beta
(영문) 대법원 2003. 5. 30. 선고 2003도981 판결

[전기용품안전관리법위반][공2003.7.1.(181),1496]

Main Issues

Whether the provisions of Articles 7(1) and 15 subparag. 8 of the Electric Appliances Safety Control Act are unconstitutional because they violate the principle of equality under the Constitution or the principle of freedom of occupation or guarantee of property rights (negative)

Summary of Judgment

The purport of Articles 5, 7(1) and 15 subparag. 8 of the Electric Appliances Safety Control Act (wholly amended by Act No. 6019, Sept. 7, 199) is to promote efficient safety management in preparation for the danger of fire, electric shock, etc. caused by electrical appliances. Thus, it is recognized that the reasonableness is recognized, and as a result, a manufacturer has obtained safety certification directly or through his/her agent from the manufacturing stage, even if the length in which an import-distributor can receive safety certification independently is cut off, it cannot be viewed as a violation of the principle of excessive prohibition by unfairly discriminating against an import-distributor in comparison with the manufacturer, thereby unfairly discriminating against the principle of equality under the Constitution, or by excessively restricting the freedom to choose occupation or the principle to guarantee property rights.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 5, 7(1) and 15 subparag. 8 of the Electrical Appliances Safety Control Act (wholly amended by Act No. 6019, Sept. 7, 199); Articles 11, 15, 23, and 37(2) of the Constitution

Defendant

Defendant 1 and one other

Appellant

Defendants

Defense Counsel

Law Firm Man Law Firm, Attorney Lee Jong-tae

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul District Court Decision 2002No6445 Delivered on January 16, 2003

Text

All appeals are dismissed.

Reasons

Unlike that the former Electrical Appliances Safety Control Act (amended by Act No. 6019, Sept. 7, 199) provides that an importer or seller may obtain type approval for the Category 1 Electric Appliances as well as their structure or use, etc., if they are deemed to have high risk or impediment to the safety of the Category 1 Electric Appliances as prescribed by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, the current Electrical Appliances Safety Control Act, as mentioned above, requires domestic or foreign manufacturers to obtain safety certification from the stage of manufacture with respect to electric appliances that are highly likely to cause risk or impediment to fire, electric shock, etc. to promote efficiency in safety management (the main sentence of Article 5(1)). The purpose of the former Electrical Appliances Safety Control Act is to ensure that the manufacturer or seller is not in violation of the principle of free safety of electrical appliances determined and publicly notified by the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Energy and to ensure the safety of the electrical appliances subject to safety certification, and to ensure that the manufacturer or seller is not in violation of the principle of free safety certification of the electrical appliances subject to safety certification or to receive an excessive import safety certification of such electrical appliances (the same Article 2).

In the same purport, the court below is just in rejecting the defendants' assertion that the provisions of Articles 7 (1) and 15 subparagraph 8 of the current Electric Appliances Safety Control Act violate the principle of equality under the Constitution, the freedom of choice of occupation, and the principle of guarantee of property rights, and therefore, it cannot be said that there were errors in the violation of the Constitution as argued by the defendants.

Furthermore, examining the evidence admitted by the court below in light of the records, even though it is not possible to obtain safety certification from the importer and seller of the secondhand copy machines as shown by the Defendants under the current Electric Appliances Safety Control Act, it cannot be deemed that there is no possibility of expectation of lawful act. Thus, the defendants' assertion on this point cannot be accepted.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yoon Jae-chul (Presiding Justice)