2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. On February 2007, the Plaintiff obtained a license for reclamation of public waters by creating a shipbuilding facility site (hereinafter “instant reclaimed site”). The Plaintiff, while performing the reclamation work on the instant reclaimed land on June 2009, suspended the construction work on the following grounds: (a) around February 2007: (b) the reclamation site 】 (c) the city 】 (d) the area of the public waters 】 (e.g., the public waters 】 the area of the public waters 】 96,308 square meters; (b)

B. On October 20, 2009, the Plaintiff entered into a contract with ○○○○ to invest the instant reclaimed land in kind and to issue 1,888,095 common shares per par value to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, on November 13, 2009, the Plaintiff invested the instant reclaimed land in kind to ○○○○○○○○○, and ○○○○○ issued the instant reclaimed land as an investment in kind to ○○○○○ on November 18, 2009 (hereinafter “the instant reclaimed land”). The Plaintiff issued 1,88,095 common shares to the Plaintiff on November 18, 2009.

C. On March 26, 2010, according to the ○○○○○○’s opinion that the instant investment in kind constitutes subject to value-added tax, the Plaintiff filed a revised return on the instant investment in kind with the Defendant (hereinafter “the revised return”), and the amount was KRW 1,012,679,753 by adding value-added tax to KRW 94,047,50,50 and the additional tax. After the said report, the Plaintiff paid the Defendant the total amount of KRW 1,012,679,753, in a situation where ○○○ was not paying the said value-added tax to the Plaintiff on July 21, 2011.

D. On August 22, 2011 after the Plaintiff paid value-added tax, etc. as above, the Plaintiff filed an application for payment order against ○○○○ to the effect that the principal of the claim is KRW 944,047,60,00 (the district court x district court 201j1,13401). On September 8, 2011, the court issued a payment order with the same content as the above purport, and the payment order became final and conclusive on October 5, 2011. However, ○○○ filed a lawsuit against the Plaintiff seeking non-permission of compulsory execution based on the above payment order on December 6, 2013 (the district court x 2013Ga107936), and the court of first instance x 205 (the appellate court x 2015 x 306). The Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed on the ground that the Plaintiff did not have been subject to value-added tax x 30015.5).6.

E. On June 1, 2016 after the judgment became final and conclusive as above, the Plaintiff filed a claim with the Defendant through the tax accounting corporation, an agent, for the refund of value-added tax of KRW 94,047,550, and the additional tax and additional dues paid by the Plaintiff, as they constitute erroneous or erroneous payment (hereinafter “the claim for refund of this case”). As to this, on July 5, 2016, the Defendant sent a reply with the purport that “the Plaintiff cannot be deemed as null and void as a matter of course,” the Plaintiff cannot be deemed as unjust enrichment or erroneous payment of the value-added tax paid by the Plaintiff, and thus rejected the claim for refund of this case (hereinafter “the instant reply”).

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 14, Eul evidence Nos. 1 and 2, Eul evidence Nos. 3-1, 2, Eul evidence Nos. 6 and 7, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Judgment on the defendant's main defense of safety

With respect to the Plaintiff’s lawsuit seeking the revocation of the instant reply as an appeal litigation, the Defendant’s instant lawsuit seeking the revocation of the instant reply is unlawful, since the instant reply is not a disposition subject to an appeal litigation.

Article 51 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Act No. 14382, Dec. 20, 2016; hereinafter referred to as the "former Framework Act on National Taxes") and "amount paid in excess" constitute unjust enrichment received or held by the State without legal cause despite the existence of tax liability from the beginning or the lapse of the tax liability thereafter. The provisions on the determination of national tax refund merely stipulate the procedures for refund of the national tax refund for which the tax payer's right to claim repayment has already become final and conclusive as an internal procedure for handling the national tax refund, and it does not become final and conclusive only by the determination of national tax refund under the above provision. Thus, the determination of the national tax refund or the rejection decision of the request for the determination is not a disposition that specifically and directly affects the existence or scope of the taxpayer's right to claim refund, and thus, it cannot be deemed a disposition that becomes the object of appeal litigation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Du4018, Nov. 26, 2009).

The above facts (this is true) and Eul evidence Nos. 1 and 2 can be acknowledged in light of the overall purport of the arguments. In other words, the plaintiff's agent stated the title of the written request submitted to the defendant when claiming refund of this case as "Submission of a written request for refund of overpaid or erroneously" and stated that "the additional dues and additional dues related to value-added tax paid are applicable to overpaid or erroneously paid amount, so it shall be immediately refunded and the principal opinion will be reached." The plaintiff's agent stated the title of the document attached to the above written request as "the reasons for claiming refund of overpaid or erroneously paid amount" and also stated as "the amount exceeding 1,012,679,750 won" as "the total amount of the value-added tax paid and additional taxes related to overpaid or erroneously paid amount" under Article 51 (1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes and "the amount overpaid or erroneously paid" under Article 51 (1) of the former Framework Act shall be deemed as "the amount overpaid or erroneously paid" and "the amount of value-added tax paid" under Article 1051, 7.5 of the Framework Act.

