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(영문) 수원지방법원 2011. 08. 10. 선고 2011구합2195 판결

토지는 양도일 당시 농지라 할 수 없어 비사업용 토지에 해당함[국승]

Case Number of the previous trial

early 2010 Heavy3612 ( December 30, 2010)

Title

Land shall not be considered farmland at the time of the transfer date and shall constitute land for non-business use.

Summary

Before the exchange contract is concluded, neighborhood living facilities were already constructed on the land, and so long as the land category is changed to the site and road, the disposition rejecting the plaintiff's request for correction on the ground that the provisions of special deduction for long-term possession do not apply because the land cannot be deemed farmland at the time

Cases

2011Guhap2195 Revocation of Disposition of Imposing capital gains tax

Plaintiff

LAA

Defendant

○ Head of tax office

Conclusion of Pleadings

July 20, 201

Imposition of Judgment

August 10, 201

Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim

The defendant's refusal to correct the capital gains tax against the plaintiff on June 15, 2010 shall be revoked.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. On December 8, 2009, the Plaintiff reported and paid KRW 30,443,760 of the transfer income tax on the instant land to the Defendant on December 31, 2010, instead of applying the special long-term holding deduction provision of Article 95 (2) of the Income Tax Act (amended by Act No. 9897, Dec. 31, 2009; hereinafter the same) to thisA, on December 8, 2009, the Plaintiff completed the registration of transfer of ownership for reasons of the exchange on December 1, 2009 with respect to the land of this case as to 0,443,760 of the same Ri (hereinafter referred to as “instant land”).

B. On April 15, 2010, the Plaintiff asserted that the provision on special deduction for long-term holding prescribed in Article 168-14(3)2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act should be applied as the Plaintiff owned the instant land to the Defendant for at least 20 years prior to December 31, 2006, and subsequently transferred it to the Defendant.

C. Accordingly, on June 15, 2010, in order for the Plaintiff to be subject to Article 168-14(3)2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, the Defendant rendered a disposition rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim for correction on the ground that the land in this case is classified into a site and a road before the transfer date, and the land category is changed to a site and a road, and that the provision on special deduction for long-term holding is not applicable to the land for non-business (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

D. On November 9, 2010, the Plaintiff appealed to the Tax Tribunal, but the Tax Tribunal dismissed the request on December 30, 2010.

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 1, 4, Eul evidence 1 and 3 (including provisional number; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

(1) Article 168-14 (3) 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act only provides that "land transferred until December 31, 2009" shall be "farmland as of the date of transfer" and Article 27 (2) 2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act does not provide that "it shall be farmland as of the date of transfer" as the requirement, but in applying Article 168-14 (3) 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, requesting the date of transfer to be farmland as of the date of transfer is an extended interpretation of the law without

(2) Although the transfer registration of ownership due to the exchange of the instant land was made on October 20, 209 on and after October 20, 2009, the land exchange contract of this case was made on and before October 20, 2009, and the person who changed the form and quality of the instant land was also a party to the exchange contract, the instant land at the time of transfer shall be deemed farmland at the time of transfer. Moreover, even if the report on the change of land category was not made solely on the ground that the report on the change of land category was not made, the disposition of this case rejecting the Plaintiff’s request for correction is unlawful on the ground that the instant land was not farmland at the time of the transfer date.

(3) Since the instant land is subject to separate aggregate of property tax pursuant to Article 182(1)2 of the former Local Tax Act (wholly amended by Act No. 10221, Mar. 31, 2010; hereinafter the same), the instant land is illegal for the Defendant’s disposition rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim for correction on the ground that Article 104-3(1)4(b) of the Income Tax Act does not apply to the special deduction for long-term holding since it is not land for non-business use under Article 104-

B. Relevant statutes

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Determination

(1) The assertion that it goes against the principle of no taxation without law

Article 104-3 (1) and (2) of the Income Tax Act stipulates that farmland, the owner of which does not reside in the location of farmland for a certain period or has not cultivated by himself shall be deemed land for non-business use, but in cases falling under land for non-business use due to the prohibition of use due to the provisions of law after the acquisition of land or other inevitable reasons prescribed by the Presidential Decree, it may not be deemed land for non-business use, and the exception to land for non-business use shall be delegated to the Presidential Decree, and Article 168-14 (3) 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act delegated by him shall not be deemed land for non-business use by December 31, 2006, which is owned for 20 years or more prior to December 31, 2006.

The purpose of the above provisions is to prevent external farmland speculation, protect and foster farmland, and revitalize agriculture and rural communities based on Article 121(1) of the Constitution, which declares the principle of light freedom as the State's duty with respect to farmland. If the land to be transferred at the time of transfer does not require that it is farmland, it may lead to an reckless development of farmland, and if the land to be transferred at the time of transfer is not a requirement for farmland, it may be caused by the reckless development of farmland, and the Special Act on Taxation and the Enforcement Rule of the same Act stipulate the reduction and exemption of capital gains tax for self-owned farmland and the reduction and exemption of capital gains tax for farmland for not less than eight years, which are stipulated in Article 168-14(3)2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, and it is reasonable to interpret that the land transferred until December 31, 2009 should be farmland, forest, and stock farm site even at the time of transfer, and such interpretation does not violate the principle of no taxation without law due to extended interpretation. Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

(2) The assertion that the instant land was farmland at the time of transfer

(A) Facts of recognition

(i) Division of land ownership and change of land category;

A) The Plaintiff completed the registration of ownership transfer on October 4, 1983 with respect to 1,535 square meters prior to 000 square meters in △△ Ri, and thisA owned 837 square meters prior to 000 square meters in the same Ri.

