2. The Commissioner of the Daegu Regional Employment and Labor Office for Permanent Residence;

3. The Commissioner of the Daegu Local Employment and Labor Agency.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

(a) Recognition of training courses and payment of training expenses;

(1) On February 4, 2008, the Plaintiff was recognized as a vocational skills development training course pursuant to Article 24 of the former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers (amended by Act No. 9316, Dec. 31, 2008; hereinafter referred to as the "former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers") for the purpose of training B experts from the head of the Gyeonggi-gu Regional Labor Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "head of the Gyeonggi Labor Agency").

(2) On February 14, 2008, from February 14, 2008 to February 26, 2008, the Plaintiff applied for subsidization of C’s training courses including the instant training courses to the head of Gyeonggi Labor Branch on March 18, 2008, and on March 200, the Defendant paid KRW 14,364,60 to the Plaintiff on March 21, 2008. Of the above training courses, the training costs of this case were KRW 4,93,298 to the Plaintiff’s employees for KRW 145,00,000,000 for 20.20,000,000,000 for 20,0000,000 won for 20,000,000,000,000 won for 20,000,000,000 won for 20,000,000.

A person shall be appointed.

C. Each disposition defendant against the plaintiff of the defendants against the plaintiff was ordered to return the support training funds as shown in the attached Table 1 in accordance with the restriction on payment among the prior disposition No. 4 of the Administrator of the Gyeonggi Labor Branch Office's measure of restricting payment (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the measure of this case").

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 2 to 5, Eul evidence 1 to 4, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiff's assertion is as follows.

A. The disposition of this case premised on the fact that E is included in the person eligible for the application for training costs is merely an administrative error due to the failure to perform the work of F in charge of the first time and did not intend to receive training costs by fraud or other improper means, and thus, the disposition of this case is unlawful.

B. Article 56(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22026, Feb. 8, 2010) (hereinafter “Enforcement Decree of the instant case”) is null and void by exceeding the bounds of delegation under Article 35(1) of the Employment Insurance Act, or excessively infringing the Plaintiff’s property right, thereby violating the Constitution. The scope of a disposition of return of a subsidy based on a restriction on payment is limited to a subsidy granted in a false or other unlawful manner, or its workplace.

D. In imposing sanctions against illegal receipt of subsidies, the Defendants’ act of imposing the instant disposition under the former Employment Insurance Act, which is not the former Act on the Development of Human Resources, is unlawful as it deviates from the scope of discretion or abused discretion.

3. Related statutes;

Attached 2 is as shown in the "related Acts and subordinate statutes".

4. Facts of recognition;

A. The instant training course is a self-training conducted by the Plaintiff-affiliated branch.

B. F was in charge of the affairs related to the establishment of training plans related to the instant training courses and the application for support for training expenses, and F was in charge of the personnel labor team for A’s branch offices under the Plaintiff’s control. From January 14, 2008, F was in charge of the occupational ability development training course, such as the instant training course, since January 14, 2008.

C. E included in the list of trainees of the instant training course has been traveling abroad using annual paid leave from February 15, 2008 to February 26, 2008. At the same time, G, who became a trainee of the instant training course, entered in the attendance book in lieu of E’s signature, as if he/she appeared for 4 days in total on February 21, 2008. [Grounds for Recognition] The fact that there is no dispute, entry in the evidence of subparagraphs A6 through 15, and the purport of the entire pleadings, as a whole, among five days during the training hours. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 20720, Feb. 14, 2008; Presidential Decree No. 20720, Feb. 15, 2008; Presidential Decree No. 20720, Feb. 21, 2008>

5. Determination

A. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion No. 2. A

(1) "False or other unlawful means" as stipulated in Article 35 of the former Employment Insurance Act refers to all unlawful acts committed by a business owner who is not generally entitled to receive, for the purpose of minimizing the eligibility to receive, or being ineligible to receive, new employment promotion incentives (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Du4272, Jun. 11, 2009).

The following circumstances revealed by the aforementioned evidence, i.e., ① the attendance book managed by the Plaintiff was recorded differently from the fact that E did not participate in the instant training course, and ② the subsidies for training costs are confirmed depending on whether the attendance was confirmed.

Since it is necessary to confirm accurate attendance because the training course of this case is paid, ③ The training course of this case was not entrusted to other companies, but conducted by the plaintiff himself, and the worker E did not participate in the training course of this case due to the use of annual paid leave, so it is reasonable to see that the plaintiff as the plaintiff was aware of the fact that he did not attend the training course of this case, and even if he did not know of it, it is reasonable to see that the plaintiff was negligent because he could have sufficiently known the fact that he did not attend the training course of this case. In light of the above, it is reasonable to see that the plaintiff was negligent in paying training fees for E which the plaintiff did not participate in the training course of this case. Thus, the plaintiff

B. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion No. 2.B.

