2. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

3. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. Status of the plaintiff, etc.

The Plaintiff and the Koo Global Incorporated Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Coul Construction”) are a business entity under Article 2 subparag. 1 of the former Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (amended by Act No. 9357 of Jan. 30, 2009 and enforced on July 31, 2009; hereinafter referred to as “Fair Trade Act”).

(b) Bidding collusions for construction works of the facilities of the Yangyang Water Quality Restoration Center;

1) The construction work of the facilities for the restoration of the water quality of Gyeyang Ginseng (hereinafter “instant construction work”) was conducted by adding environmental pollution prevention facilities, such as noise, vibration, malodor, etc., sports facilities, ecological pond, etc., residents convenience facilities, field experience spaces, etc. to sewage treatment terminal facilities, which are sewage treatment facilities to treat sewage and discharge it to rivers or other public waters, and the construction work was conducted by submitting an application form for prior examination by July 20, 2009, following the public announcement of tender by the Korea Land Corporation, and the tender procedure was conducted on September 29, 2009 (hereinafter “instant tender”); the selection of a successful bidder was conducted by reflecting the design score of 50%, and the price score of 50%.

2) Around September 2009, Nonparty 1’s regular director proposed to Nonparty 2’s regular director of the Corde Construction to exclude price competition in the instant bid, and accepted it by Nonparty 2’s regular director. Thereafter, Nonparty 1 instructed Nonparty 3’s deputy director, and Nonparty 2’s regular director of the Corde Construction to consult Nonparty 5’s deputy director with each other through Nonparty 4. Accordingly, Nonparty 3’s division and Nonparty 5’s deputy director agreed to determine the bid price of the instant bid as 94.8% (Plaintiff) and 94.78% (Coul Construction) (hereinafter “instant collaborative act”).

3) On September 29, 2009, the date of bidding, the Plaintiff and the person in charge of each bid for the construction of the joint bid was confirmed as to whether the tender was prepared as agreed upon in advance at the parking lot of the Korea Land Corporation and submitted a tender.

4) According to the results of the tender announced on November 23, 2009, the Plaintiff was selected as the successful bidder of the instant construction project by the consortium (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff Joint Supply and Demand Company”) who is a member of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, on December 16, 2009, the Plaintiff Joint Purchase and Demand Company entered into a contract with the Korea Land Corporation for a contract with the amount of KRW 47,400,000 (including value-added tax).

(c) Application for reduction and exemption by construction of harrassment and Plaintiff;

1) On October 19, 201, when the Defendant was investigating the instant collaborative act, he first filed an application for reduction or exemption among the enterprisers participating in the instant collaborative act, and thereafter submitted data related to tendering, such as a written statement of staff and tender price.

2) Accordingly, on July 12, 2012, the Secretary General of the Defendant confirmed the status of the investigator in charge of investigation and cooperation with respect to the operation of the reduction and exemption system, including corrective measures against voluntary reporters of unfair collaborative acts, etc. (amended by Defendant Notice No. 2011-11, Jan. 3, 2012) pursuant to Article 11 of the former Public Notice on Operation of the Reduction and Exemption System (amended by Defendant

3) On May 19, 2014, the Plaintiff filed an application for reduction or exemption for the instant collaborative act, and the content of investigation and cooperation for the application for reduction or exemption included that the instant collaborative act was conducted between the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1’s non-executive officer, and Nonparty 2’s regular director.

D. The defendant's disposition

1) On September 11, 2014, the Defendant issued a corrective order and a penalty surcharge payment order as indicated in attached Table 1 (hereinafter “instant disposition”) with the Plaintiff’s decision on September 201, 2014, under which the instant collaborative act constitutes Article 19(1)8 of the Fair Trade Act. The Defendant calculated the penalty surcharge in accordance with Articles 22 and 55-3 of the Fair Trade Act, Article 61(1) and [Attachment 2] of the former Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21626, Jul. 7, 2009; hereinafter “former Enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act”), and the former detailed criteria for imposing penalty surcharges (amended by Defendant No. 2010-9, Oct. 20, 2010; hereinafter “instant penalty surcharge”). The Defendant calculated the penalty surcharge as follows.

