1 person;

Attorney Jeong Byung-hee et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Law Firm LLC (LLC) continental Aju

Attorney Lee Jong-chul et al.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendant.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

A. Each time charter party in this case is a contract with a corporation of the Republic of Korea that has foreign elements, and thus the governing law should be determined pursuant to the Private International Act. The main text of Article 25(1) of the Private International Act provides that “The contract shall be governed by the law that the parties have chosen explicitly or implicitly.” Since each time charter party in this case has set the governing law into the English law, the English law is also the governing law in this case where the Plaintiffs seek to pay charterage, etc. under each time charter party in this case.

In a time charter contract where a shipowner has both the possession of a ship, the right to appoint a shipmaster and crew and the right to overall control and management of a ship, “redelivery” refers to returning a ship to a shipowner in principle under the conditions determined by the time charter contract. If, in the time charter contract, the shipowner takes over and pays for fuel oil (ununiter) remaining on the ship at the time of the counter-ship to the time charterer, the time charterer imposes in advance notice to the shipowner at the time of the counter-ship and the point of the counter-ship on several occasions, and if the requirements and procedures are prescribed, such as setting the quality of fuel oil remaining at the time of the counter-ship and the minimum quantity expected at the time of the counter-ship, the counter-delivery should be interpreted as being subject to the conditions determined by the time charter contract, and thus, this does not include cases where a ship is returned due to the early termination, etc. of the time charter.

B. In full view of the circumstances stated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s defense of offsetting the Defendant’s automatic claim is groundless since each remaining fuel oil payment claim against the Plaintiffs did not exist as follows.

1) The governing law of each time charter contract of this case concluded between the plaintiffs, the owners of each vessel of this case, and Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as " Hanjin Shipping"). The governing law of each time charter contract of this case is English law. Since the plaintiffs claims charterage pursuant to each time charter contract of this case against the defendant, the plaintiffs, and the defendant claims offset against each of the remaining fuel oil claims against the plaintiffs, the principle of set-off in English common law applies to the requirements and effects of the set-off. (2) Each time charter contract of this case provides that the shipowner shall be given prior notice of the time and point of delivery to the shipowner at the time of the vessel of this case, and that the shipowner shall maintain the quantity of fuel oil near the quantity of fuel oil at the time of delivery to the vessel, and that the time charter is not able to perform the above obligations in the form of "No. 1 of the new term charter contract of this case" of this case and "No. 3 of the new term charter contract of this case" of this case shall be paid to the shipowner.

In full view of these circumstances, Article 33 of the Annex to the instant case does not apply to the instant case where the administrator terminated each time charter contract of this case on the grounds that the administrator was an executory contract after the commencement of rehabilitation procedures for the Hanjin Shipping.

3) Furthermore, it is difficult to recognize that the Defendant reserved ownership until the time when receiving fuel oil from each oil supplier in return for the full payment of fuel oil, and that the Defendant paid the full payment of fuel oil to each oil supplier. Furthermore, according to the precedents of the English court, the shipowner may transfer his right only when the time charterer owns the ownership of the remaining fuel. Thus, even if the shipowner received the ship from the time charterer who did not have the ownership of the remaining fuel, it cannot be deemed that the ownership of the remaining fuel was transferred. The Defendant’s assertion that each remaining fuel price claim against the Plaintiffs exists on a different premise is without merit.

C. Examining the foregoing legal doctrine and the record, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of a contract and the ownership of fuel oil, as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. As to the ground of appeal No. 2, the defendant's ground of appeal No. 2 that the plaintiffs cannot recognize the validity of offset prior to the filing of the lawsuit in this case with the defendant's claim for the remaining fuel oil payment against the plaintiffs as a passive claim is related to the court below's assumptive and additional judgment, and as long as the court below's decision that each remaining fuel oil payment claim against the plaintiffs does not exist as seen earlier, the legitimacy of such assumptive and additional judgment does not affect the conclusion of the judgment, so the argument on this issue is not acceptable without the need to

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals by the Defendant are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kwon Soon-il

Justices Park Il-san