2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

3. The total cost of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff, including the part resulting from the supplementary participation.

The decision made by the National Labor Relations Commission on August 7, 2012 by the Central Labor Relations Commission on the application for reexamination of unfair dismissal between the plaintiff and the defendant joining the defendant shall be revoked.

2. Purport of appeal

The same shall apply to the order.

A. The Plaintiff was established on March 17, 1981 and established six regional headquarterss and fifty-six inspectors, and is a public institution that conducts motor vehicle inspection, traffic accident prevention activities, traffic safety diagnosis and guidance services for transportation companies using 1,100 full-time workers. The Intervenor joining the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as the “ Intervenor”) is subject to disciplinary action due to the grounds for disciplinary action against the provision of money and valuables, etc. (hereinafter referred to as the “instant misconduct”) who was employed and worked for the Plaintiff as specified in the following table.

The details of disciplinary action on the date of removal from position (position) in the name and position of the Defendant, included in the main text, as of September 8, 1986, shall be subject to the disciplinary action on the date of the final disciplinary action against the date of removal from position, which was included in the list of the Defendant’s name and position, as of November 16, 201, 201. The Defendant’s Intervenor’s Intervenor’s Defendant’s Defendant’s Defendant’s Defendant’s Defendant’s Defendant’s dismissal on December 13, 2011, shall be subject to the payment of money and goods to Grade III (Deputy) of the Shipping Agency’s Technical Director of the Korea Shipping Agency on December 1, 2089. On November 21, 2011, 201, the Defendant’s Defendant’s Defendant’s dismissal on December 13, 2011, who was dismissed on December 21, 2011.

1) Offering money and valuables

Note 2) Money and other valuables granted

3) Offering money and valuables

Note 4) Acceptance of money and valuables

B. On February 15, 2012, the Intervenor filed an application for remedy with Busan Regional Labor Relations Commission by Busan Regional Labor Relations Commission on the ground that the above dismissal from position and disciplinary action were unfair, and on April 13, 2012, the Busan Regional Labor Relations Commission rendered an application for remedy with Busan Regional Labor Relations Commission. The Busan Regional Labor Relations Commission decided that the Intervenor’s application for remedy against unfair dismissal from position was dismissed on the ground that the disciplinary action against the Intervenor was taken on the ground that the three-year period of prescription elapsed, and that the disciplinary action against the Intervenor was taken on the ground that it was unfair, and thus, the Intervenor’s application for remedy against removal from position and dismissal against the Intervenor was dismissed.

C. Accordingly, on April 30, 2012, the Plaintiff filed an application for reexamination with the National Labor Relations Commission for the revocation of the decision on unfair dismissal among the above rulings rendered by the Central Labor Relations Commission as to April 30, 2012. On August 7, 2012, the National Labor Relations Commission dismissed the Plaintiff’s application for reexamination on the ground that “Although the personnel regulations of the Plaintiff were amended on July 31, 2009, there was an extension of the statute of limitations on the receipt of money and valuables, entertainment, etc., but there was no transitional provision excluding retroactive application at the time of the amendment, it is inappropriate in light of the amendment of the State Public Officials Act, and the principle of non-payment in law is a universal legal principle, and the above personnel regulations cannot be an exception. The period of prescription of the Intervenor’s application for reexamination was already imposed at the time of each disciplinary action against the Intervenor for three years prior to the amendment, and it is difficult to deem that there was justifiable reason for the Plaintiff could not request the disciplinary action period.”

[Ground of recognition] The non-contentious facts, Gap 1-3 (including each number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the decision on the retrial of this case is lawful

A. Summary of the argument

(1) Plaintiff

(A) Since the statute of limitations is the procedure for the exercise of the right to discipline, the provision at the time of the disposition should be applied in principle. The Plaintiff’s personnel regulations amended differently from the State Public Officials Act do not have any transitional provision stipulating that the previous provision shall apply to the grounds for disciplinary action that occurred before the enforcement of the statute. Moreover, the above revised personnel regulations that extend the statute of limitations with respect to the effect of involuntary appeal are not contrary to the principle of prohibition of retroactive legislation, but do not have much value of protecting the Intervenor’s trust interest, etc. compared to the necessity of the disciplinary action. Therefore, the period of prescription against the instant misconduct by the Intervenor should be deemed to have been extended from 3 to 5 years by the amendment of the personnel regulations of July 31, 2009, and thus, the

(B) Even if the statute of limitations on disciplinary action against each of the instant misconducts is deemed three years in accordance with the former personnel regulations, ① the proviso of Article 69 of the former personnel regulations provides that a disciplinary action may be taken even after the lapse of the statute of limitations, if there are justifiable grounds for not being able to request disciplinary action within the period of time. As such, the period from 2008 to 2011 is in fact impossible to expect the demand for disciplinary action against the Intervenor since the officer of the audit office, the head of the management support headquarters, or the executive officers of the labor union are related to the personnel corruption, and thus, the aforementioned proviso constitutes justifiable grounds.