A) Basic penalty surcharges

(1) The sales amount shall be 43,090,909,090 won (excluding value-added tax) which is the contract amount of the instant construction project.

(2) In light of the content and ripple effect of the instant collaborative act, the level of gravity of the act constitutes “an act of serious violation” and thus, the imposition rate of 7-10% is applied in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (a) of Article 4.1.1.c. (1) of the Public Notice of Penalty Surcharges IV. However, the instant collaborative act constitutes a speculative collaborative act of obvious competition-restricting effects by nature as bidding collusion, and the instant collaborative act constitutes a public project of substantial impact on the finance of the State and local governments, and the instant public project sets forth KRW 4,309,09,909, which applies the imposition rate of 10% as basic penalty surcharges.

(1) A table (unit: won) ① Standard rate of imposition (=basic penalty surcharge) 43,090,909,090 10% 4,309,090,909

(B) the first and second adjusted penalty surcharges;

(1) The basic penalty surcharge shall be maintained as the primary adjusted penalty surcharge for the Plaintiff on the ground that there is no ground for the primary adjustment by the elements of the act.

(2) As the Plaintiff’s senior executive officer directly participated in the instant collaborative act, 10% is increased, while the Plaintiff cooperates in the investigation, such as recognizing the facts of the act and making statements helpful to determine illegality, 20% is reduced. 3,447,272,727 won reduced by 10% in consideration of the Plaintiff’s net income during the previous year as of the date of deliberation as of the date of deliberation, shall be determined as the second adjustment penalty surcharge.

(4) Table (unit: won) included in the main sentence. (5) The basic amount of penalty surcharges. (6) The amount of penalty surcharges imposed on the executive officers shall be reduced to x the amount of penalty surcharges imposed on the secondary amount of penalty surcharges. (8) The amount of penalty surcharges imposed on the secondary amount of penalty surcharges [d....................) 4,309,090,90% 10%

C) Determination of imposition penalty surcharges

Since the plaintiff organized a consortium and participated in the bidding of this case, 10% has been reduced, and then 3,102,00,000 won has been abandoned below the million won shall be determined as a penalty surcharge.

본문내 포함된 표 (단위: 원) ⑧ 2차조정과징금액 ⑨ 컨소시엄 ⑩ 부과과징금액[=⑧×(1-⑨)] 3,447,272,727 10% 3,102,000,000

2) Meanwhile, on September 11, 2014, the Defendant rendered a decision to dismiss the Plaintiff’s application for reduction or exemption under Article 22-2 of the former Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (amended by Act No. 1234, Jan. 24, 2014; hereinafter “the Enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act”) and Article 35(1)3 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 25503, Jul. 21, 2014; hereinafter “the Enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act”), on the ground that the Plaintiff fell under a second-class investigator, but falls under Article 35(1)6(a) and (b) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, on the ground that the Plaintiff’s application for reduction or exemption falls under Article 2014-188 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (hereinafter “instant application for reduction or exemption”).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, 2, Eul evidence 5, 7, and 17 (including each number; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the part concerning the claim to revoke the application for reduction or exemption is legitimate

We examine ex officio the interests of the lawsuit in the lawsuit of this case concerning the revocation of the motion for reduction or exemption.

1) According to Articles 21 and 22 of the Fair Trade Act, when there is an act of violating the prohibition of unfair collaborative acts, the Defendant may order the relevant enterpriser to take corrective measures or impose penalty surcharges on the relevant enterpriser. According to Articles 22-2(1) and 35(1) and (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act, where a person who reported or cooperated in an investigation after the commencement of the investigation by the Defendant on the unfair collaborative act satisfies certain requirements, the penalty surcharge and corrective measures may be mitigated or exempted. The Defendant may, upon a voluntary reporter or a person who has cooperated in an investigation, separately deliberate or separately decide on the relevant case so that the identity of the person who has filed a voluntary reporter or a person who has cooperated in the investigation is not disclosed. Moreover, the public notice of the operation of the reduction and exemption system, such as corrective measures against the former voluntary reporter, which stipulated matters concerning the detailed operation procedures of the reduction and exemption system under Article 35(4) of the Enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 2014-19, Jan. 2, 2015). hereinafter referred to “the reduction and exemption”).

