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(영문) 대법원 2014. 6. 12. 선고 2012다4138 판결

[손해배상(기)][미간행]

Main Issues

[1] The method of proving falsity in a case where a claim for damages is filed by alleging that defamation was caused by a statement of false facts

[2] Grounds for excluding the illegality of defamation / Standard for determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alleged facts are true

[3] The requirements and criteria for determining defamation by posting Internet posts

[4] Matters to be considered when establishing the limitation between the freedom of expression and the protection of reputation

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act, Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act / [2] Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act, Article 21 of the Constitution / [4] Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act, Article 21 of the Constitution

Reference Cases

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 2005Da58823 Decided January 24, 2008 (Gong2008Sang, 355) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 2010Da60950 Decided March 28, 2013 (Gong2013Sang, 728) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2010Da61793 Decided December 27, 2012 / [3] Supreme Court Decision 2001Da28619 Decided January 14, 2005 (Gong2007Da29379 Decided December 27, 2007) / [4] Supreme Court Decision 2004Da612979 Decided May 27, 2005

Plaintiff-Appellant

Plaintiff (Law Firm Chungcheong, Attorneys Lee Hy-young et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant-Appellee

Defendant (Attorney Hun-Ba et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 2007Na1519 decided December 9, 2011

Text

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

A. In a case where the plaintiff damages another person's reputation by expressing the fact, when the plaintiff claims damages by claiming that the alleged fact is false or false as the cause of the claim, the burden of proof of the falsity exists against the plaintiff. However, in a case where the defendant asserts that the alleged fact is true and solely for the public interest, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to the ground for excluding illegality (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da58823, Jan. 24, 2008).

In determining whether a factual assertion is true, a person who claims that there is no suspicion in the event that it is a fact that is not specified in a period and space, and who is actively asserting that there is no suspicion in the event that it is a fact that it is not embodied in a specific period and space, bears the burden of presenting prima facie evidence to accept the existence of such a fact, and the victim may prove its falsity by impeachmenting the credibility of the materials presented (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da60950, Mar. 28, 2013, etc.).

Meanwhile, in a case where an act detrimental to another person’s reputation was committed and the objective of which is solely for the public interest, if it is proved that the alleged fact is true, as well as where there was a considerable reason to believe it as true even without proof, it shall be deemed that it is not unlawful. Here, whether an actor has a considerable reason to believe it as true should be determined in light of the following: (a) whether the actor has conducted an adequate and adequate investigation to confirm the authenticity of the content thereof by taking into account various circumstances, such as the content of the alleged fact, the certainty and credibility of the evidence or materials believed to be true, the easiness of confirmation of the fact, the degree of damage inflicted by the victim due to the timely statement; and (b) whether the authenticity is supported by objective and reasonable materials or grounds (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da61793, Dec. 27, 2012, etc.).

B. Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court determined that the illegality of the publishing act is excluded, on the grounds that there is insufficient proof of the falsity of the facts indicated in the primary bulletin of this case, and that there is considerable reason to believe that the Defendant was true.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court is justifiable to have determined that the Plaintiff failed to prosecute the credibility of the materials presented by the Defendant, and that the Defendant conducted adequate and sufficient investigation to verify the authenticity of the facts. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the burden of proof and proof as to

2. As to grounds of appeal Nos. 3 and 4

A. In order to establish defamation due to posting on the Internet, a statement of specific facts must be made that may undermine the social assessment of the victim. Whether the posting on the Internet constitutes a tort by destroying the reputation of another person should be determined based on the overall appearance that the posting on the Internet gives to the general public by comprehensively taking into account the objective contents of the posting, the ordinary meaning of the words used, the method of linking the phrases, etc. in relation to the overall purport of the posting, under the premise of the general method of posting on the Internet, and the meaning of the posting on the Internet should be considered together with the relevant expression in the social flow along with the relevant social background (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2001Da28619, Jan. 14, 2005; 2007Da29379, Dec. 27, 2007).

Meanwhile, in setting the limitation between the freedom of expression and the protection of reputation, the criteria for review should be differentiated depending on whether the victim whose reputation is damaged by the expression in question is a public figure or a private figure, and whether the expression concerns a matter of public interest or belongs to a pure private domain. In addition, the restriction on the freedom of expression should be mitigated in the case of expression on a matter of public and social meaning. In addition, political comments or political arguments by a political party are often used to a certain extent in order to obtain support from the people, which may be accepted as an investigative exaggeration. If a political assertion by a political party is not accompanied by a specific statement of fact, it may be accepted as an investigative exaggeration. Although a political assertion by a political party is not accompanied by a specific statement of fact, most of the alleged facts should be treated as a political public figure, and it is common to believe or refuse that the assertion is an objective truth. Thus, such special characteristics should be sufficiently considered when determining illegality related to a political comment or defamation of a political party (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da69291, May 27, 2005).

B. The lower court determined that the illegality of publishing in the second and third posts of this case, which are the contents of the Defendant’s critical position and opinion or assertion, was denied on the grounds as indicated in its reasoning, on the following grounds: (a) there is no specific statement of fact likely to undermine the Plaintiff’s social evaluation; and (b) even if a specific statement of domestic facts exists, the Defendant’s major policy is the politics of a political party that mainly takes the protection of workers’ rights and interests as its major policy, and (c) posted the second and third posts in the process of raising an issue

C. Examining the facts duly established by the court below in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, although the part of the second and third posts in this case, which should be seen as the opinion or comment, such as the failure to investigate or take measures such as investigation and inspection, is considerably included. However, considering the objective contents of the second and third posts in this case as well as the ordinary meaning of the words used in the notices, the overall flow of the posts, etc., it can be deemed that the second and third posts in this case indicate specific facts that may undermine the Plaintiff’s social assessment, such as not only because the Plaintiff pointed out that the Plaintiff was responsible for a certain position, but also that the Plaintiff was unable to properly conduct an investigation by using a position where the Plaintiff was responsible for an investigation or occasional reports.

However, as in the instant case, in a case where the attachment relationship between large enterprises and public officials, and the prosecutor’s investigation of large enterprises are subject to national interest, the public officials’ integrity and fairness in the investigation process should be strictly and thoroughly verified, and thus, the filing of suspicion against it should not be easily obstructed under the name of protecting the reputation of public existence. In full view of various circumstances, including the content and expression method of notices posted by the Defendant, the degree of public interest, and the degree of efforts to confirm facts, it is difficult to deem the Defendant’s act to be beyond the bounds of

Therefore, the court below's determination that there is no specific statement of fact that could undermine the plaintiff's social evaluation in the second and third posts of this case is erroneous. However, the judgment of the court below that the publishing act is dismissed, and the decision of the court below that rejected the plaintiff's claim of this part of this case is just, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the statement of fact and the rejection of illegality in defamation,

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Jo Hee-de (Presiding Justice)