② In addition, the period of the statute of limitations was imposed on the part of the Plaintiff without knowing the grounds for the disciplinary action, and immediately imposed disciplinary proceedings on the Intervenor after becoming aware of each of the instant misconducts. As such, the Intervenor’s assertion of the lapse of the statute of limitations in this case is in violation of the good faith principle. Therefore, the new trial ruling based on the premise that the statute of limitations has lapsed is unlawful.

(2) Defendant and Intervenor

(1) Unlike the simple procedural regulations by nature of the statute of limitations, whether the statute of limitations is applicable shall comply with personnel management regulations at the time of the violation, and the principle of no lawsuit against law shall apply unless there is transitional regulations.

② Unlike the retroactive legislation, the retroactive application ought to be strict, and there was no intent to apply the retroactive application of the Plaintiff or labor union. Considering the background and content of the amendment of personnel regulations, the Plaintiff’s past transitional cases, and the principle of clarity, etc., the absence of any separate transitional provisions constitutes the lack of regulations, and ought to be seen as

③ Since the Plaintiff did not inform the labor union of the extension of the statute of limitations for disciplinary action in the process of amending the personnel regulations, if the revised personnel regulations purport to retroactively apply, it is invalid because the rules of employment were to be modified disadvantageously to workers without the consent of the labor union.

④ Since a disciplinary decision was not de facto impossible, there is no reason attributable to the Intervenor with respect to the attempted disciplinary action.

B. Relevant provisions

The entries in the attached Table shall be as specified in the relevant regulations.

(c) Fact of recognition;

(1) Article 49 of the Plaintiff’s Personnel Management Regulations provides that the personnel committee in charge of promotion personnel of employees shall be comprised of not less than five and not more than 11 members, including the chairperson, who is the chairperson, and the Plaintiff shall have the representative of the labor union at the time of holding a personnel committee for promotion review pursuant to Article 44 of the collective agreement between labor and management, and shall recommend candidates for promotion. Nonparty 1, the former chairperson, who was in office as the chairperson of the labor union from June 1, 2004 to December 1, 2007, exercised the above authority as the chairperson of the labor union, and the Intervenor 4 was in office as the executive officer of the labor union from July 2004 to December 207 (the authority is limited if it is not the chairperson of the labor union or vice-chairperson).

(2) From the end of December 2007, the Defendant Defendant 1 provided Nonparty 1 with cash amounting to KRW 10 million as a case of promotion to Nonparty 2 at around December 21, 2007, and KRW 5 million to Nonparty 2 at the former Management Support Headquarters around December 2007, respectively (this part of the Defendant Defendant 1 became final and conclusive after being sentenced to a fine of KRW 3 million ( Nonparty 1 related to Nonparty 1 and Seoul Central District Court Decision 201Da1475), a fine of KRW 2 million (limited to Nonparty 2 related to Nonparty 2 and Seoul Central District Court Decision 201Da1635) as a crime of offering bribe in relation to the above facts).

(3) On January 19, 2007, the Intervenor 2 provided Nonparty 1 with cash KRW 20 million along with the solicitation (Seoul Central District Prosecutor’s Office: the act of the Intervenor 2 constitutes the offense of giving property in breach of trust, but was not subject to prosecution (not subject to prosecution) on the ground that the statute of limitations has expired).

(4) On August 28, 2007, the Defendant Defendant 3 remitted cash of KRW 3 million to the Defendant’s Intervenor 4 to the effect that “The Defendant’s Intervenor 3 was “to conduct a promotion, audit and inspection, and request the Defendant’s wife in the future” (in relation to this, the Defendant’s Intervenor 4 was sentenced to a fine of KRW 5 million and a penalty of KRW 3 million as a result of the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act (Seoul High Court Decision 2012No1002).”

