[2] In a case where a disposition of imposition of money is made in deviation from or abuse of discretionary authority, whether the court may revoke only the part exceeding the reasonable and reasonable part based on the reasonable degree of disposition (negative)

1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

A. The portion of claiming the payment of subsidies by the direct party litigation against the non-decision on the subsidies in the defendant vice-market

(1) In full view of the provisions of Article 16-2(6) of the former Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents (amended by Act No. 13912, Jan. 27, 2016) and Article 15 of the Ordinance on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents (hereinafter “instant Ordinance”), the lower court determined that it is unlawful to claim the payment of subsidies by the method of a party litigation on the part of the dismissal of the application for subsidies by the Defendant Bupyeong-si Market as to the application for subsidies by the committee’s committee’s decision where it is decided to fully or partially reject or pay the amount.

(2) Examining the record in accordance with the relevant legal doctrine, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on party litigation.

B. The part claiming the payment of the subsidy determined by the defendant vice-market

(1) Inasmuch as granting of a subsidy is considerably wide discretion granted to an administrative agency regarding the selection and cancellation of a beneficiary as a beneficial administrative act and the criteria and scope thereof (see Supreme Court Decision 2017Du56193, Aug. 30, 2018). Thus, in cases where an administrative agency established the standards for granting a subsidy within the scope of delegation by higher statutes, barring special circumstances where the standards are objectively unreasonable or unreasonable, the administrative agency’s intent should be respected as far as possible, barring special circumstances, such as exceeding the bounds of language and text in relation to the interpretation and application of such standards, or lacking objective rationality (see Supreme Court Decision 2017Du43319, Jan. 10, 2019).

(2) According to Articles 15 and 15 of the instant Ordinance and the criteria for subsidization of expenses for the use of the Bupyeong City Improvement Project (Notice 2015-25 of the Bupyeong City Notice; hereinafter “instant subsidization criteria”), the subsidies determined by Defendant Seocheon City upon the application by the Promotion Committee shall not be paid to the Promotion Committee applied, but be directly paid to interested parties who have the right to receive loans, service costs, etc. from the Promotion Committee. To this end, the Promotion Committee shall submit a separate application for subsidization along with the “statement of payment” and “written statement of payment” as to how each interested party allocates the subsidies determined within 20 days from the date of receipt of notice of the decision on subsidization from Defendant Seocheon City Mayor, the “written application for subsidization” and “a copy of the bank account to each interested party’s corresponding amount,” and upon the submission of the application, the Defendant Seocheon City shall publicly notify the Promotion Committee’s payment plan on the Internet homepage and Seocheon City newsletter and pay the subsidy to each interested party’s account within 10 days from the date of completion of the announcement.

The provisions on the procedure for the application for payment after notification of the subsidy decision are intended to protect the interested parties of the promotion committee, and it is reasonable to view that the promotion committee is not allowed to request the payment of the subsidy determined against Defendant Busan City without complying with the procedure for the application for payment within the period of 20 days set forth in the instant subsidization criteria.

(3) In the same purport, the lower court determined that the Plaintiff’s claim for this portion was groundless. In so determining, the lower court did not err by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation and application of the instant subsidization

2. As to the ground of appeal by the defendant vice-market

A. In a case where a disposition of imposition of money with discretion on whether to take the disposition and the degree of the disposition are deemed to have been abused or abused by misunderstanding the facts that form the premise of the disposition, the court can only determine whether to deviate or abuse the discretionary authority, but it cannot determine whether to what extent it is appropriate within the scope of the discretionary authority. Thus, the court must revoke the entire decision, and the court cannot only revoke the part exceeding the reasonable part (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du18062, Jun. 23, 2009).

B. The lower court determined that the instant disposition ought to be entirely revoked, on the ground that “the part not recognizing the cost of the residents’ general meeting in 2012” and “the part not recognizing the cost of the residents’ general meeting in 2010 and 2012” were unlawful in calculating the cost of the use, which is the premise of the instant disposition, and that the instant disposition constitutes a case where the discretionary power was exceeded and abused, and that the scope of the payment of subsidies is discretioned in Defendant Deputy City and the court cannot directly determine the amount of the subsidies.

C. Examining the record in accordance with the relevant legal doctrine, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on partial revocation of disposition.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal by the Plaintiff are assessed against the Plaintiff, and the costs of the appeal by the Plaintiff are assessed against the Defendant Deputy Market. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Min You-sook (Presiding Justice)