A. Recognizing the fact that e-mail was sent to the victim as shown in the facts charged in this case, misunderstanding of facts and misunderstanding of legal principles (1), but it is merely an expression of the Defendant’s temporary decentralization against the victim who opened a business near the Defendant hospital and expressed the Defendant’s temporary decentralization, and there was no criminal intent of intimidation. Since the victim did not feel any fear of the Defendant’s e-mail at all, it is not established

(2) The Defendant’s intimidation of the victim is a victim’s illegal act threatening to conceal the Defendant’s timber and a minimum lawful act against the Defendant’s act of worship.

B. The lower court’s sentence of unreasonable sentencing (fine 1.5 million won) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. (1) In relation to the assertion of mistake of facts and misapprehension of legal principles, intimidation means that a person gives notice of harm likely to cause fear to a general public. As such, the subjective constituent elements of intimidation do not require the actor's awareness of and citing that the actor informss of harm to such an extent, and the intent or desire to actually realize the harm so notified (see, e-mail, etc., Supreme Court Decisions 74Do2727, Oct. 7, 1975; 90Do2102, May 10, 199, etc.). As duly adopted and examined by the court below, if the victim violated the prior agreement with the Defendant and opened the business at the Defendant's hospital near the Defendant's hospital, the victim's expression "at the risk of provoking act," "I wish to keep the victim's e-mail with the victim's death at the bar of knife," and "I wish to give it back to the hospital," and "I wish to do so."