[대여금][미간행]
Hong-gun (Attorney Yang Sung-gun, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Hong U.S. Co., Ltd. (Attorney Han-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
November 17, 2010
Daejeon District Court Decision 2009Gahap1761 Decided April 16, 2010
1. Revocation of a judgment of the first instance;
2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 1.5 billion won with 20% interest per annum from the day following the day of service of a copy of the complaint of this case to the day of complete payment.
The same shall apply to the order.
1. Basic facts
A. Defendant’s application for subsidies
On November 13, 1997, the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to provide subsidies of KRW 1,560,000,000 on the condition that the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff were paid out only the principal after five years since the short-term loan repayment, etc. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 18173, Dec. 8, 2003>
B. Notification of the terms and conditions of the Plaintiff’s subsidy grant and submission of the Defendant’s commitment
1) On December 29, 2003, the Plaintiff, following a resolution by the Hongsung-gun Council on December 11, 2003, paid KRW 1,500,000 of the subsidies to the Defendant for the purpose of supporting the management stability of the livestock product comprehensive processing site, and notified the Defendant of the terms of granting the subsidies that “the principal shall be returned in a lump sum by December 31, 2008, the fifth anniversary of the date of subsidization” (hereinafter “instant terms of granting”).
2) On December 30, 2003, the Defendant submitted to the Plaintiff a letter of commitment (Evidence 6) stating that “I will make every effort to stabilize the management with the Defendant’s business stabilization fund by receiving KRW 1,500,000,000 from the Plaintiff, and will make every effort to grant subsidies to KRW 1,50,000,000,000, which is thoroughly transferred and accepted at the time when the Defendant’s management subject is changed, as specified in the terms of granting subsidies, as stated in the terms of granting subsidies (hereinafter “instant undertaking”).
C. Payment of the subsidy of this case
On December 31, 2003, the Plaintiff granted the Defendant subsidies of KRW 1,50,00,000 in total, including KRW 970,000,000 on March 12, 2004 and KRW 530,000,000 on March 12, 204.
[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, Gap evidence 2, and 3 evidence 1, 2, Gap evidence 4 through 7, Gap evidence 16-1 through 4, Eul evidence 1, and the purport of the whole pleadings
2. The assertion and judgment
A. The plaintiff's assertion
1) On December 8, 2003, the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to provide the instant subsidy on condition that the principal shall be repaid five years after filing an application for the payment of the instant subsidy, and accordingly, the Plaintiff provided the instant subsidy to the Defendant via a resolution of the Gun Council after receiving the instant undertaking from the Defendant. However, the Defendant delayed the return of the instant subsidy even after the lapse of December 31, 2008, which is the date of the repayment of the subsidy under the instant undertaking. The Defendant is obliged to pay the instant subsidy and the damages for delay to the Plaintiff pursuant to the instant undertaking.
2) According to the Ordinance on the Management of Subsidies of Hongsung-gun (amended (amended (amended by Ordinance No. 1409, Jul. 11, 1997; hereinafter "the "Ordinance on the Management of Subsidies") the term "requirements deemed necessary to achieve the purpose of grant" may be attached to the decision on the grant of the subsidy. In determining the grant of the subsidy of this case, the terms of the grant of this case that the plaintiff only pays to the defendant five years after the decision on the grant of the subsidy of this case fall under the terms of "the conditions deemed necessary to achieve the purpose of grant" and accordingly, the terms of the grant of this case that the plaintiff would make the defendant contribute to the normalization of the defendant's management by operating the subsidy at a interest rate for five years, and accordingly, the promise of this case was made.
3) The Defendant, despite the absence of the intent to repay the instant subsidy granted from the original Plaintiff in accordance with the instant undertaking, did not induce the Plaintiff to receive the subsidy, and violated the terms and conditions of the subsidy to repay the principal of the subsidy more than five years, and there is no possibility of success in the subsidized program. The Plaintiff may order the Defendant to return the entire subsidy of this case pursuant to Article 17 of the Subsidy Management Ordinance, and the Defendant is obliged to pay the Plaintiff the instant subsidy and its delay damages.
4) The Defendant’s refusal to repay the principal of the instant subsidy is in violation of the principle of good faith or the principle of good faith, inasmuch as the instant subsidy was granted under the terms and conditions of the instant subsidy that the Defendant would reimburse the principal of the instant subsidy more than five years after the need for the Defendant’s subsidies for business normalization, on the ground that the said terms and conditions are contrary to the basic nature of the subsidy and undermine the essential effect of the administrative disposition.
B. Determination
1) Whether the terms and conditions of delivery of the instant case and the undertaking are invalid
A) Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Act on the Budgeting and Management of Subsidies provides that “The term “subsidies” means subsidies, charges, and other benefits provided by the State for the purpose of creating them or providing financial assistance to the affairs or projects conducted by any person other than the State, as determined by the Presidential Decree.” The term “subsidies” refers to money given without just counter-payment.
