Attorney Choi Young-young, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

1. As to the illegality of the declaration price setting aside

In full view of the circumstances stated in its reasoning, the lower court held by the Plaintiffs from Chinese exporters.

The court below rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the rejection of the plaintiffs' import declaration price is illegal on the grounds that the reported price is significantly different from the transaction price of similar goods and that there is a reasonable reason to suspect the accuracy or truth of the reported price when importing each of the goods listed in the [Attachment 1] of the judgment below (hereinafter "the judgment of the court below") (hereinafter "the goods of this case").

Examining the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the grounds for denial of transaction prices under Article 30

2. As to whether the determination of dutiable value is illegal

A. As to the determination of the dutiable value of the instant goods excluding the [Attachment 1] Nos. 1 - 7 of the instant goods

Based on its reasoning, the lower court rejected Plaintiff 1’s assertion that: (a) the Defendant deemed that it was lawful to regard the vegetation harvested from the Chinese china, which appears to be the production site for the remainder of the instant goods, other than i.e., [Attachment 1] No. 1-7] among the instant goods, as similar goods; and (b) determine the dutiable value pursuant to Article 32 of the Customs Act; and (c) consider the import declaration price for E company or Echina as the transaction price of similar goods.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the method of determining dutiable value under

B. With respect to the determination of dutiable value of the goods of this case, Articles 30 through 35 regarding the determination of dutiable value of the imported goods (A) of the relevant legal doctrine (A) provides for the five methods of determination as to the determination of dutiable value of the imported goods, as a matter of principle, Articles 30 through 35 of the Customs Act provides for the determination of the dutiable value based on the "transaction price adjusted by adding up commissions, etc. to the price actually paid or payable by the buyer to the price actually paid or payable by the buyer pursuant to Article 30, and Articles 31 through 35 of the Customs Act shall be applied in sequence if the determination cannot be made by the method under Article 30. Of them, Articles 32(1) of the Customs Act provides that "if the dutiable value cannot be determined by the method under Articles 30 and 31 of the Customs Act, the dutiable value shall be determined by the method under Articles 30 through 34 of the same Act as the transaction price of the similar goods whose dutiable value is recognized as the dutiable value.

On the other hand, Article 35(2) of the Customs Act provides that "if it is impossible to determine the dutiable value by the method under paragraph (1), the dutiable value shall be determined by the method reasonably recognized in light of the substance and practice of transaction, such as the method of applying the price adjusted at the time of international transaction, the price

(B) In light of the language, structure, and purport of the provision on the determination of dutiable value of imported goods, and in particular, Article 32(1) of the Customs Act uses the term "market price" used in Article 30 of the Customs Act as it is, it is reasonable to interpret that only the "market price of similar goods recognized as dutiable value pursuant to Article 30 of the Customs Act" means the "market price of similar goods recognized as dutiable value pursuant to Article 30 of the Customs Act" and that "the tax authority denies the declared dutiable value and determines the dutiable value pursuant to Articles 31 through 35 of the Customs Act are not included therein.

(2) Determination

Pursuant to Article 35, the lower court cannot determine the dutiable value for the articles in the instant case by the methods prescribed in Articles 30 through 34 of the Customs Act, with respect to the [Attachment 1] No. 1-7] among the articles in the instant case.

Then, the lower court held that the Defendant’s determination of the dutiable value based on the Chinese mountainous district price pursuant to Articles 35(1) and 32(1) of the Customs Act is lawful on the following grounds: (a) the dutiable value of the imported goods of the D company, claiming that Plaintiff 1 should be recognized as the transaction price of similar goods, is denied by the tax authority and determined pursuant to Article 35 of the Customs Act; and (b) is not included in the “transaction price of similar goods,” which is recognized as the dutiable value pursuant to Article 32(1) of the Customs Act.

Examining the record in light of the aforementioned provisions and legal principles, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on “transaction price of similar goods” under Article 32(1) of the Customs Act, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal. The Supreme Court Decision 2005Du17188 Decided December 27, 2007 cited in the grounds of appeal is different from the case, and thus, it is inappropriate to invoke the case in this case.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kwon Soon-il

Justices Lee Dong-won

Justices Kim Gin-soo