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(영문) 대법원 1976. 9. 28. 선고 76도2118 판결

[폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반,폭행][공1976.11.15.(548),9395]

Main Issues

Whether it is sufficient to recognize the authenticity of the statement made by the public prosecutor and the police in the testimony of the witness, etc. only by the statement that "the fact that the police of the complex prosecutor's office has made the true statement about this case and there is no signature in the statement."

Summary of Judgment

When the witness makes a statement in the court as a witness, it is not enough to recognize the authenticity of the statement by the prosecutor's office and the police that the prosecutor's office and the police make a true statement about this case and that there is no signature in the written statement. Therefore, the admissibility of the above written statement as evidence cannot be justified.

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant

Defense Counsel

Attorney (National Assembly Line)

original decision

Busan District Court Decision 76No2522 delivered on June 9, 1976

Text

The appeal on the part of facts No. 1 in the judgment of the court below is dismissed, and the remaining part of facts (fact No. 2, 3, and 4 in the market) is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Busan District Court Panel Division.

Reasons

The gist of the grounds of appeal by the Defendant and the defense counsel is that the original judgment (including the part of the first instance judgment cited in the original trial) is erroneous by any false evidence that does not exist without evidence or believe in violation of the rules of evidence, and even if not, it does not constitute a crime of putting the Defendant at a price lower than the market price;

record, if any;

1. A comparison of the evidence admitted in the original judgment with the fact that the original judgment recognized the fact 3, and compared with the records, the evidence admitted in the original judgment is only the part of the statement corresponding to the same fact among the suspect examination protocol (two times) against the defendant by the prosecutor, and no other material sufficient to support the authenticity of the statement can be found. Thus, this fact cannot be viewed as illegal because it was attributable to the confession of the defendant, which was recognized only by the confession of the defendant.

2. As to the facts other than the original judgment, the original judgment cited each of the suspect's interrogation records and the suspect's interrogation records on the defendant prepared by the prosecutor's prosecutor and the judicial police officer's handling affairs, and the records, the defendant and the defense counsel denied the part contrary to the facts stated in the court at the time of the public trial in the first instance, but only denied the part of the defendant's interrogation records on the defendant's investigation records on the defendant, which was prepared by the judicial police officer's refusal to give them as evidence, and the fact-finding's interrogation records on the defendant cannot be viewed as the evidence of the court's examination records on the defendant, which was prepared by the judicial police officer's refusal to give them as evidence, and there is only the above fact-finding, the most advanced and well-known statement on each of the defendant's interrogation records on the defendant, which were prepared by the defendant's prosecutor's office and the police officer's signature on this case, and it is evident that each of the above evidence is not sufficient to acknowledge the remainder of the prosecutor's examination records.

3. If so, the above illegality with respect to the facts 1 in the original judgment shall not be deemed to have influenced the judgment on the same part, but with respect to the facts 2.3.4 in a concurrent relationship with the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, as shown in the exhibition, it shall be deemed that the recognition of three facts was illegal and such illegality affected the judgment on the facts in the judgment, etc. Therefore, the appeal in this case shall be dismissed pursuant to Articles 390, 39, and 364.4 of the Criminal Procedure Act on the ground that there is no reason for the part concerning the crime 1 in the original judgment, and the part concerning the crime 2.3.4 in the judgment shall be dismissed pursuant to Articles 390, 391, and 397 of the same Act on the ground that there is a reason for the same part concerning the crime 2.3.4 in the judgment, and the case shall be reversed by the court below and remanded to the collegiate division

Justices Hong Man-hee (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-부산지방법원 1976.6.9.선고 76노2522
본문참조조문