In addition, Article 14 (1) of the Local Finance Act (Act No. 6400 of Jan. 29, 2001) provides that "No local government shall make any contribution, grant any subsidy or make any disbursement of public funds to any person or any organization that is not a public institution, except in the following cases," and Article 14 (1) 4 of the Local Finance Act provides that "Where it is deemed necessary for a project recommended by a local government" shall be "
B) Meanwhile, the Plaintiff’s grant of the instant subsidy to the Defendant is a so-called beneficial administrative disposition with the effect of granting rights or interests to the other party as stipulated in the Local Finance Act, and it is subject to the discretion of an administrative agency. In the case of beneficial administrative disposition, even if there are no special grounds in the laws and regulations, the burden may be imposed as an associate officer (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Du12837, Mar. 25, 2004). Such burden may be imposed unilaterally by an administrative agency while taking an administrative disposition, but it may be added by setting the contents of the burden upon consultation with the other party in the form of an agreement prior to adding the burden (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da56262, Feb. 12, 2009). It is reasonable to deem the instant promise to be an agreement on the grant of subsidy to the Defendant on the premise that the Plaintiff performed the obligation of the Defendant on the premise that the Defendant performed it for business normalization of the Defendant.
C) However, as seen earlier, in the case of the beneficial administrative disposition, even though there is no legal basis, additional clauses may be attached thereto. However, the contents of such additional clauses shall be lawful and implementable, and shall be in compliance with the principle of proportionality and the principle of equality and to the extent that it does not harm the essential effect of the administrative disposition (see Supreme Court Decision 95Nu1762 delivered on April 26, 196).
In light of Article 18(2) of the Act on the Budgeting and Management of Subsidies, which provides that “The head of a central government agency shall return the principal in lump sum by December 31, 2008, the five years from the date of the grant of the subsidy,” which is a condition for the grant of the subsidy, shall add a duty to return the subsidy already granted to the State to the extent that it does not violate the purpose of the grant of the subsidy if substantial profits accrue to the subsidized operator at the time of the completion of the subsidy program.” In light of Article 18(2) of the Act on the Budgeting and Management of Subsidies, which provides that “The head of a central government agency may attach a condition that shall return all or part of the subsidy already granted to the State to the extent that the subsidy program is not contrary to the purpose of the grant of the subsidy, regardless of the occurrence of future profits, and thus, it is contrary to the purport of the above general provision as well as to the purport of the said subsidy which is the money granted without
Therefore, the delivery terms of this case are deemed to have such gross errors, and such significant defects are objectively clear in the content itself. Thus, the delivery terms of this case are null and void merely because they unfairly attached the delivery terms of this case to the plaintiff.
As to this, Article 17 of the Subsidy Management Ordinance provides that the Plaintiff may order the return of all the subsidies already granted if there is a certain reason, such as the case where the recipient of the subsidy violates the conditions of the subsidy. The Defendant voluntarily expressed his intent to repay the principal of the subsidy when requesting the subsidy of this case, and the Plaintiff interpreted that the repayment of the principal of the subsidy of this case may be made under the conditions of the subsidy of this case. Thus, even if there is a defect in the conditions of the subsidy of this case, such defect shall not be deemed as a grave and obvious defect, and thus, it shall
Article 17 of the Subsidy Management Ordinance (Sanctions against a person who has received a subsidy) provides that "the head of a Gun may suspend the grant of a subsidy or order the return of all or part of the subsidy already granted when the person who has received the subsidy is deemed to fall under any of the following subparagraphs: 1. When the subsidy program is in violation of the Acts and subordinate statutes or the conditions of the subsidy; 2. When the whole or part of the subsidy program is suspended; 4. When the subsidy program has not been contributed to the public by fraud or other improper means; 6. When the subsidy program has not been granted by fraud or other improper means; 6. When the subsidy program violates an order or disposition under this Ordinance, or refuses an inspection or a false report:
However, in order for a defective administrative disposition to be null and void as a matter of course, it must be objectively obvious that the defect has violated an important part of the law and objectively. In determining whether the defect is significant and obvious, the purpose, meaning, function, etc. of the law should be examined from a teleological perspective, and at the same time, reasonable consideration should be given to the specificity of the specific case itself. In a case where an administrative agency has taken an administrative disposition by applying a provision of a law to certain legal relations or factual relations, it is clearly stated that the legal principles that the provision of the law is not applicable to such legal relations or factual relations, and even if there is no room for dispute over the interpretation thereof, if an administrative agency has taken the disposition by applying the above provision, the defect is significant and obvious
In the instant case, the terms and conditions of the granting of the instant subsidy are deemed to have an essential effect against the purport of the subsidy that was granted without receiving any consideration for the purpose of providing financial assistance as seen earlier. As such, the defect is serious, and as seen below, the Defendant cannot apply the above provisions to the Defendant, notwithstanding the fact that there is no reason to order the return of all or part of the subsidy under Article 17 of the Subsidy Management Ordinance cited by the Plaintiff, and thus, it is apparent that the defect is apparent that the order to repay the principal of the subsidy without any legal basis.
Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.
