1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

A. As to the fourth ground for appeal

Each type of business listed in the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Premium Table (Notice No. 2004-64 of the Ministry of Labor, Notice No. 2005-41 of the Ministry of Labor, Notice No. 2006-41 of the Ministry of Labor, and Notice No. 2007-52 of the Ministry of Labor) defines the manufacturing industry as "the manufacturing industry shall be classified as "other than manufacturing activities, such as repair of ships, repair and remodelling of rolling stock, repair and repair of aircraft, manufacture and repair of various machinery and tools, and dismantling of hulls, etc." and the manufacturing industry of machinery and apparatus as "repair of various machinery and apparatus," defined as "business of repairing various machinery and apparatus," and defined as "business of manufacturing, processing or repairing various machinery and parts" (hereinafter referred to as "each of the definitions of this case").

The definitions of this case may be reasonably determined by taking into account the risk of disaster, homogeneity of economic activities and total ratio of total insurance benefits to total wage, main final products, finished goods, services provided, work process and contents, etc. of the applicable business unit, the main purpose of the former Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor No. 1, Jul. 12, 2010) pursuant to the delegation purpose of Article 12 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums, etc. for the Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor, Act No. 8812, Dec. 7, 2005).

Therefore, each of the definitions provisions of this case cannot be deemed to be contrary to the principle of statutory reservation, as it does not have any legal delegation or deviates from the limitation of delegation, and as such, each of the definitions provisions of this case, which classify repair act as manufacturing business, without any reasonable ground, cannot be deemed to be contrary to the constitutional equality principle

B. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 through 3

In determining whether a business falls under any of the industrial accident compensation insurance premium table, it shall be fairly taken into account not only the business objectives and the registered type of business but also the actual business details and the form of work of workers (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Du3729, Jun. 11, 2009, etc.).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning after compiling the adopted evidence, and determined that the service contents and maintenance scope of the plaintiff's each of the of the of the of the of the of the of the of the of this case are mainly the prevention and maintenance work and the measurement work of malfunctions, semiconductors for power use, and the maintenance and repair work of power generation facilities, such as control and measurement equipment, etc. of the of the of this case, and that this is included in the scope of "business repairing machinery or parts" as stated in the example of "business of manufacturing various machinery or parts of the machinery of this case" of the business type table.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just and acceptable. In so doing, it did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal principles on the determination of types of business by the industrial accident compensation premium table.

2. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

A. The extinctive prescription system is a system that ceases to exercise the right for a certain period, i.e., where the exercise of the right continues for a certain period of time, and as such, where a right holder who holds a certain claim claims claims only as to a certain part of the claim, and did not make a claim as to the remaining part of the claim, the interruption of prescription does not take effect as to the remaining part (see Supreme Court Decision 84Nu134, Mar. 24, 1987, etc.).

Therefore, Article 42(1)2 and Article 41 of the former Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Act No. 7706 of Dec. 7, 2005) stipulate the right to collect insurance premiums, etc. as grounds for suspending the extinctive prescription of the right to collect insurance premiums, etc. pursuant to the notification under Article 27 of the same Act, the part of which the prescription is interrupted is limited to the notified part and its amount, and the right to collect insurance premiums, etc. other than the notified part and the right to collect the insurance premiums shall continue without suspending the prescription.

B. The court below held that even if the defendant notified the plaintiff to pay KRW 483,320 on the ground that some differences exist as a result of an investigation into the total amount of wages from January 1, 2005 to May 31, 2005 of the business from February 6, 2007, the above notification is not effective as to the right to collect industrial accident insurance premium in 2005 caused a change in the industrial accident insurance premium rate due to the change in the business type of the business type of the first business, and thus, the right to collect industrial accident insurance premium in 2005 on the ground of the change in the industrial accident insurance premium rate due to the change in the business type of the first business has no effect of interrupting prescription. Thus, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the statute of limitations as to the right to collect industrial accident insurance premium in 205 on the ground of the change in the industrial accident insurance premium rate due to the business type of the first business. < Amended by Act No. 7799, Nov. 1, 2005>

C. Meanwhile, the record reveals that on November 6, 2008, the Defendant notified the Plaintiff of the payment of KRW 33,928,860 as the final premium of KRW 25,697,250 as the final premium of KRW 2005 as the final premium of KRW 25,697,250 as the industrial accident insurance premium of KRW 2005 as the final premium of KRW 6,73,060 as the final premium of the second business in 2005, and KRW 1,498,550 as the final premium of KRW 33,928,860 as the final premium of KRW 33,928,860 as the final premium of KRW 33,928,860 as the final premium of KRW 25,69,250 as to the first business.

Nevertheless, the court below determined that the right to collect the whole amount of the final premium of 33,928,860 won in the year 2005 for the first or third projects has expired by the statute of limitations. In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the scope of extinctive prescription, thereby making a judgment. The defendant's assertion pointing this out has merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant is reversed in the disposition of imposition of KRW 8,231,610 of the final premium in 2005, and this part is sufficient for this court to directly render a judgment. Therefore, it is decided to render a decision in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 437 of the Civil Procedure

According to the above, since the part of imposition of KRW 8,231,610 among the imposition disposition of KRW 33,928,860 of the final premium in 2005 cannot be revoked, among the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the defendant falling under this part of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked, and the plaintiff's appeal corresponding to this part shall be dismissed, and all of the plaintiff's appeal and the defendant's remaining appeals shall be dismissed, and the whole costs of the lawsuit shall be five minutes, and the remainder shall be borne by the plaintiff and the defendant,

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)