Residential Ulsan

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Article 93(1) of the Public Official Election Act (hereinafter “Public Official Election Act”), on the premise that “in order to exercise an influence on election”, restricting the acts set forth therein is defined as a crime with the purpose of "to exercise an influence on election" as an excessive subjective element other than intentional intent. The purpose of the above provision is not to require active intent or final recognition, but to do so, it is sufficient only with doluence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2008Do10520, Jan. 30, 2009). When determining whether the act such as the distribution and posting of documents and drawings under Article 93(1) of the Public Official Election Act is an ordinary, courtesy, or private act or is an evasion of the law with a purpose to exert an influence on election, the legislative purpose of the above provision is to infringe on the fairness and peace of election even if the act does not reach election campaign, and thus, it should be reasonably determined in light of the motive and method of such act, etc., 2009 and circumstances at the time of the act.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the court below found the defendant guilty of the crime of this case on the ground that the defendant's act of transmitting the text messages of this case is not merely ordinary, courtesy, and private school acts, but also for the purpose of influencing the election, such as the defendant's attempt to obtain favorable results in the election by raising his awareness against the electorates, and there is no error of law such as misconception of facts or misapprehension of legal principles due to violation of the rules of evidence, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Hong-hoon

Justices Kim Nung-hwan

Justices Min Il-young