2) Whether the delivery conditions in the instant case are “any conditions deemed necessary to achieve the purpose of delivery”
Article 7 (Conditions for Granting Subsidies) of the Ordinance on the Management of Subsidies provides that "the head of the Gun may attach conditions deemed necessary for achieving the purpose of granting subsidies, such as the self-responsibility of a reasonable rate of the amount of subsidies and the conditions deemed necessary for the achievement of the purpose of granting the subsidies determined by statutes
However, in full view of the evidence and the purport of the entire pleadings cited earlier, the Plaintiff may recognize the fact that the Defendant used the subsidy of this case 1.5 billion won, thereby assisting the Defendant in the amount of KRW 1.5 billion, instead of subsidizing financial benefits equivalent to the interest during the five-year period.
In addition, the term "requirements deemed necessary for the achievement of the purpose of grant" as stipulated in Article 7 of the Subsidy Management Ordinance means the conditions necessary for the achievement of the purpose of grant, such as submission of a performance report to the head of the Gun when the subsidized project operator is prohibited from using the subsidy for another purpose, or modification of the contents of the subsidized project, and submission of the subsidy to the head of the Gun when the subsidized project is completed. The conditions of grant of this case cannot be viewed as conditions necessary for the achievement of the purpose of grant of the subsidy, since the principal of the
Therefore, this part of the prior plaintiff's assertion is without merit on different premises.
3) Whether it is possible to order the return of the entire subsidy of this case under Article 17 of the Subsidy Management Ordinance
According to Article 17 of the Subsidy Management Ordinance, the person who received the subsidy may be ordered to return all or part of the subsidy already granted as a sanction for the person who received the subsidy in certain circumstances, and it shall be deemed that there is any reason to order the Defendant to return all of the subsidy already granted.
First of all, it is deemed that the term of granting the subsidy of this case falls under “when it violates the terms and conditions of subsidization” under Article 17 subparag. 1 of the above Ordinance, and the terms and conditions of granting the subsidy of this case are serious and apparent and null and void as seen earlier. Therefore, even if the Defendant did not perform the repayment of the principal of the subsidy in accordance with the invalid undertaking of this case,
Next, according to the health stand for the “when there is no possibility of success in the subsidized project” under Article 17 subparag. 2 of the above Ordinance, and the overall purport of the evidence and arguments cited earlier, the Defendant’s financial standing has been significantly deteriorated in around 2003 due to the repayment of short-term loans, interest, etc. to raise funds for purchasing money and operating funds at the time of the incorporation of the company. Since the Defendant may recognize the fact of overcoming the management crisis after receiving the instant subsidy from the Plaintiff and realizing the black management around 2009, it cannot be said that there is no possibility of success in the subsidized project.
Finally, Article 17 subparagraph 5 of the above Ordinance provides that "When a subsidy was granted by false or other unlawful means, the Health Center corresponding to the case", and as seen earlier, the Defendant provided the Plaintiff with the instant undertaking to reimburse the principal of the subsidy five years after the Defendant demanded the subsidy of this case. However, since the instant undertaking becomes null and void as seen earlier, even if the Defendant did not perform the undertaking, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant received the subsidy by false or other unlawful means.
Therefore, the defendant cannot be deemed to have a reason to order the return of all or part of the subsidy already granted under Article 17 of the above Ordinance. Therefore, this part of the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.
4) Whether the refusal to repay the principal of the instant subsidy constitutes a violation of the good faith or the good faith or the good faith, asserting that the instant undertaking is null and void
The principle of trust and good faith under the Civil Act is an abstract norm that a party to a legal relationship should not exercise a right or perform a duty by any content or method that violates the principle of trust and good faith in consideration of the other party’s interest. In order to deny the exercise of such right on the ground that it violates the principle of trust and good faith, a trust has been provided to the other party, or the other party has been objectively regarded as being in a legitimate state, and the exercise of the right against such other party’s trust has to reach an extent that it is not acceptable in light of the concept of justice (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da18174, Jun. 25, 2009).
Comprehensively taking account of the following circumstances, the Plaintiff’s share of 3.8 billion won in capital at the time of establishment of the Defendant’s 3.85 billion won in capital (or 4.9% in equity), and 2.079 billion won in the Green Livestock Farming Cooperative Co., Ltd. (or 54.1% in equity) was established by investing 45.71% in the Defendant’s shares at the time of December 2003, 200, and 29.24% in Red Livestock Co., Ltd. and 29.04% in total, it is difficult to recognize that the Plaintiff was against the Defendant’s new obligation to grant subsidies due to the above recognition and the hearing process. In light of the following circumstances, it is difficult to view that the Defendant’s new obligation to grant subsidies was inconsistent with the Defendant’s new obligation to grant subsidies to the Plaintiff, as well as the Defendant’s new obligation to provide subsidies, to the effect that the Defendant would have been against the Defendant’s new obligation to provide subsidies.
Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion on this part is without merit.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance with different conclusions is unfair, and the plaintiff's claim is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.
Judges Yoon Jin-be (Presiding Judge)