Therefore, the instant reply cannot be deemed a disposition subject to an appeal litigation pursuant to the legal doctrine as seen earlier, which constitutes a decision to refuse a refund of an application seeking a decision under Article 51 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes. Therefore, the Defendant’s main defense pointing this out is reasonable, and the instant reply, which is not a disposition, is unlawful

3. Judgment on the plaintiff's assertion on the defendant's main defense of safety

In light of the above, the Plaintiff asserts that the Plaintiff’s claim for refund of this case is not a claim for refund under Article 51 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes, but a claim for correction under Article 45-2(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes, and the Defendant’s response to this case also constitutes a disposition that is subject to appeal litigation as a refusal to

However, as seen earlier, the Plaintiff’s claim for refund of this case is a claim for refund under Article 51 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes. In addition to the circumstances described below, the Plaintiff’s claim for refund of this case is interpreted as a request for correction under Article 45-2(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes, and there is no room to regard the Defendant’s reply as a disposition of refusal to make the above correction request. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion

① The Plaintiff asserted that the instant claim for refund under Article 45-2(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes was a claim for correction under Article 45-2(2) after the lapse of a reasonable period of time, as well as the time of the instant claim for cancellation of the instant claim for refund. In other words, the Plaintiff’s claim for refund under Article 51 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes was presented at the end of the period of filing the claim for refund (Article 45-2 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes as to this case’s claim (Evidence 1) but it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s agent’s claim for refund under Article 45-2 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes was presented at the time of filing the claim for correction under Article 5-1 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes (Article 45-2 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes only because the Plaintiff’s claim was presented at the time of filing the instant claim for correction under Article 5-2 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes). Moreover, it is apparent that the Plaintiff’s claim for refund under Article 515-2 of the former Framework Act was valid.

② Next, deeming the Plaintiff’s claim for refund of this case as a disposition of rejection of the Defendant’s request for correction under Article 45-2(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes would distort the Defendant’s intent. In other words, in order to recognize that the Defendant rendered a disposition of rejection of a request for correction under Article 45-2(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes, it should include at least one act performed by the Defendant, which does not meet the requirements under Article 45-2(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes, and thus, the claim does not be accepted. However, the instant reply does not include any such contents. As seen earlier, the Defendant merely stated that “the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have made unjust enrichment as to the return of the revised tax amount because it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff did not constitute erroneous or erroneous payment,” and that “the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have separately stated that the Plaintiff’s request for refund of this case’s tax base was the ground for the determination of the amount of tax erroneously or erroneous payment under Article 45-2(2).

In the response of this case, although the defendant did not make any decision as to whether the plaintiff's case constitutes Article 45-2 (2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes, and it explicitly stated that the review and decision should be conducted separately, it is deemed that the response of this case is a rejection of the request for correction under Article 45-2 (2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes, and it is deemed that the defendant's rejection of the request for correction under Article 45-2 (2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes does not exist and it is not consistent with this rule.

③ Furthermore, it cannot be deemed necessary to interpret the Plaintiff’s claim for refund of this case as a request for correction under Article 45-2(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes. In other words, according to the contents of the Plaintiff’s evidence No. 1, the court of first instance, which rendered a judgment that ○○○○ rendered a lawsuit against the Plaintiff on September 3, 2015, against which the Plaintiff filed a claim for objection against the Plaintiff on the ground that “the value-added tax paid by ○○ may be recovered from the subsequent claim for correction” at the end of the judgment, can be seen as having avoided the fact that the Plaintiff might take measures to remedy the Plaintiff’s claim for correction (see, e.g., subparagraph 1 and subparagraph 8). In addition, the Defendant’s reply made on July 5, 2016, which took place as a problem, emphasized that the Defendant should make a separate review and judgment on the claim for correction under Article 45-2(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes and its review and judgment separately.

In light of the fact that the Plaintiff had been able to become able to remedy the claim for correction before filing the claim for refund of this case on June 1, 2016 through the judgment of the relevant lawsuit, and that the Defendant had the period of filing the claim for correction under Article 45-2(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes (see, e.g., evidence 15 and evidence 4 of the same Act) at the time of receiving the instant reply to the purport that the request for correction should be separately made by the Defendant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005-2(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes) (see, e., Supreme Court Decision 45-2, Apr. 23, 2016); and (g) the time when the Plaintiff received the instant reply (see, e.g., evidence 15 and 4 of the same Act at the latest), it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff was able to receive the refund of money for the reason that the Plaintiff did not have an opportunity to correct the amount.

4. Conclusion

As the lawsuit of this case is unlawful, it shall be dismissed without any need to further examine other arguments. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of first instance is just in this conclusion, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.