B) On December 10, 2008, the 1,535 square meters prior to 000 square meters in △△-ri was divided into 1,014 square meters prior to 000 △△-ri, and 199 square meters prior to 000 ri-ri, 232 square meters prior to 000 ri-ri, and the 232 square meters prior to 000 ri-ri was divided into 7 square meters prior to 225 lit-ri on August 17, 2009. The 1,014 square meters prior to 00 ri-ri-ri was changed from the previous site on March 16, 2009 to the 1,000 ri-ri-ri-ri, and the 7 square meters prior to 000 o-ri-ri-ri, such as 00 ri-ri-ri-ri, 000 m20.

C) The land category of 837 square meters prior to 000 square meters in △△-ri was divided into 687 square meters prior to 000 △△-ri on December 10, 2008, and 17 square meters prior to 000 ri-ri on October 21, 2009, and the land category of 00 square meters was changed to a site.

2) The Plaintiff’s new building construction process

A) On February 20, 2006, the Plaintiff obtained permission for the development of a Class 1 neighborhood living facility (retail stores) with a building area of 325 square meters (317 square meters in a site area, 8 square meters in a road area) from the △△ City on February 20, 2006 from the △△△△ City for the creation of a site of 198 square meters in a building area. The Plaintiff obtained permission for the development of 11 square meters in a land among land of 0000

B) After that, on July 16, 2008, the Plaintiff obtained permission to engage in development activities for the creation of a Class 1 neighborhood living facility (retail stores) of 428 square meters in building area as to the aggregate of 133 square meters in 000 square meters in 1,300 square meters in △△-ri land, and 1,137 square meters in 000 square meters in 1,137 square meters in 2,573 square meters in 2,573 square meters in 1,57 in 200 land in △△-ri.

C) On November 6, 2008, the Plaintiff constructed Class 1 neighborhood living facilities of the size of 2,324 square meters in a site area and Class 1 neighborhood living facilities of the size of 433.8 square meters in a building area of 471.6 square meters from the △△ City on November 6, 2008, and completed registration of the preservation of ownership on the building on February 24, 2009.

3) The AA’s new construction process

A) On November 28, 2005, thisA filed an application for consultation on permission to divert farmland, and around that time, thisA constructed Class 1 neighborhood living facilities of the first floor size with permission to divert farmland for the creation of a site for Class 1 neighborhood living facilities (retail stores) with respect to land 000,000 square meters in △△-ri, and 936 square meters in 00, and completed registration of preservation of ownership on September 7, 2009.

B) After doing so, this AA obtained from the △△ Mayor on October 20, 209 the approval from the head of △△△△△ to change the use of land for which the farmland was converted into the site of Class II neighborhood living facilities (general restaurants and offices) in the site of a site area of 912 square meters, road area of 24 square meters, and for the purpose of 936 square meters in total of 00,00,000,000 square meters.

(iv) exchange contracts and ownership transfer registration;

A) As of December 1, 2009 between the Plaintiff and thisA, an exchange contract was prepared between the Plaintiff and the instant land owned by the Plaintiff and △△△△, a ownership of thisA, to exchange approximately 133 square meters (hereinafter “instant exchange contract”).

B) The Plaintiff, as referred to in paragraph (a) of Article 1, completed the registration of transfer of ownership on the instant land with respect to this case. On December 8, 2009, the Plaintiff completed the registration of transfer of ownership on the ground of exchange on December 1, 2009 with respect to the Defendant of △△ 00 large scale 133 square meters.

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap 2 to 12 evidence, Eul 2 and 3 evidence, and the purport of the body before oral argument

(B) Judgment on the plaintiff's above assertion

According to the above facts, thisA filed an application for farmland conversion consultation on November 28, 2005 with respect to the part of the land of this case among the land owned by △△△ 000, which was transferred by △△△, prior to the division under the exchange contract of this case. The Plaintiff also received development permission on February 20, 2006, but it is recognized that the development permission was granted on December 10, 2000, but the land category of △△ 232 square meters was divided from △△ 00,000, and was divided into the land of this case on August 17, 2009, and it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s land category was divided into the land of this case on December 10, 200, and the land category was divided from △△△ 00,000 and the land of this case was divided into the land of this case on December 10, 200, and it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff and △ △ 2000, as the ownership transfer permit was divided.

Therefore, as seen earlier, as long as the land category was changed to a building site and a road on the ground of the instant land before the execution of the instant exchange contract, as seen earlier, this would not be deemed farmland at the time of the transfer date, and Article 168-14(3)2 of the Income Tax Act would not apply to the instant land. Moreover, even if the land category was changed with the permission to divert farmland of the instant land by EA, other than the Plaintiff, even if the land category was changed with the permission to divert farmland of the instant land, it is merely that the Plaintiff, before the instant exchange contract was concluded, permits EA to actually use the land, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the instant land was farmland at the time of transfer. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’

(3) Claim that land is not a non-business subject to separate aggregate of property tax

According to Articles 95 (2) and 104 (1) 2-7 and 104-3 (1) 4 (b) of the Income Tax Act, if a person who owns land other than farmland, forest land and stock farm land has become subject to separate aggregate of property tax or separate taxation pursuant to Article 182 (1) 2-3 of the former Local Tax Act during the period of possession, he may be excluded from non-business land and obtain special deduction for long-term holding. Thus, even if the land of this case is indicated in the detailed statement of regular taxation in 2009 as subject to separate aggregate of property tax, the land of this case was changed from the previous land to the land and road, and since the land of this case was transferred on December 8, 2009, the land of this case is only subject to separate aggregate of property tax, and there is no room for the plaintiff's assertion that Article 182 (1) 4 (b) of the former Local Tax Act or Article 182 (1) 4 (b) of the Local Tax Act other than the said Act.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.