2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The reasoning for this Court’s explanation concerning this case is as follows: (a) the Act No. 4 and No. 20 of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be respectively deemed to be the Korean Traditional Temples Act; and (b) the reasoning for the judgment of the court of first instance is as stated in the reasoning for the judgment of the court of first instance; and (c) thus, it shall be cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article

2. Parts in height:

○ Article 2-2(c) of the judgment of the court of first instance is dismissed as follows.

1) Article 9 of the Traditional Temples Act provides that the transfer of real estate owned by the relevant temple within the traditional temple preservation area shall be subject to permission by the defendant, the competent minister, along with a letter of approval by the representative, etc. of the organization to which the temple belongs, and a disposal act conducted without such permission is null and void. Thus, even if such disposal act is based on the compulsory auction procedure, it does not change otherwise. The request for such written approval as required documents is not merely an attempt to make the competent minister easily determine whether to apply for a transfer approval by simply specifying the matters applied for permission and securing evidentiary documents, but also a request for approval by the representative, etc. of the organization to which the temple belongs (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 97Da49817, Oct. 22, 199; 97Nu13474, Nov. 26, 199).

In addition, in light of the language and text of the above provision, its main purpose is not to always obtain permission from the defendant in all cases where the ownership of the traditional temple property changes, but it is derived from the public interest purpose of preserving and supporting the traditional temple having historical significance as a heritage of national culture and the cultural heritage belonging to the traditional temple by preventing the sale of the temple property without permission from the chief of the traditional temple. Even if there is a sacrifice by the creditor, it is inevitable for the legislator to select as an important value for the public interest demand for the preservation of the traditional temple than the safety of transaction or the other party's property rights. Therefore, whether to apply for permission from the competent agency for the transfer of the temple property is left to the intention of the traditional temple, and even if it is impossible to dispose of the property within the traditional temple preservation area because there is no other property within the traditional temple preservation area, the transferee of the property from the traditional temple is not a person who takes over the property without permission from the traditional temple, and it is not reasonable to file an application for permission from the competent agency for permission for the transfer of the property with the competent agency 10.

Moreover, in the procedure of compulsory auction, the highest bidder has the right to obtain permission of auction on the date of auction, and cannot be said to have any right against the executory creditor or debtor. Thus, the highest bidder cannot exercise vicariously the application for permission on the transfer of the inspection property against the competent agency by subrogation of the chief of the traditional temple who is the executory debtor (see Supreme Court Decision 93Nu2784 delivered on September 27, 1994).

2) In light of the above legal principles, the fact that the plaintiff applied for permission to transfer the building of this case to the defendant on behalf of the defendant in subrogation of the defendant without attaching A's letter of approval by the representative of a religious organization in violation of the above provision and legal principles, although the highest price in the procedure for compulsory auction is merely the bidder, is not the bidder. Therefore, the defendant's disposition rejecting the above application is legitimate. Accordingly, the plaintiff's assertion on different premise is without merit).

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Min Young-young

Judge Chuncheon