○○○○○○○○○○-dong ○○○○-dong ○○○○-dong ○○○○○○-dong ○○○○○-dong 12,454 square meters, 595 square meters, and 198 square meters of ○○-dong ○○-dong ○○-dong ○○-dong ○○-dong ○○-dong ○○-dong ○○○-dong ○○○-dong ○○-dong ○○-dong ○○○ 55 square meters, and 198 square meters of ○-dong ○○-dong ○-dong ○○ ○○-dong dong ○○-dong 17 September 190, the Plaintiff owned the land by donating it to the Plaintiff and completing the registration of ownership transfer. The Defendant may recognize that there was no dispute between the parties to the disposition of imposition, or that it was based on the descriptions under subparagraph 6-1, 2, and 3.

2. Judgment on the plaintiff's assertion

A. The assertion that such idle land is not a idle land

(1) The plaintiff asserts that the land of this case is designated as a park site after acquisition of the land from the time of considering the non-party 1, who is the former owner, and the use of the land is prohibited or restricted by the law, and it is deemed that it does not constitute idle land for three years from December 31, 1989 to 3 years from December 31, 1989 under the provisions of the law, and that the land excess profit tax does not vary depending on the owner's change. Thus, even in relation to the plaintiff, the land of this case shall not be deemed as falling under idle land for three years from December 31, 1989.

(2) According to Article 8(3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act (amended by Act No. 4561 of Jun. 11, 1993), the prohibition of land use due to the provisions of laws and regulations, loss of a ground building, collapse, and other inevitable causes as determined by the Presidential Decree, such land shall not be deemed idle land, etc. for a period as determined by the Presidential Decree. Article 9(6) of the same Act provides that the above provision shall apply mutatis mutandis to the land owned by a corporation. According to Article 23 subparag. 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Act No. 1365 of May 30, 192), and Article 8(3) of the Addenda of the same Act, Article 23 subparag. 3 of the same Act provides that the land shall not be deemed idle land for three years from December 31, 1989.

(3) However, Article 3(2) of the same Act provides that the determination of idle land, etc. shall be based on the actual status as of the expiration of the taxable period, except as otherwise provided for in this Act, and the same Act aims to recover the land excess profit that the owner gains due to the increase of the land price of idle land, etc. in tax due to various development projects and other social and economic factors, thereby achieving equity in tax burden, stabilizing the land price, ensuring the efficient utilization of the land, and contributing to the sound development of the national economy (Article 1 of the same Act). In light of the foregoing, the determination of which land is subject to the land excess profit tax should be based on the land owner as of the expiration of the taxable period.

According to the above evidence and evidence Nos. 7-1 through 4 and the whole purport of the oral argument, the land of this case was designated as a park site for the creation of ○○ Green Park under the Urban Planning Act on July 1, 1979 among the land acquired and owned by the non-party Y○ on December 30, 1965 or on March 21, 1968, and the plaintiff can find the fact that he acquired the land of this case on September 17, 1990. Thus, the plaintiff is obvious that the land of this case does not fall under Article 8 (3) of the same Act by acquiring the land of this case after it was designated as a park site and its use was prohibited or restricted. Thus, the plaintiff's above assertion is groundless.

B. The assertion that the development charges are imposed

(1) The Plaintiff asserts that since the urban planning project for park creation was implemented on July 18, 1990 and the project has not been completed as of the end of 1990, which was the end of the scheduled taxable period, the land in this case is the land on which the development charges are imposed under the Restitution of Development Gains Act (amended by Act No. 4434 of Dec. 14, 1991) and therefore, the land in this case may not be imposed by Article 5(1)3 of the Land Excess Acquisition Tax Act.

(2) Article 5(1)3 of the Land Excess Gains Tax Act provides that no land excess gains accrued from the land on which the development charges are imposed shall be imposed until the development project is completed. Meanwhile, Article 3(1) of the Restitution of Development Gains Act provides that the State shall collect the development gains reverted to a project operator as the development charges under the conditions as prescribed by this Act; and Article 6(2) of the same Act provides that the State shall collect the development gains reverted to a landowner as the land excess gains under the conditions as prescribed by the Land Excess Gains Tax Act; and Article 6(1) of the same Act provides that a project operator under any subparagraph of Article 5(1) is liable to pay the development charges.

(3) Therefore, according to the whole purport of the argument and statement of evidence No. 7-1 to No. 4, the non-party Jeong Jong-jin, who is the child of Jung-jin, in his own park area, can find the fact that the execution period of the urban planning project was commenced with the permission from the head of ○○ on July 18, 1990 from the date to December 31, 1990 after obtaining the permission from the head of ○○○-si, the owner of the land at the time of the instant case and the owner of other land, and completed the first project on June 30, 1993 and the subsequent project was not completed after receiving the disposition of suspension.

