1. Based on its reasoning, the lower court concluded each of the instant insurance contracts with the intent to treat each of the instant construction machinery in which the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act”) applies between the policyholder and the Plaintiff at the time of entering into each of the instant insurance contracts, and, in particular, as to the accident that occurred while the Plaintiff moved to the same as the construction machinery to which the Automobile Accident Compensation Act applies, and to pay the liability insurance amount pursuant to the Car Compensation I. Since such individual agreement takes precedence over each of the instant insurance contracts, the lower court determined that the Plaintiff is liable to pay the Defendant the liability insurance amount under each of the instant insurance contracts.

2. However, the lower court’s determination is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

A. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence duly admitted, the plaintiff entered into each of the insurance contracts of this case with SELS Co., Ltd., Master Timber Co., Ltd., and Ecogn's Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "each of the policyholders of this case"). The type of each of the types of the motor vehicles of this case in the contract table managed by the plaintiff is stated as 'TT construction machinery', 'TTI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI', 'TI'.

B. Each of the contracts of this case is "compensation for the amount of personal compensation I paid as the personal compensation or the amount obtained by deducting the amount which can be paid as the personal compensation I if the insured motor vehicle did not join the personal compensation II." The purport of this case is to compensate for only the remainder after deducting the amount which the insured motor vehicle is entitled to be paid as the personal compensation I from the amount which the insurer is entitled to pay as the personal compensationI, regardless of whether or not the insured motor vehicle is admitted as the personal compensationI, unless there is any special circumstance. Thus, there is no room to apply the personal compensation I to the victim as the relationship in which the insured is not liable as the personal compensation I, and even if there is no amount which the insured is paid as or is entitled to be paid as the personal compensation I, it does not purport to compensate more than the amount calculated by applying the personal compensation I to such case, and in such a case, the insured motor vehicle shall be entitled to the personal compensation as the whole amount of the damage caused by the insured's legal liability (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Da.

C. Examining the aforementioned facts in light of the aforementioned legal principles and relevant laws, the following facts are as follows: (1) Each of the instant units of insurance contracts does not fall under construction machinery to which the Automobile Loss Compensation Act applies; (2) according to the text of each of the instant insurance contracts, the insured parties of each of the instant insurance contracts are not entitled to receive compensation for accidents caused by each of the instant lanes, but cannot receive compensation for personal injury I in accordance with the provision of the instant proviso; (2) in such a case, barring any special circumstance, each of the instant units of insurance contracts can receive compensation for all damages incurred by bearing legal liability due to each of the instant lanes, and (2) under each of the instant insurance clauses, the personal injury II is limited only to the purchase of personal injury I. Accordingly, each of the instant insurance contracts may be limited to the purchase of personal injury II. Accordingly, it is sufficient to view that each of the instant policyholders of the instant units of insurance contracts had subscribed to personal injury I on the premise that personal damage I would receive compensation for accidents caused by the instant lanes in mind.

In full view of these circumstances, even though considering the fact that the Plaintiff was exempted from liability for compensation Class II due to industrial accident exemption provisions in each of the instant insurance clauses, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff and the instant policy holders, at the time of entering into each of the instant insurance contracts, have made an individual agreement stating that “The Plaintiff and the instant policy holders, at the time of entering into each of the instant insurance contracts, have excluded the instant proviso provisions on the personal damage I’s compensation crime and bear the liability for damages other than the liability for damages under the Automobile Loss Compensation Act” (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da57385, Nov. 15, 2012).

Nevertheless, solely for the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that there was an individual agreement to compensate for damage other than the liability for damages under the Automobile Loss Act at the time of entering into each of the instant insurance contracts. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of insurance contracts and insurance terms, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation contained in the

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Chief Justice Park Jong-young

Justices Kim Jae-tae

Justices Kim Jae-in