2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. From the first BB to February 12, 2010, the Plaintiff (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Plaintiff”) was paid the 18th National Assembly member election, which was held on April 9, 2008, through the Plaintiff’s deposit account for political funds, and from March 28, 2008 to April 9, 2008, the sum of KRW 1.6 billion in total, 1.5 billion in total, 1.5 billion in Kim FF, 1.3 billion in total, 1.21 billion in total, 321 billion in total, 100 million in total, and 10 million in total, 3.25 billion in total, and 2925 billion in total, and 39.25 billion in total, and 29.25 billion in total, reported to the election commission by the National Election Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the instant money”). The Plaintiff was paid to each of the 18th National Assembly members who were reported to the election commission.

B. On July 19, 2010, the Defendant imposed gift tax of KRW 683,775,000 on KRW 1.5 billion received from KimD, KRW 632,684,560, and KRW 1.560,00 on KRW 1.5 billion on KRW 1.5 billion received from bothCC, and KRW 1.1 billion on KRW 14,251,50,50, and KRW 1500,000 on KRW 1.651,50,000 on KRW 1.651,50,000, and KRW 150,000 received from bothCC (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “instant disposition”). < Amended by Act No. 103251, Jan. 1, 2010; Act No. 13071, Jan. 1, 2010; Act No. 13060, Jan. 1, 2017>

C. The Plaintiff appealed and filed an appeal with the Tax Tribunal on November 29, 2010 on August 20, 201, but was dismissed on April 14, 201.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, Gap evidence 2-I, 2, 3, Eul evidence 1, 2, and 3, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The instant disposition is unlawful for the following reasons.

① The instant money was borrowed from KimD, KimF, and YangCC as the Plaintiff requires the 18th National Assembly election funds. Since all of the above money was returned according to the agreement at the time of borrowing, it cannot be deemed that economic benefits were transferred to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the said money does not constitute “donation property” under the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act (amended by Act No. 9916, Jan. 1, 2010; hereinafter “former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act”). Meanwhile, the “political funds, other than those under Article 76(3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, which are stipulated as subject to gift tax” under Article 76(1) of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act, are applicable only to the political funds donated in violation of Article 31 of the Political Fund Act, and thus, it is unlawful to impose the said money on the Plaintiff only when it was returned within 31 months after the donation, and thus, it does not constitute an unlawful imposition of excess money under Article 32 subparag. 1 of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act.

B. Relevant statutes

The entries in the attached Table-related statutes are as follows.

(c) Fact of recognition;

1) The Plaintiff received KRW 3210,000,000 (the instant money) from the 18th National Assembly member, who was carried out on April 9, 2008, in total, KRW 3.21 billion from KimF, KimFD, KimD, and YangCC. The details of the payment are as follows. The Plaintiff received KRW 1.4 billion from the 27th of March 2008, KRW 1.4 billion from his mother KimD on March 28, 2008, KRW 1.11 billion from Kim F, KRW 1.1 billion from the 26th of March, 2008, KRW 30 million from the 2008, KRW 9.10,000 on April 3, 208, and KRW 100,000 from the 17th of April 17, 2008, respectively, and received KRW 1.7 billion from the 2008D in cash.

2) In the 18th National Assembly election conducted on April 9, 2008, KimF and YangCC were elected as the plaintiff's proportional representative candidate. After that, the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office judged that KimF and YangCC contributed to the plaintiff with respect to the recommendation of the plaintiff as the proportional representative candidate for the National Assembly election from the plaintiff, and charged the plaintiff with the violation of the Public Official Election Act and the Political Funds Act (hereinafter referred to as the "SmF, etc.") on May 30, 2008.

3) As a compensation for election expenses received from the National Election Commission on June 5, 2008, the Plaintiff returned 1,421.479,452 won to the twoCC and 1,532,963,292 won to the KimF respectively.

