Article 8(3) of the former Land Excess Profit Tax Act (amended by Act No. 4561 of Jun. 11, 1993; hereinafter the same shall apply) provides that land falling under idle land due to the provisions of the Acts and subordinate statutes after its acquisition, loss of a ground building, collapse, or other inevitable reasons prescribed by the Presidential Decree shall not be deemed idle land, etc. for the period prescribed by the Presidential Decree, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1). Meanwhile, Article 23 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13198 of Dec. 31, 1990) provides that the acquisition date of the land for the first time from 190 to 190, which is the first time after the lapse of 190, shall be deemed to have been 10 years from the date of its acquisition, and Article 8(3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that the latter part of the same Act shall be deemed to have been acquired for the purpose of constructing a new building under subparagraph 3 (limited to the proviso of Article 19 of the former Enforcement Decree.

However, in determining the plaintiffs' assertion that the land of this case should be judged whether it constitutes idle land under the above provision of amendment, the land of this case was transferred on May 8, 1990, and at that time before the above provision of amendment clause 4 is enforced, so the plaintiffs' assertion premised on this provision is without merit, and even if so, on December 31, 1990, for which the liability for payment of capital gains tax for the year 1990 is established, even after the lapse of one year under Article 23 subparagraph 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Land and Transport Tax Act, which was already excluded from idle land, the land of this case is subject to the land excess profit tax by itself, so it is not justified.

However, in light of the above legal principles, as long as the plaintiffs proved that they acquired the land of this case for the purpose of construction, the land of this case which was acquired on March 23, 1976 cannot be deemed as the land corresponding to idle land under the former Land Tax Act at the time of transfer of the land. Thus, the court below should have deliberated on the purpose of acquiring the land of this case and determine whether the land constitutes idle land. However, the court below erred in the law applicable to the transfer of this case where the court below rejected the plaintiffs' assertion without reaching this point, and there is an error of law that the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion and the statement that

Therefore, without examining other grounds of appeal, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)