", it is reasonable to view that disclosure of information does not constitute "information that is deemed necessary for the public interest," since disclosure of information does not constitute "information that is deemed necessary for the public interest," in view of the privacy protection of the public official in cases where the public official received money or valuables due to his/her personal qualifications, etc. without relation to his/her duties, even if it is not desirable to disclose such information in view of the privacy protection of the public official (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 201Du724, 2003Du80

Nevertheless, the court below determined that all of the information on the public official receiving money and valuables constitutes "information deemed necessary for the public interest." In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on information subject to non-disclosure under Article 7 (1) 6 of the Act, etc., or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations on whether a public official receiving money and valuables receives money and valuables in his/her personal capacity without relation to his/her duties.

4. As to information on corporations, organizations, and places of business of individuals

The lower court determined that the Defendants’ failure to disclose information, which an individual operating a corporation, an organization, or a place of business (hereinafter referred to as “corporation, etc.”) received money or other valuables, constitutes information subject to non-disclosure, which may seriously harm the legitimate interests of the corporation, etc., if disclosed, and constitutes information subject to non-disclosure.

However, in light of the legislative intent and contents of Article 7 (1) 7 of the Act, information on the trade name, organization name, business name, business place name, business registration number, etc. of corporations, etc. is not related to trade secrets of corporations, etc. which, if disclosed, are deemed likely to seriously undermine legitimate interests of corporations, etc. However, information on the account number of financial institutions, etc. traded by corporations, etc. is likely to threaten business status of the corporations, etc. if disclosed in combination with the name and name of the corporations, etc., and such information constitutes business secrets of corporations, etc., which are related to business secrets of corporations, etc., and which, if disclosed, are deemed to be likely to seriously undermine legitimate interests of the corporations, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Du9391, Apr. 22

Nevertheless, without excluding the above information subject to disclosure, the court below held that the information pertaining to the corporation, etc. should be disclosed on the ground that there is no evidence to acknowledge that the information pertaining to the business secrets of the corporation, etc., which would seriously harm the legitimate interests of the corporation, etc., if disclosed. In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles pertaining to the information subject to non-disclosure as stipulated in Article 7 (1) 7 of the Act and failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations on the existence of the above information

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the lower judgment against the Defendants is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the lower court for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Shin-chul (Presiding Justice)