(1) Whether the parent law is out of the scope of delegation

Article 35 (1) of the former Employment Insurance Act provides that the Minister of Labor may restrict support to a person who has received or intends to receive support by fraud or other improper means, as prescribed by the Presidential Decree, and may order him/her to return the support already provided. In light of the purpose and purport of workplace skill development projects and the content thereof, it is reasonable to deem that the Presidential Decree is delegated to the Minister of Labor as to whether the Minister of Labor must issue a restriction on support or an order to return the support, and therefore, the provision of the Enforcement Decree of the instant case does not exceed the scope of delegation under Article 56 of the former Employment Insurance Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Du6105, Oct. 27, 2006);

(2) Whether it violates the principle of excessive prohibition

The enforcement decree of this case does not grant any kind of incentives, etc. to a person who has received or intended to receive incentives, etc. by fraud or other improper means, regardless of whether they are related to false or other improper means, and if they have been paid by mistake, it is reasonable to deem that the provision of this case is a provision that has been prepared to achieve the purpose of sanctions against unjust recipients of incentives, etc., by ordering the return thereof if they were paid by mistake, and to achieve the purpose of preventing unjust payments of future incentives, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Du6476, Aug. 20, 2009).

As above, the enforcement decree of this case is just and its purpose was limited to one year, not a long-term period of restriction on payment, in a way to achieve its purpose, and thus, the infringement of property rights was limited to the minimum limit. The necessity to strictly control and manage the payment of subsidies for the purpose of the establishment of employment insurance finance and the efficient and transparent operation of the support system is greater than the private interest infringed upon by the restriction on payment of subsidies. Thus, the balance of legal interests is also satisfied. If the fact that the payment of subsidies was received through false or other unlawful means was discovered, the subsidy was not paid for one year during the restriction period of payment if it was found that the fact was discovered later, and the restriction on the scope of return of the subsidy was not a whole of the subsidy paid for one year during the restriction period of payment restriction period, but a more favorable treatment is found as a result of the occurrence of the fact that it does not comply with the principle of excessive prohibition, it cannot be deemed that the enforcement decree of this case violates the principle of excessive prohibition.

Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

C. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion No. 2. C

Article 56(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act provides that if a person received or intended to receive a subsidy, etc. by fraud or other improper means, without paying all the subsidy, etc. within one year from the date of receipt or application for payment, the person ordered the return of the subsidy, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Du6476, Aug. 20, 2009). Thus, the “grant, etc. granted during the period of restriction on payment” subject to return under the above provision is limited to the subsidy, etc. paid in a false or other unlawful manner, or is limited to the place of business paid in a fraudulent or other unlawful manner. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

D. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion No. 2. D

(1) Whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion under the social norms shall be determined by comparing and balancing the degree of infringement on public interest and the disadvantages suffered by an individual due to such disposition, by objectively examining the content of the offense, which is the reason for the disposition, the public interest to be achieved by the relevant disposition, and all the relevant circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Du6946, Sept. 20, 200

Article 35 (1) of the former Employment Insurance Act provides that the Minister of Labor may order a person who has received or intends to receive support for employment security and vocational skills development activities by fraud or other improper means to restrict the support or return the support already provided, as prescribed by Presidential Decree. Article 35 (2) of the same Act provides that where the Minister of Labor orders the return pursuant to paragraph (1) of the same Article, he/she may additionally collect an amount not exceeding the amount paid by fraud or other improper means according to the standards prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor. The proviso provides that Article 16 (5) 1 of the same Act and Article 25 (4) 1 of the same Act (the provision where the State or a local government entrusts workplace skill development training) shall apply mutatis mutandis to a person who conducts workplace skill development training under subparagraph 1 of Article 2 of the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills.

Meanwhile, according to Article 25 (4) of the former Workers' Vocational Skills Development Act, the Minister of Labor may order a person whose recognition has been revoked pursuant to paragraph (1) or a business owner, worker, business owner, business owner's organization, etc., or workplace skill development organization whose education, support, or loan has been restricted pursuant to paragraph (3) to return all or part of the amount already provided or loaned. In such cases, the amount provided for in each subparagraph of the same paragraph may be additionally collected as to the amount already provided by fraud or other improper means among the amount already provided in accordance with the standards prescribed

(2) Comprehensively taking account of the contents of the above provisions and the relevant provisions of the former Employment Insurance Act, where a business owner receives training costs by false or other unlawful means in conducting workplace skill development training after obtaining recognition from the Minister of Labor pursuant to the former Act on the Development of Vocational Skills, along with various sanctions prescribed in Article 25 of the former Act on the Development of Skills (an order for cancellation of recognition, restriction on recognition, restriction on support or loan, order for return of illegally received amount, and return of additionally collected amount), pursuant to Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act and Article 56(1) and (2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act

Article 25(4)1 of the former Employment Insurance Act provides that a person who has received or intends to receive training expenses by fraud or other improper means shall not be obliged to pay the remaining training expenses, and shall not be paid subsidies, etc. for one year from the date he/she has received or applied for payment of training expenses. However, if an additional amount is collected with respect to an order to refund training expenses paid by fraud or other improper means pursuant to Article 35(2) of the former Employment Insurance Act, it is reasonable to deem that the scope of such amount shall be determined pursuant to Article 25(4)1 of the former Workers’ Vocational Skills Development Act. The above provision differs from the subject and contents of the regulation, and there is no ground to deem that the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers is preferentially applied to the Employment Insurance Act as a special law of the Employment Insurance Act, and it is difficult to deem that the Defendants violated discretionary power on the ground that they were

6. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Civil Service Bureau

Judges Kim Yong-nam

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.