4) On August 14, 2008, KimF et al. was sentenced to imprisonment (including a suspended sentence) with prison labor for violating the Public Official Election Act and the Political Funds Act (including a suspended sentence of imprisonment) by the Seoul Central District Court (2008Gohap560). However, the appellate court (Seoul High Court 2008No2194) declared on November 12, 2008 that the above sentence is all maintained as follows (hereinafter referred to as the "criminal judgment of this case"). Although KimF et al. appealed, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on May 14, 2009 and the above judgment became final and conclusive on the same day.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap's 4, 5, 6 evidence, Gap's 7, and 8 evidence, each of 1 to 6, and the purport of the whole of the legal arguments

D. Determination

1) Determination as to whether the instant money constitutes a loan and the scope of donated property

A) As long as the relevant criminal judgment has become final and conclusive in the administrative litigation, it cannot be recognized that it is difficult to employ a factual judgment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Du10424, Nov. 26, 199). In light of the above legal principles, health class, KimF, etc. was prosecuted as a violation of the Political Funds Act, etc. in relation to the payment of the instant money to the Plaintiff, and the fact that the said judgment became final and conclusive is determined by the criminal judgment of this case as it is not a loan but a free provision or a donation, and as such, it cannot be found that the instant money constitutes a "political fund that is subject to gift tax under Article 76(3) of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act," unless there is any circumstance to deem it difficult to employ a factual judgment of the instant criminal judgment finalized in this case. Thus, it is reasonable to deem that the instant money constitutes a "political fund that is subject to gift tax under Article 76(3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act."

B) In the criminal judgment of this case, the plaintiff argued that the object of gift tax should be not entirely the amount of the money of this case but the amount equivalent to its interest, in light of the fact that the plaintiff received financial opportunity through the KF from the KF, etc., but as seen above, the criminal judgment of this case does not constitute the case where the money of this case is provided or donated to the plaintiff without compensation, but even if the nature of the above money constitutes the loan, it is still violation of the Political Funds Act by providing property benefits such as the "financial opportunity through the loan". The plaintiff's above assertion is not based on the family judgment of the criminal judgment of this case, and it is difficult to recognize it differently, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. Further, the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff is not subject to gift tax under Article 76 (3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, Article 76 (1) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, which only violates Article 31 of the Political Funds Act and Article 36 (2) of the former Political Funds Act.

2) Whether Article 31(4) of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act can be applied to the return of the instant money

A) Determination as to whether Article 31(4) of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act is unconstitutional

Article 31(4) of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act provides that "in cases where the donated property (excluding pre-paid money) is returned within the time limit for report under Article 68 by agreement between the parties concerned, it shall be deemed that no donation existed from the beginning." Article 31(5) of the same Act provides that "in cases where the donee returns the donated property (excluding money) to the donor or re-donates it to the donor within 3 months after the time limit for report under Article 68 expires, gift tax shall not be levied on the returned or re-donate." In full view of the contents and purport of each provision, in cases where the donated property is money, it shall not be excluded from gift tax even if the donee returns donated property within the time limit for report under Article 68 or within 3 months after the time limit for report under Article 31(4) and (5) of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act is returned by the donee, since it cannot be seen that the amount of money cannot be returned within the time limit for report or non-donation of return of donated property is different from the Plaintiff’s claim that it is impossible.

B) Determination on other Plaintiff’s assertion

First, even if the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have unconstitutionality of Article 31(4) and (5) of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act, each of the above provisions shall be excluded in cases where the donation is deemed to be a donation under Article 76(3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, and thus, the pertinent disposition of this case shall also be revoked since the contract of donation is retroactively terminated under the general principle of termination of contract. However, the Plaintiff did not have any reasonable grounds for interpreting the same as the Plaintiff’s assertion.

In addition, the plaintiff asserts that since he received the money of this case from KimF, etc. through the deposit transfer and returned it by the same method, it constitutes transfer and acquisition of deposit claims, it is not included in "money under Article 31 (4) and (5) of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act". However, it is difficult to view that the money of this case which was donated and returned through the transfer transfer is excluded from "money under each of the above provisions" because it is merely an electronic means of giving and receiving money, and the plaintiff, KimF, etc. merely exchanged the money of this case by the transfer of money in the deposit account and did not use the method of changing the name of the account, etc., it cannot be viewed as transfer and acquisition of deposit claims, and in full view of the fact that the money transferred through the deposit transfer does not change the name of the account, it cannot be viewed as a transfer and acquisition of deposit claims, and it is reasonable to view that the money of this case is included in the "money transfer" under each of the above provisions, and therefore, it is not reasonable for the plaintiff

3. Conclusion

Thus, the defendant's disposition of this case is legitimate, and the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit.