(b) The case holding that the ownership of the property belongs to the Gun owner, regardless of whether there is a level of land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the land on the premise that yellow agents

C. In the application of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Disposal of State Properties under the proviso of Article 2(1)3 of the Addenda to the Protection of Cultural Properties Act (Act No. 1265), the Director General of the Cultural Properties Administration has authority such as the determination of the property to be disposed and the payment of the price to the property purchaser even if it is the Director General of the Cultural Properties Administration

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the defendants.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the land of this case can be disposed of only by the Minister of Finance and Economy at the time of the enforcement of the former Act on the Property of the Republic of Korea at the time of the enforcement of the Act on the Property of the Republic of Korea, although only the Minister of Finance and Economy can dispose of the land of this case at the time of the enforcement of the Act on the Property of the Republic of Korea, but the Director of the Cultural Heritage Management did not follow the prescribed procedures of the Act on January 26, 1963, and returned the land of this case to the non-party 1 with the approval of the Head of the Cabinet at the time of the time of the enforcement of the Act on the Registration of Property of the Republic of Korea only after obtaining the approval of the Head of the People's Office on January 26, 1963 (which is recognized as a clerical error in the law. Therefore, in comparison with the records, the registration of transfer of each of the land of this case in the name of the defendants is justifiable, and it cannot be viewed as an unlawful disposition of this case.

Defendant 15's grounds of appeal are examined.

The final appeal is filed by Nonparty 2 (resident 1 omitted) of Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, which is the land for which the appeal is filed. The appeal is filed by Nonparty 2 (resident 2 omitted), about 27, and about 13, which is the original land owned by Nonparty 1 (resident 1 omitted), and Defendant 15 purchased the land owned by Nonparty 2 from Nonparty 2, which is the purchase of the above 27, which is that the above 27 portion cannot be the subject of the claim. However, according to the purport of the court below's failure to exhaust all necessary deliberations and records, Defendant 15 argued that the above purport was stated in the court below, and it is possible to find that there was no evidence despite the denial of its assertion in the plaintiff's litigation performer, so the defendant 15 did not submit a copy of the register and a copy of the land cadastre attached to the plaintiff's statement of grounds for final appeal, and this cannot be viewed as a lack of sufficient deliberation to support the defendant's assertion that there was no misunderstanding of evidence.

Defendant 1's grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below acknowledged that the forest land including this case was owned by the non-party 3, the non-party 1 (the co-defendants of the court of first instance), five Cho Jong-gun, the non-party 1 (the co-defendants of the court of first instance), as the king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's son's son's son's son's son's son's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's king's son's son's son's her own son's son's 's her.

The grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 4 by Defendant 6 and 11 others are examined.

In full view of the records and records, the statement of various documentary evidence adopted by the original judgment and the whole purport of the parties' arguments, it is reasonable to accept the fact-finding on the ground that all of the daily forest, including the land in this case, which was owned by Nonparty 1-5, ○○○○-gun, Nonparty 3, was delivered to the Gosking, and the entire land owned by Nonparty 3, was reverted to the Gosking. Therefore, it is reasonable to accept the fact-finding on the ground that the whole ownership of the land owned by Nonparty 3, was attributed to the king. Therefore, it is not reasonable to criticize the fact-finding on the premise that it should be limited to the scope of the land in the Gosking-gu zone, which is necessary for his protection, centered on the premise that it was not a yellow field, but based on the evidence of the original judgment, or that there was any error in the reasoning for failing to exhaust all further deliberation.

The grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3 are examined.

As seen earlier, as seen earlier, the original judgment recognized, based on evidence, that the land in this case was recognized as having been delivered to him as a large number of the kings, and that the establishment of the king was established on the basis of having been delivered to him, and if the factual basis is so, the ownership of the real estate in this case should be deemed to be attributed to the sulfur, regardless of whether it was a large land level or not, the original judgment should be justified, and the ownership of the real estate in this case shall not be deemed to have been attributed to the sulfur, and it shall not be deemed to have been a case where a fact was acknowledged by disregarding the logical rule and the empirical rule, or a case where there was a

The grounds of appeal No. 5 are examined.

However, there is no evidence to support the defendant's assertion that the land of this case is the trust property of the non-party 1, and the court below did not have any record that there is a mistake in violation of the rules of evidence such as setting the rule of experience and logical rules, etc., and there is no need to find the reasons for rejection. Therefore, it is not reasonable to argue that the court below's whole right to the preparation of evidence is erroneous or not attached with just grounds for rejection.

The grounds of appeal No. 6 are examined.

However, according to the evidence Nos. 1-1 to 87, one copy of the land of this case was the registration of ownership transfer from the plaintiff on February 6, 1963 due to the termination of trust on August 24, 1963. The original judgment stated on this date that the head of the Cultural Properties Administration returned the land of this case to the non-party 1 and completed the registration of ownership transfer due to the termination of trust. In determining that the disposal of the land of this case by the head of the Cultural Properties Administration without any authority of the head of the Cultural Properties Administration is legally null and void, the former Act on February 9, 1963 was enacted, and there was no error that the issuance of the original judgment can be disposed of by the Director of the Cultural Properties Administration through the deliberation of the Deliberation Committee on Disposal of Property of this case at the time of 1963, unless the Cultural Properties Protection Act was provided for in the Act on Special Cases Concerning Disposal of Property of this case. Thus, the court below's decision that the above disposal of the land of this case could not be affected by the Director of the State Properties.

Therefore, all appeals by the Defendants are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices of the Supreme Court (Presiding Justice) Kim Young-nam Kim Young-ho