beta
(영문) 서울고등법원(춘천) 2019.09.25 2019나50777

면직무효확인

Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is all dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

Reasons

1. The reasoning for the judgment on this part of the judgment of this court is as stated in the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the part that, “six persons who were employed as a youth intern and were converted into a weapons contract position” as “four persons, including the plaintiff, from among the six six persons who were employed as a youth intern and converted into a weapons contract position, and two persons converted into a weapons contract position through separate procedures,” and thus, this part of the judgment is cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. The reasoning of the judgment of the court on this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is the same as that of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, this part is cited pursuant to the main sentence of Article 420 of the

3. Judgment on the claim for confirmation of nullity of dismissal action

A. The starting point of the statute of limitations for a disciplinary action should, in principle, be the basis of the final misconduct committed among the series of continuous and continuous misconducts, even though the statute of limitations has lapsed when an employee committed a series of misconducts for a certain purpose.

(See Supreme Court Decision 85Nu841 Decided January 21, 1986. In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged by the health team, Eul-1 through 18, 28, and 29 respective statements and arguments in light of the above legal principles, it is reasonable to view the Plaintiff’s entry into the Defendant as a youth intern upon the request of the head of the relevant agency, and then convert the Plaintiff into a non-life contract position through the procedure for the conversion of the non-life contract position into a life contract position. Then, it is reasonable to view the Plaintiff’s continuous application for the procedure for the recruitment of the permanent employment position of this case to constitute a series of irregularities committed by the Plaintiff, who is not qualified, to be employed as a regular employee.

Therefore, the starting point of the instant disciplinary action is the time when the Plaintiff was finally employed as a regular employee on May 25, 2016.