2) Comprehensively taking account of the above provisions, the Defendant’s dismissal disposition against an enterpriser’s application for reduction or exemption of penalty surcharges by voluntary report in relation to an unfair collaborative act is ultimately one procedure to determine whether to reduce or exempt a business operator’s application for reduction or exemption from a penalty surcharge, etc. However, the Defendant only makes a separate decision on the application for reduction or exemption from disclosure of the identity of the voluntary reporter. However, even if the Defendant’s dismissal of the application for reduction or exemption from a business operator, if the Defendant separately issued a corrective order or penalty surcharge payment order against the business operator’s violation at that time, such separate decision can only be deemed as a separate disposition as seen above, even if the enterpriser’s rejection disposition is revoked by disputing the legitimacy of the above rejection disposition, such circumstance alone cannot be said to deny the effect of the final decision ordering the business operator to make an application for reduction or exemption from the cancellation of the application for reduction or exemption, and thus, the business operator ought to seek revocation of the application for reduction or exemption from the final decision of 201 to the Supreme Court’s revocation of the application for reduction or exemption order, 25.

In full view of all these points, in a case where there is a final decision on the corrective measures or the imposition of penalty surcharge even if a rejection of an application for reduction or exemption due to voluntary report, etc., it would be the most effective and appropriate means to seek revocation by directly disputing the illegality of the final decision by the relevant business operator. Therefore, there is no benefit of lawsuit seeking revocation against the rejection of the application for reduction or exemption.

3) Examining the facts acknowledged in light of the aforementioned legal principles, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff has no interest in the lawsuit seeking the revocation of the rejection disposition of the instant application for reduction. Accordingly, the lawsuit for revocation of the rejection disposition in the instant lawsuit is unlawful.

3. Whether the instant order to pay penalty surcharge is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) Illegal recognition of the status of an investigator and cooperation officer

A) On October 19, 201, 201, Coul Construction made a false statement to the Defendant that “The instant collaborative act was constituted between the Plaintiff and Nonparty 6, who belongs to the sales team of Coul Construction and Nonparty 7, while being aware that the Plaintiff and Nonparty 2 had led the instant collaborative act, while applying for reduction or exemption of the instant collaborative act, Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2’s leading of the instant collaborative act until the Plaintiff’s application for reduction or exemption was filed after confirming the status of the first investigator. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that Coul Construction stated all facts related to the instant collaborative act in accordance with Article 22-2(3) of the Fair Trade Act and Article 35(1)1(c) of the Enforcement Decree of the said Act, and the Defendant revoked the status of the Defendant’s investigator and other Defendants 1 and 2’s leading to the instant collaborative act in accordance with Article 12(2)1(c) of the said Enforcement Decree, and thus, the Defendant’s order for reduction or exemption of the penalty surcharge should be revoked.

B) Even if the Plaintiff is not recognized as the first-class investigator for investigation, the Plaintiff submitted the evidence necessary to prove the instant collaborative act to the Defendant, and the Plaintiff cooperate faithfully until the investigation is completed by the Defendant, and thus, the Plaintiff is deemed as the second-class investigator for investigation under Article 35(1)3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act. Article 35(1)6 of the Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter “Enforcement Decree of the Act”), amended by Presidential Decree No. 23864, Jun. 19, 2012, Article 35(1)6 of the Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter “Enforcement Decree of the Act”), does not apply to the Plaintiff for the following reasons. Accordingly, the order to pay the penalty surcharge of this case

(1) Article 22-2(3) of the Fair Trade Act does not specify the scope of restriction on the status of those who have filed a voluntary report or those who have filed an investigation cooperation and does not delegate it to the subordinate law. As long as the above provision interpreted the standard for restriction on the status of those who have filed a voluntary report or those who have filed an investigation cooperation as delegated to the subordinate law, it goes against the principle of prohibition of comprehensive delegation under the Constitution or the principle of statutory reservation. Therefore, the pertinent provision of the Enforcement Decree restricting the status

(2) Article 2 of the Addenda to the Enforcement Decree of the amended Act provides that “The amended provisions of Article 35(1)6 shall apply to cases where a voluntary declaration or cooperation is made after the enforcement of this Decree, and the provisions of the Enforcement Decree of the instant case shall apply to cases where a voluntary declaration or cooperation is made in the investigation in the first order among the business operators who participated in unfair collaborative acts after June 22, 2012 when the Enforcement Decree of the amended Enforcement Decree was in force. As for the construction of the Republic of Korea, which is the first priority investigator for the investigation of the instant collaborative act, was made on November 29, 201, prior to the enforcement of the amended Enforcement Decree, the amended provisions of the instant Enforcement Decree do not apply to the Plaintiff.

