[택지초과소유부담금부과처분취소][공1998.1.1.(49),127]
[1] Whether a revocation lawsuit may be instituted without the previous trial procedure against the disposition of imposition of excess ownership charges on the same housing site in the previous year (negative)
[2] In a case where a building built for a residential purpose and registered as a house is used for a residential purpose without going through a lawful procedure, but such boarding business license is granted, whether the building site constitutes a housing site under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (a) of the Act on Ownership of the Housing Site (affirmative)
[1] The obligation to pay individual housing site ownership charges arises independently each year during the period of possession of a housing site exceeding the upper limit of the ownership of each household. Thus, the previous imposition and subsequent imposition are different from each other, and thus it cannot be said that it would be unreasonable to go through the procedure of the preceding trial on the subsequent imposition. Thus, even if the previous imposition and subsequent imposition have gone through the procedure of the preceding imposition and subsequent imposition, the subsequent imposition and subsequent imposition shall not be deemed to go through the procedure of the previous imposition and subsequent imposition. Thus, even if they go through the previous imposition and subsequent
[2] Although a building constructed for the original residential purpose and registered as a residential purpose is used as a house without due cause without due cause, but the business permission was granted for the boarding business or the competent administrative agency has paid various taxes imposed on the premise that the building part is a business facility, the use without permission itself does not become legitimate, barring special circumstances, the building site constitutes a housing site under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (a) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site, barring special circumstances.
[1] Article 18 (3) of the Administrative Litigation Act, Article 19 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites / [2] Article 2 subparagraph 1 (a), Article 9, Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, Article 2 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites
[1] Supreme Court Decision 93Nu9132 delivered on September 28, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2984) Supreme Court Decision 94Nu4653 delivered on November 8, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 3292) Supreme Court Decision 96Nu4671 delivered on August 23, 1996 (Gong196Ha, 2918) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 94Nu11606 delivered on January 12, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 94Nu16069 delivered on April 28, 1995
Rule
Head of Dong-gu Daejeon Metropolitan City
Daejeon High Court Decision 94Gu1126, 2723 delivered on April 19, 1996
The part of the judgment of the court below regarding the disposition of imposition dated August 31, 1994 is reversed, and that part of the lawsuit is dismissed, and the appeal as to the disposition of imposition dated September 9, 1993 is dismissed. The total costs of the lawsuit as to the disposition of imposition dated September 31, 1994 and the costs of the lawsuit as to the disposition of imposition dated September 9, 1993 are all borne by the plaintiff.
1. As to the disposition of imposition of August 31, 1994
The part of the judgment of the court below regarding the disposition of August 31, 1994 is examined ex officio prior to the determination of the grounds for appeal.
The obligation to pay charges on an individual's ownership of a housing site (hereinafter referred to as "charges") arises independently during each imposition period during the ownership of a housing site in excess of the upper limit by a household. Thus, the previous imposition and subsequent imposition are separate dispositions. Although the housing site subject to imposition are identical to the person liable for payment, the price of the housing site subject to imposition by the imposition period depending on changes in the officially announced individual land price, and the rate of imposition may vary depending on the passage period from the date when the housing site is subject to imposition, so the contents of the dispute over the imposition may vary each other. Thus, the above imposition disposition cannot be deemed to be "the same type of case" as provided in Article 18 (3) 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act or "the phased progress for the same purpose" as provided in Article 18 (3) 2 of the same Act, and even if the above imposition are common, the previous imposition and subsequent imposition were conducted through the previous imposition and imposition procedure after the lapse of six years (see the previous imposition and imposition procedure after the lapse of nine years).
According to the records, although the plaintiff was subject to an administrative appeal on the disposition of imposition of September 9, 1993 (the imposition period on June 2, 1992) but there is no separate administrative appeal on the disposition of imposition of August 31, 1994 (the imposition period on June 1, 1993) which differs from the above disposition of imposition, but it is found that there is no separate objection against the disposition of imposition of August 31, 1994 (the imposition period on June 2, 1993) which differs from the above disposition of imposition. Nevertheless, the court below judged that the part of the lawsuit of this case on the disposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of imposition of the above
Therefore, the part of the judgment below regarding the disposition of imposition of August 31, 1994 among the judgment below is reversed, and the part of the case is remanded to the party members. The part of the lawsuit is dismissed on the ground that it does not meet the above litigation requirements, and it is unlawful and inappropriate.
2. On September 9, 1993, as to the disposition of imposition of September 9, 1993
We examine the grounds of appeal.
A. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, in a case where a building constructed to be used for the original residential purpose and is used for a residential purpose without due alteration of the purpose of use without due process, the site of the building constitutes a site subject to the regulation of the Act on the Ownership of Aggregated Housing Sites (hereinafter “Act”), barring special circumstances, barring special circumstances, and the part of the building site of this case among the total area of the building of this case ( Address 1 omitted) of Daejeon Dong-gu and ( Address 2 omitted) 81.19 square meters of the building of this case, which was constructed as a house and registered as a house in the public register, is originally used for a house, and the plaintiff uses the entire building of this case including that part as a house as a whole without due alteration of the purpose of use without due process for the whole area of the building of this case. In light of the records and the contents of related statutes, the court below's findings of fact and the determination of facts as to the building site of this case, which is calculated according to the ratio of the above part without legitimate alteration of use, is justified and there are no errors in law.
In addition, even if the plaintiff obtained permission to conduct a business for a female lodging business or paid various taxes imposed on the premise that the part of the building is a business facility, the use of the building itself is not legitimate (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Nu11606, Jan. 12, 1995; 94Nu16069, Apr. 28, 1995). All arguments are without merit.
B. In light of records and relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, the court below held that the land ( Address 3 omitted) in the Dong-gu, Daejeon ( Address 4 omitted) does not constitute the land where the construction of a house is prohibited or it is practically impossible to construct a house under Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act. However, the court below's decision that the land ( Address 5 omitted) is difficult to be considered as having been managed as a group of land ( Address 1 omitted) and ( Address 2 omitted) is just and acceptable, and there is no error of law such as incomplete deliberation or misconception of facts due to a violation of the rules of evidence or an omission of charges under Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act, or misapprehension of legal principles as to the land group under Article 9 of the Act. All of the arguments are without merit.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding the disposition of imposition dated August 31, 1994 among the judgment below is reversed, and the corresponding part of the lawsuit is dismissed, and the appeal as to the disposition of imposition dated September 9, 1993 is dismissed, and the total costs of the lawsuit as to the disposition of imposition dated August 31, 1994 and the costs of the lawsuit as to the disposition of imposition dated September 9, 1993 are assessed against the plaintiff who is all losing. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.
Justices Shin Sung-sung (Presiding Justice)