Meanwhile, Article 2 Subparag. 2 of the Improper Solicitation and Solicitation Act only provides for the definition of “public officials, etc.” and does not provide for a clear provision as to the definition of “ordinary public officials, etc.,” and the term “grades” refers to “a higher grade or rank” in advance, and does not limit it to grades or ranks in relation to official order and clothes. If the passive elements of the penal provision are excessively narrow interpretation beyond the possible meaning of the language and text, the scope of punishment against the accused would be widened and may be contrary to the principle of prohibition of analogical interpretation, which is the derived principle of the principle of no punishment without law, and thus, it is necessary to interpret it reasonably within the scope that does not deviate from the ordinary meaning of the text of the law

In full view of the above legislative purpose, the prohibition of receiving money and valuables, etc., the contents and structure of the penal provision, and the contents of Article 8(3)1 on the passive elements of the penal provision, “or higher-ranking public official, etc.” under Article 8(3)1 of the Improper Solicitation and Solicitation Act refers to a person at a position or rank higher than the other party to provide money and valuables, etc., who is in a position to be in a position to be superior, encouragement, reward, etc. in terms of social norms based on his/her superior relationship with the other party to the provision of money and valuables, etc., and the provider of money and valuables, etc. and the other party to the provider of money and valuables

1. The purpose of Article 1 of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act (hereinafter “Improper Solicitation and Graft Act”) is to ensure the fair performance of duties of public officials, etc. and to secure public confidence in public institutions by prohibiting the acceptance of money and valuables, etc. by public officials, etc. (Article 1). Article 8 of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act provides that “public officials, etc. shall not receive, demand or promise money and valuables, etc. exceeding one million won, or three million won, from the same person, regardless of whether they are related to their duties, and under the pretext of donation, support, donation, etc., or donation, in excess of one million won, at one time from the same person.” Article 8(1) of the Improper Solicitation and Solicitation Act provides that “No person shall offer, promise, or express intention to offer money and valuables, etc., which are prohibited to public officials, etc. or their spouses, etc., or to which public officials, etc., belong or their spouses, etc., violate Article 8(1)1 of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act.”

Meanwhile, Article 2 Subparag. 2 of the Improper Solicitation and Solicitation Act only provides for the definition of “public officials, etc.” and does not provide for a clear provision as to “ordinary public officials, etc.,” and “grades” refer only to “a higher grade or rank” in advance, and does not limit it to grades or ranks in relation to official order and clothes. If the passive elements of a penal provision are excessively narrow interpretation beyond the possible meaning of the language and text, the scope of punishment against the accused would be broad and may be contrary to the principle of prohibition of analogical interpretation, which is the derived from the principle of no penal punishment without law, so it is necessary to interpret it reasonably within the scope that does not deviate from the ordinary meaning of the text of the law.

In full view of the above legislative purpose, the prohibition of receiving money and valuables, etc., the contents and structure of the penal provision, and the provisions of Article 8(3)1 on the passive elements of the penal provision, etc. under Article 8(3)1 of the Improper Solicitation and Solicitation Act, the term “ordinary public official, etc.” refers to a person of higher rank or rank than the other party to provide money and valuables, etc., who is in a position to be in a position to be superior, encouragement, reward, etc. in terms of social norms based on his/her superior relationship with the other party to the provision of money and valuables, etc., and the provider of money and valuables, etc. and the other party to the provider of such money

2. For the following reasons, the lower court upheld the first instance judgment that found the Defendant not guilty of the instant facts charged by deeming that the money and valuables, etc. provided by the Defendant did not constitute grounds for exception to the prohibited money and valuables, etc. under Article 8(3)1 of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act. In other words, Nonindicted 1 and Nonindicted 2, the counterpart to the offer of money and valuables, etc., are in a relationship of official duty as a member of a demographic organization with which the Prosecutor General is determined, and are not in a relationship with Nonindicted 1 and Nonindicted 2’s order or direction and supervision with Nonindicted 1 and Nonindicted 2, it cannot be readily concluded that the Defendant does not constitute “ordinary public official, etc.” of the above exceptional grounds. In addition, the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone is difficult to readily conclude that the Defendant provided food and money to Nonindicted 1 and Nonindicted 2 for any other purpose than the above and encouragement,

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, although some parts of the judgment below’s reasoning were insufficient, the court below’s conclusion that the Defendant’s food and money provided to Nonindicted 1 and Nonindicted 2 did not constitute “money and valuables provided to a subordinate public official, etc. for the above-mentioned, encouragement, reward, etc.” under Article 8(3)1 of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act is acceptable. In so doing, the court below did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal principles on the interpretation of “ordinary public official, etc.” and “competion, encouragement, etc.” under Article 8(3)1 of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Jae-chul (Presiding Justice)