2) The illegality in calculating the relevant sales amount

The relevant sales should be calculated on the basis of an amount equivalent to 34% of the Plaintiff’s share in the consortium, rather than the entire contract amount that the Plaintiff entered into with respect to the instant construction project. Therefore, the instant penalty surcharge payment order made on a different premise is unlawful.

3) Illegality regarding the imposition standard rate

① In the instant bidding conducted through a package deal design and construction, the design sector actually puts an inferior competition in the design sector, and ② the public notice on detailed guidelines, etc. for the imposition of penalty surcharges amended by the Defendant’s Notice No. 2013-2 on June 5, 2013 (hereinafter “Amended penalty surcharges”) provides for detailed guidelines for the assessment of gravity of the offense at the time of calculating the basic penalty surcharges, and evaluates the degree of gravity of the offense according to the calculation scores based on such guidelines. Accordingly, in calculating the points of the instant collaborative act, the instant collaborative act is deemed to fall under the “non-serious” serious violation, and ③ the Defendant jointly determines the successful bidder, and the bid price or bid bid price rate is higher than the instant one, and thus, the instant collaborative act is deemed to be a violation of the principle of proportionality or the principle of equity, and thus, is thus unlawful.

4) Illegal calculation of discretionary adjustment penalty surcharge

The provisions of the penalty surcharge notice, which is established and operated by the defendant, shall be limited to the case where the registration director is involved in the act of this case, and it is unlawful for the defendant to calculate the penalty surcharge by applying the provision of the executive director.

5) Violation of the determination of penalty surcharges

① In light of all the circumstances, the Defendant’s reduction of the penalty surcharge by 30% on the ground that the amount of the penalty surcharge is not in balance with the profit acquired by the Plaintiff from the violation, ② the Defendant’s reduction of the penalty surcharge by reason of the fact that the amount of unjust enrichment is less than the conclusion of a contract when concluding a contract with a joint supply and demand company, ③ the majority of construction companies have reduced the penalty surcharge by 10% or more on the ground of difficulties in construction competitions, and the Defendant did not reduce the penalty surcharge against the Plaintiff even if the Defendant did not reduce the amount of the second adjustment penalty surcharge by 10% on the ground that the Defendant did not have to do so. In determining the amount of the penalty surcharge, the Defendant’s reduction of the second adjustment penalty surcharge by 10

B. Relevant statutes

Attached Table 2 shall be as stated in the relevant statutes.

C. Determination

1) Determination as to the allegation of illegality in recognition of the status of investigator and partner

A) Whether the status of the investigating partner is unlawful

(1) According to the provisions of Article 22-2(1) and (3) of the Fair Trade Act and Article 35(1)1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, five requirements for becoming the first investigation partner are as follows: ① “a person who cooperates in an investigation after the commencement of the investigation by the Defendant”; ② “a person who cooperates in an investigation without obtaining information on an unfair collaborative act or without obtaining sufficient evidence necessary for proving an unfair collaborative act; ③ the first person who independently provides evidence necessary for proving an unfair collaborative act; ④ “a person who cooperates in the investigation in good faith before the completion of the investigation, such as stating all facts related to the unfair collaborative act and submitting relevant materials; ⑤” and “the suspension of the unfair collaborative act.” Thus, in order for the Plaintiff to be recognized as a first investigation partner, all of the requirements must be satisfied.