However, Article 6 (1) of the same Act provides that a project operator who is responsible for the payment of development charges refers to a project operator who is a landowner who obtains non-income development gains due to the execution of a development project, barring special circumstances, and a person who simply entrusts a development project or executes a project by being awarded a contract or with the consent to lease or development of land without obtaining the development gains arising from the increase of land value (see Supreme Court Decisions 93Nu19354, Aug. 24, 1993; 92Nu10521, Oct. 8, 1993). The above refining is merely a person who implements a development project with the consent of a landowner on the land in this case, and thus, it cannot be imposed development charges, and therefore, the land in this case cannot be deemed a land on which development charges are imposed, and thus the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

(c) argument on the place of the expiration of the taxable period;

(1) The plaintiff applied the officially announced value of January 1, 1991 when the defendant applied the land price on December 31, 1990, which is the expiration date of the taxable period. The plaintiff asserted that the taxation disposition of this case, which imposes the land excess profit tax by applying the land price on January 1, 1991, is unlawful, inasmuch as the land price on December 31, 1990 was not separately announced.

(2) According to Articles 23(3) and 11(1) and (2) of the Land Excess Gains Tax Act and Article 33 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, the standard market price of individual lots of land calculated by the Act on the Public Notice of Values and Appraisal of Land, etc. (hereinafter “Land Announcement Act”) shall be the amount calculated by deducting the amount under each subparagraph of Article 11(1) of the Land Excess Gains Tax Act again from the amount calculated by deducting the standard market price of individual lots of land on the starting date of the relevant taxable period from the amount calculated by the standard market price of the land price at the expiration date of the taxable period. According to Articles 4 and 10 of the Land Price Public Notice Act and Article 5 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, the Minister of Construction and Transportation shall select the standard land price and assess and publicly notify the current reasonable price on January 1, 1, each year, which is the basic date of the public notice of Land Price Disclosure, and the administrative agency

(3) Article 5 of the Enforcement Decree of the Land Price Disclosure Act provides that the price of the reference land under the provisions of Article 4(1) of the Land Price Disclosure Act shall be January 1 of each year except in extenuating circumstances. Accordingly, the price of the individual land calculated by the relevant administrative agency pursuant to the provisions of Article 10 of the Land Price Disclosure Act shall also be January 1 of each year. However, the standard market price of the individual land under the provisions of Article 10 of the Land Price Disclosure Act, which is the expiration date of the taxable period, shall not be the same as the standard market price of January 1, 19, which is the expiration date of the taxable period of December 31, 191. However, if the standard market price of the individual land under the provisions of Article 11(3) of the Land Price Disclosure Act, Article 34 of the Land Price Disclosure Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance and Economy No. 1852 of March 14, 191. It shall be applied to each piece of land whose base price shall not be applied separately from the standard market price of the individual land price per one month.

D. The assertion that the exemption of the former owner from the liability for the period of possession

(1) The Plaintiff asserts that, inasmuch as Nonparty 1, the former owner of the instant land, was not obligated to pay the land excess profit tax under Article 8(3) of the Land Excess Gains Tax Act, the Plaintiff did not have any obligation to pay the land excess profit tax for the period during which he owned the instant land.

(2) The fact that the instant land was designated as a park site on July 1, 1979 and the construction, etc. was limited among the land owned by Nonparty Y○○, and the Plaintiff acquired it on September 17, 1990 is acknowledged as above. Thus, the instant land does not be deemed as idle land, etc. under Article 8(3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act during the aforementioned ownership period. Thus, the Plaintiff, who succeeded to the instant land, did not have a duty to bear the burden on the land excess profit accrued during the said period.

Therefore, in calculating the land price increase in the period that does not fall under idle land, etc., the Plaintiff shall only bear the tax amount for land excess gains from September 17, 1990 to December 31, 1990, which is the expiration date of the taxable period, from September 17, 1990. In accordance with Article 11(3) of the same Act, Article 34(1) and (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and Article 25(1) and (2) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act, if there is no standard market price of individual lots of land on the expiration date of the period, the difference between the standard market price and each standard market price on the immediately preceding date of the decision shall be calculated by aggregating the standard market price on the immediately preceding date of the immediately preceding decision and the fraction of less than one month shall be rounded off in applying the number of months. Accordingly, in this case, if the tax amount of land excess gains is calculated according to the above standard, it shall be KRW 10,281,416.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the defendant's taxation disposition of this case is unlawful since the above amount exceeds 10,281,416 won, it is revoked, and the remaining claims are dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.