1. Article 194 of the Military Court Act (amended by Act No. 194, May 17, 194); Article 2 of the same Act (amended by Act No. 194) provides that “all property created for the maintenance and management of the Confucian School” shall be the property of the Confucian School; Article 4 of the same Act provides that the establishment of the Confucian School Foundation by Do shall be the property of the Confucian School and real estate among the property of the Confucian School Foundation shall be the basic property of the Confucian School Foundation; Article 13 of the same Act provides that the Confucian School Foundation shall succeed to the right regarding the property of the Confucian School established prior to the enforcement of this Act and subordinate statutes only if it is legitimate. Accordingly, even if the property of the Confucian School is used by the Confucian School, such as the site of the building in the Confucian School, it does not constitute real estate owned by the State or any third person at the

2. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted, the following facts are revealed.

A. The land survey division, which was investigated and prepared by the Joseon General and the Provisional Land Survey Division, is indicated as being the fact that the “State” was the sacrificing-gun ( Address 1 omitted) Sari-gun (Sari-gun), 450 square meters (hereinafter “the land before the instant partition”).

B. Each real estate listed in the attached list of the lower judgment (hereinafter “instant real estate”) is being used as a site, such as the Taeyang Confucian School’s land, which was successively divided from the land before the instant partition, or as a road thereof. As to the land ( Address 2 omitted) among the instant real estate on September 18, 1979, the Defendant completed each registration of preservation of ownership on July 11, 1986 as to the land ( Address 3 and 4 omitted) which is the remaining land among the instant real estate.

3. We examine the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier.

Even if the real estate prior to the instant partition was used as the site for the scambal of the scambal school at the time of the enforcement of the Military Act No. 194, the real estate prior to the instant partition cannot be deemed as the real estate belonging to the Confucian School Foundation pursuant to Article 4 of the said Act, and thus, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed as having acquired ownership pursuant to Article 194 of the Military Act.

Nevertheless, solely on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the real estate before the instant partition was reverted to the Plaintiff, a Confucian School Foundation, subject to Article 194 subparag. 4 of the Military Court Act, and accepted the Plaintiff’s primary claim seeking the implementation of the procedure for ownership transfer registration based on the restoration of the real name.

In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on Article 194 of the Military Administration Act, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

4. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Jae-hyung (Presiding Justice)