(2) According to the overall purport of the statements and arguments as to Gap evidence Nos. 2, 4, 5, and Eul evidence Nos. 7 through 12, the plaintiff can be acknowledged as having stated in the collaborative act of this case that, on May 19, 2014, the plaintiff did not make an application for reduction or exemption to the defendant and confirmed status of the first investigating copier by the defendant at the time of the application for reduction or exemption. However, in light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the purport of each statement and argument as to Eul evidence Nos. 7 through 10, it is difficult to find that the plaintiff has cooperateed in the investigation even if the defendant did not obtain information on the unfair collaborative act or failed to obtain sufficient evidence necessary to prove that he was an unfair collaborative act, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

(A) On October 19, 201, the Coul Construction involved in the instant collaborative act submitted data related to tendering, such as a written statement and tender price, to the Defendant, immediately after filing an application for reduction of or exemption from the instant collaborative act. “Necessary evidence” under Article 35(1)2(b) of the Enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act refers to the evidence that can directly or indirectly prove the instant collaborative act, and such evidence includes documents and statements (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du2920, Oct. 23, 2008). The summary or statement of the instant collaborative act submitted to the Defendant around December 29, 201 contains the following contents. Accordingly, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff and the Defendant obtained not only information on the instant collaborative act in which only the Plaintiff participated in the instant collaborative act but also sufficiently secured evidence necessary for proving it.

The price at which Nonparty 7 and the Plaintiff’s person in charge of the Plaintiff’s telephone calls prior to the bid of this case, etc., included in the main text, agree to not compete in line with Dong and to compete only with technical elements. Nonparty 7 and Nonparty 6 agree to determine the bid bid rate at 94.8% and 94.3% of the bid of this case by: Nonparty 5, who was ordered by the above Nonparty 7 around September 27, 2009, was extracted from the Plaintiff’s person in charge of the Plaintiff’s work on or around September 27, 2009, to verify whether the bid price was reflected in accordance with the above amount. In order to verify whether the Plaintiff’s person in charge of the Plaintiff’s work on September 29, 2009, the Plaintiff’s 94.8% and Culul Construction had been selected on or around September 29, 209.

(B) Section IV.3.2.(5) of the Defendant’s penalty surcharge notice enacted upon delegation of the Fair Trade Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, one of the grounds for the increase of discretionary adjustment penalty surcharge, refers to the case where a director or senior executive officer ( regardless of the registration in the register) directly participated in an offense (excluding any prohibited act of an enterprisers’ organization). This is to increase penalty surcharges according to the Defendant’s discretion on the premise that an unfair collaborative act is constituted not only the elements per se for establishing an unfair collaborative act, but also on the premise that an unfair collaborative act is established. Therefore, even if the Plaintiff and the Defendant failed to obtain evidence necessary to prove that the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2 were led to the instant collaborative act, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant failed to obtain sufficient evidence necessary for proving the instant collaborative act, as long as the Defendant submitted a written statement specifying the subject matter, method, contents, etc. of the instant collaborative act as above.

(C) Even if the Defendant revoked ex officio the Defendant’s status of the investigator and co-inheritors construction on the ground that Cululul Construction did not state all the facts regarding the instant collaborative act while applying for reduction or exemption, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant had already secured sufficient evidence to prove the instant collaborative act, as seen above, even if the Defendant revoked ex officio the status of coululul construction.

(3) Therefore, regardless of whether the Defendant’s first-class disposition of confirming the status of the investigating co-contractor for the construction of joint harassment is legitimate, the Plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of the first investigating co-contractor under Article 22-2(1) and (3) of the Fair Trade Act and Article 35(1)1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act. Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit without examining other issues.

B) Whether the non-existence of the status of the investigating partner was unlawful

(1) First, as to whether the enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act is invalid or not, Article 22-2(1) of the Fair Trade Act provides that “any person who voluntarily reports or cooperates in an investigation by means of evidence, etc., may be mitigated or exempted.” Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides that “The scope of persons who are mitigated or exempted pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) of the same Article and the criteria for mitigation or exemption from corrective measures and the scope of provision of information and data pursuant to paragraph (2) of the same Article shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.” Article 35(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that “[i] there are no specific requirements for mitigation or exemption from corrective measures under the provisions of Article 2 of the Fair Trade Act or the scope of reduction or exemption from penalty surcharges pursuant to the provisions of Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act shall be divided into one order and two order, and thus, Article 22-2(1) of the same Act provides that “[i] there are no specific grounds for mitigation or exemption from corrective measures or exemption from the scope of penalty surcharges pursuant to the Act.”

