B. The meaning of "when a person is convicted of a leave of absence due to detention" as a ground for retirement under the rules of employment (=decision of de facto punishment)

C. Whether the provision of “B” violates Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act that demands justifiable grounds, such as the presumption of innocence, dismissal, etc. under the Constitution (negative)

D. In a case where the collective agreement or rules of employment do not stipulate retirement disposition under Paragraph (b) above as a disciplinary action, whether disciplinary proceedings such as granting the opportunity to defend himself/herself against the retirement disposition are necessary (negative)

B. The phrase “when a person is convicted of a leave of absence when the person is indicted for a criminal case” stipulated as a ground for retirement in the rules of employment refers to that when the period of leave prescribed in the rules of employment and the collective agreement expires, that is, when an employee who is treated as a leave of absence for the prosecution of detention has expired, a judgment of conviction, i.e., a judgment of conviction, which is, a judgment of conviction, that is, a judgment of conviction,

C. Interpretation that a disposition of retirement is to be taken when an employee who was taken a leave of absence due to detention was sentenced to the judgment of the court of first instance (the judgment of the court of first instance) for conviction does not mean that the crime established in the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, it does not mean that the crime committed in the judgment of conviction was affirmed, and that the employee cannot provide labor, which is a basic duty under labor contract, for the reason that the period of temporary retirement expires until the judgment of the court of first instance (the judgment of the court of first instance) and the fact that the employee cannot be provided with labor, which is a basic duty under labor contract, even after the long-term detention, is treated as retirement by itself. Thus, the rules of employment as referred to in Paragraph B does not contravene the principle of presumption of innocence under the Constitution, and on the other hand, where the employer terminates a labor contract relationship with the employee by unilateral declaration of intention in accordance with the above rules of employment, the above rules of employment

D. Since a retirement disposition under the above provision of the collective agreement or rules of employment as referred to in Paragraph (b) is not stipulated as one of the disciplinary actions, it is not necessary to undergo disciplinary proceedings such as granting the relevant employee an opportunity to defend himself/herself in taking such disciplinary action.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

When an employer dismisses, temporarily retires, suspends, suspends, transfers, reduces wages, or takes other disciplinary measures against a worker without any justifiable reason, a person eligible to apply for relief to the Labor Relations Commission pursuant to Article 27-3 of the Labor Standards Act is only the “worker concerned” subject to such unfavorable measures as dismissal, etc., and a trade union is not included in the above dismissal. Thus, it is a view that the case of a party member (Supreme Court Decision 92Nu1114 delivered on November 13, 1992) takes place. Therefore, it is not acceptable to argue that the lower court’s decision to this purport erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to Article 27-3(2) of the Labor Standards Act.

2. Determination on the grounds of appeal Nos. 2-1, 2-2, and 3

Article 14 subparag. 4 of the Rules of Employment of the Defendant (hereinafter “Defendant”) provided for as one of the grounds for retirement under Article 14 subparag. 7 of the Defendant’s Intervenor (hereinafter “Defendant”) means that the period of temporary retirement under Article 9(2) of the Rules of Employment and Article 23(2) of the collective agreement expires, i.e., the initial period of temporary retirement under Article 9(2) of the Rules of Employment and Article 23(2) of the collective agreement, i.e., the detention of a person who is unable to provide actual labor until the judgment of the court of first instance is rendered, i.e., a judgment of conviction, i., a judgment of conviction of a person who was laid off due to detention, is sentenced to the first instance judgment of the court of first instance, deeming that the facts established in the judgment of conviction were final and conclusive by the pronouncement of the first instance judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, deeming the employee to be retired to be in violation of Article 17 subparag. 17 of the Labor Standards Act to be deemed to be justifiable and reasonable. 4 of the Labor Standards Act.

3. Determination on the grounds of appeal Nos. 2-4 and 3

The court below held that Article 14 subparagraph 7 of the Rules of Employment is applied in a convenient manner by the intervenor company and is abused in a single room for unfair labor practices, the rules of employment cannot be deemed null and void merely on the ground that it is likely to abuse whether to establish unfair labor practices and remedy disadvantages to workers, depending on the case, and that the intervenor company's retirement disposition against the non-party 1, non-party 2, and non-party 3 pursuant to Article 14 subparagraph 7 of the Rules of Employment cannot be deemed as unfair labor practices. In light of relevant evidence and the records and the provisions of relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, the above determination of the court below's above determination is just and acceptable, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence or by misapprehending the legal principles on unfair labor practices, such as the theory of lawsuit, and therefore there is no ground for guidance

4. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 2-5

Since the collective agreement or rules of employment of the intervenor company does not provide for retirement disposition pursuant to Article 14 subparagraph 7 of the rules of employment as disciplinary action, it is not necessary to undergo disciplinary proceedings such as providing the relevant employee with an opportunity to defend himself/herself (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Nu0480, May 8, 192; Supreme Court Decision 92Nu6082, Nov. 13, 1992; 92Nu6082, Nov. 13, 1992). Therefore, we cannot accept the argument of criticism that there was an error of law by misapprehending legal principles as to this point.

5. Therefore, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff who has lost. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon-young (Presiding Justice)