(2) Next, in accordance with Article 2 of the Addenda to the Enforcement Decree of the amended Act, the provision of this case only provides that the application shall be determined based on the initial voluntary reporter or investigator pursuant to Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the amended Enforcement Decree, and Article 2 of the Addenda to the amended Enforcement Decree does not provide that the first voluntary reporter report or cooperation shall apply to the investigation after the enforcement of the amended Enforcement Decree. ② Article 35(1)6 of the amended Enforcement Decree enhances the effectiveness of sanctions on collaborative acts among two enterprisers, and excludes mitigation benefits on the report of the early withdrawal, thereby inducing competition among enterprisers subject to corrective measures or penalty surcharges in principle, and it does not need to limit the scope of application. ③ According to Article 35(3) of the amended Enforcement Decree, the defendant may separate or separate the pertinent case from the application of the amended Enforcement Decree, but it can be seen that the application of the amended Enforcement Decree could not be disclosed at the time of the investigation or investigator’s prior to the application of the amended Enforcement Decree.

(3) As seen earlier, it is reasonable to view that the provision of the Enforcement Decree of the instant case is applicable to the Plaintiff on the ground that the Plaintiff’s application for reduction or exemption was made in the second order after June 22, 2012 when the Enforcement Decree of the amended Enforcement Decree came into effect on May 19, 2014. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion on the different premise is without merit.

2) Determination of illegality in calculating the relevant sales amount

A) Articles 22, 55-3(1), and 55-3(3) of the Fair Trade Act provide that a penalty surcharge of up to 10/100 (up to 2 billion won in the event that no sales have been made) may be imposed on an enterpriser who has conducted an unfair collaborative act within the scope of “Sales determined by the Presidential Decree” multiplied by 10/100, in order to deprive the enterpriser of illegal economic benefits acquired through the unfair collaborative act and to realize the administrative purpose of preventing the unfair collaborative act. In addition, Article 9(1) and (3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act provides that the standards for imposing penalty surcharges may be prescribed by the Enforcement Decree in consideration of the substance and degree of the violation, duration, and frequency of the violation, and the size of profits acquired from the act of violation. Accordingly, Article 9(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act provides that the criteria for imposing penalty surcharges pursuant to the proviso to Article 25(2) of the Fair Trade Act shall not apply to a person who has conducted an unfair collaborative act beyond the scope of the standards for imposing penalty surcharges pursuant to Article 25(3).

B) In addition to the above legal principles, there is room to view that: (a) the penalty surcharge imposed on an unfair collaborative act, including bid collusion, was abused discretion in violation of the principle of proportionality in order to realize the administrative purpose of preventing the unfair collaborative act; (b) the nature of administrative sanctions imposed on the relevant act of violation as administrative sanctions (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Du7456, Oct. 28, 2004); (c) it is difficult to deem that the relevant sales are limited to unjust enrichment arising from bidding collusion; (d) the Plaintiff has a direct or indirect interest in the entire contract amount; and (e) the Plaintiff calculated excessive penalty surcharge in light of the profits acquired without appropriately considering the profits derived from the percentage of shares within the consortium; (e) there is no room to deem that the Plaintiff abused or abused discretion in violation of the principle of proportionality; (e) the Plaintiff’s bid price was awarded at least KRW 43 billion; and (e) the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Defendant’s participation in the bidding was made with the agreement and without any reason to reduce the contract amount.

3) Determination as to the allegation of illegality in determining the imposition standard rate

A) The Defendant has discretion to determine whether to impose a penalty surcharge on a violation of the Fair Trade Act and the amount of a penalty surcharge within a specific scope prescribed by the Fair Trade Act when imposing a penalty surcharge. The degree of gravity of the violation caused by an unfair collaborative act shall be determined by comprehensively taking into account the degree of undermining competition order caused by the violation, the influence and ripple effect on the market, the degree of damage to the relevant consumers and enterprisers, and whether to acquire unjust enrichment (see Supreme Court Decision 2014Du2324, Dec. 11, 2014).

B) The facts acknowledged earlier, the evidence and purport of the Plaintiff’s entire pleading are as follows. ① The instant collaborative act jointly determined price with the Plaintiff who participated in the tendering procedure other than the Plaintiff, and its intent was clearly cancelled. ② The instant collaborative act is merely for the purpose of creating stable profits by avoiding bid competition among the bidders, and thus, appears to have been for the interest of the Plaintiff and CB construction. ③ The instant collective act is a large construction project with approximately 43 billion won and its impact on the finance of the State and local governments is considerably high, ④ the Defendant’s application of the revised detailed standards for imposition of 7% penalty surcharge to the Plaintiff’s enforcement date, based on the revised detailed standards for imposition of 10% prior to the enforcement date of the former Public Notice No. 200, supra. 2). The instant collective act is deemed to have been subject to the amended Public Notice No. 106, supra. 2, the Defendant’s application of the new guidelines for imposition of penalty surcharge to the Plaintiff’s new guidelines for imposition of penalty surcharge by 10% prior to the enforcement date.

4) Determination of illegality in calculating the discretionary adjustment penalty surcharge

A) Article 2 subparag. 5 of the Fair Trade Act provides that "executive" refers to a general partner, auditor, or a person corresponding thereto who conducts business, or a commercial employer, such as a manager, who is capable of conducting overall business of the main office or branch office." Article 55-3 of the Fair Trade Act and Article 61 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that one of the grounds for the increase of discretionary adjustment penalty surcharge, where "the director or senior executive equivalent thereto (excluding any prohibited act by the enterprisers' organization) is directly involved in the act of violation," the penalty surcharge may be increased by up to 10%. Thus, the defendant may increase the penalty surcharge if the executive of the enterpriser's company is directly involved in the act of violation regardless of whether it is registered in the register, and the fact that the non-party 1, an unregistered executive director, was directly involved in the act of this case. Thus, the defendant did not err in the calculation of 10% of the average calculation standard for the plaintiff.

B) As to this, the Plaintiff asserts that the public notice of penalty surcharge states that the registration of the registry was invalid because it was out of the limit delegated by the superior law when stipulating the “in a case where a director or a senior executive officer corresponding to the above or above of a violation was directly involved in the act of violation” as the ground for aggravated penalty surcharge. However, even if the pertinent provisions such as Article 2 subparag. 5, Article 55-3(1) and (3) of the Fair Trade Act and Article 61(1) and (3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act are collected in entirety, the Plaintiff does not limit the “director” as a ground for aggravated penalty surcharge to the “director registered in the registry” in the Fair Trade Act and its Enforcement Decree, so it cannot be said that the public notice of penalty surcharge exceeds the bounds of the superior law, regardless of whether or not the registration was made in the registry. This part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

5) Determination as to the allegation of illegality in imposing penalty surcharges

The facts acknowledged earlier, the following facts revealed by the aforementioned evidence, i.e., ① the collaborative act of this case was conducted with the aim of creating stable profits by avoiding competition among bidders, and the Plaintiff was awarded a successful bid in the bid of this case, and the contract price of which is 43 billion won or more. ② The Defendant reduced 10% of the first adjusted penalty surcharge by the Plaintiff on the ground that the net income for the business year of 2013 is less than the Plaintiff’s net income, and the amount of unjust enrichment is less than the case where the Plaintiff entered into the contract alone as the joint contractor was formed, and the amount of unjust enrichment has to be less than the case where the contract was entered into independently. ③ The evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is difficult to view that the order to pay the penalty surcharge of this case was formed by a binding administrative practice under which the Defendant constituted a joint contractor or to reduce the penalty surcharge for reasons of the difficulty in the construction competition, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this. The Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the lawsuit of this case is unlawful as to the claim for cancellation of the application for reduction or exemption, and the remaining claims of the plaintiff are dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment]

Judges Yellow-Jil (Presiding Judge)

1) Although the company was changed to the company as the Coul Global Coul Global, it was a Coul Construction Co., Ltd. at the time of bidding for the facilities of the Yangyang Water Quality Restoration Center. As such, it is deemed to be “Coul Construction.”

2) Currently, the name of the company was changed to the Korea Land and Housing Corporation, but the Korea Land and Housing Corporation was the Korea Land Corporation at the time of the instant construction project.