(5) Article 83-2(1) of the State Public Officials Act (amended by Act No. 9296, Dec. 31, 2008) extended the period of extinctive prescription against the receipt of money and valuables, and the embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds from three to five years. The Ministry of Strategy and Finance, compared to the period of audit on April 15, 2009, issued a letter to the government ministries requesting the Board of Audit and Inspection to take measures to extend the period of extinctive prescription against the receipt of money and valuables from three to five years through the revision of the personnel regulations, etc. on the ground that there is a demand by the Board of Audit and Inspection to revise the personnel regulations of the State Public Officials Act.

(6) The Plaintiff revised Article 69 of the Personnel Regulations on July 31, 2009, and extended the prescription period from three to five years against the receipt of money and valuables, and the embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds as stated in Article 83-2(1) of the State Public Officials Act. Meanwhile, Article 1 of the Addenda of the amended State Public Officials Act provides that “this Act shall enter into force on the date of its promulgation,” but Article 5 of the Addenda of the amended State Public Officials Act provides that “Notwithstanding the amendment of Article 83-2(1) of the former Act, with respect to the scope of application of the above amended provision, the former provision shall apply.” The amended personnel regulations of the Plaintiff merely stipulate that “this provision shall enter into force on July 31, 2009,” and did not stipulate any special transitional provision, and the Plaintiff did not stipulate any retroactive application of the former disciplinary cause at the time of obtaining consent from the trade union.

(7) From December 21, 2010 to March 25, 2011, the Board of Audit and Inspection announced the results of the investigation on the following: (a) the investigating agency conducted an audit on the Plaintiff on two occasions on the basis of the above audit results: (b) the Plaintiff, including the Intervenor, who is suspected of not receiving money or valuables related to personnel affairs; and (c) the head of the pre-management support headquarters, including Nonparty 2, who received money or valuables by a personnel entrustment, etc., on November 17, 2011, four persons, including Nonparty 2, etc., including Nonparty 2, who received money or valuables by a personnel entrustment, etc., are detained; and (d) nine persons, who are minor, are not detained, and notify the Plaintiff.

(8) On November 4, 2011, the Plaintiff received notice of the result of each public official’s criminal disposition against Nonparty 1 from the Seoul Central District Public Prosecutor’s Office as to the Defendant Intervenor 4 around December 27, 201.

(9) The Plaintiff’s chief director demanded a resolution of disciplinary action as listed below for the Intervenor’s disciplinary action against each of the instant misconducts. A resolution of disciplinary action was held and passed by the Disciplinary Committee. Upon the Intervenor’s request for reexamination, the Appellate Committee was held, and the Intervenor passed the same disciplinary action against the Intervenor.

On November 22, 2011, December 22, 2011, 201, the Defendant joining the Defendant who was dismissed on December 13, 201, the date of final disciplinary action (effective effect) as of the date the Disciplinary Committee was held on the date on which the request for a resolution on resolution on the name disciplinary action was made in the main sentence, as included therein, and the Defendant joining the Defendant removed on November 22, 201, December 201, 201, the Defendant joining the Defendant removed on November 22, 2011, and removed on December 13, 2011, December 22, 201, 201, the Defendant removed on December 13, 2011, the Defendant joining the Defendant on December 3, 201, dismissed on January 25, 2012 from office on December 20, 2015. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 233788, Dec. 16, 2012>

(10) The plaintiff, among 41 persons related to personnel expenses, received money and valuables of at least 5 million won, referring to Article 71 [Attachment Table 3-1] of the Personnel Management Regulations, for 37 persons other than 4 persons related to the personnel expenses, referring to disciplinary action against dismissal, for those who receive money and valuables of at least 3 million won but less than 5 million won, disciplinary action against dismissal, and for those who receive money and valuables of less than 3 million won, for 18 persons among 37 persons who are in office, as a matter of principle, disciplinary action against dismissal, for 6 persons, for 3 months of suspension from office, and for 7 years of suspension from office, respectively.

[Grounds for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap 2-11, 13, 16, 17, and 19 (including each number), the purport of the whole pleadings

D. Determination

(1) Whether the statute of limitations has lapsed

(A) The period of prescription based on the interpretation of the personnel regulations of this case

In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged as above, evidence as mentioned above, Eul 2 and 8 together with the purport of the entire pleadings, it is reasonable to view that the disciplinary action against each of the instant misconduct by the intervenors is subject to the personnel regulations prior to the amendment, and it is three years.

1) The period of prescription is directly related to the existence of the right to discipline.

A) The provision on the period of prescription of the Plaintiff’s personnel management provision concerning the period of disciplinary action is against the principle of good faith to prevent an employee from exercising his/her right to discipline for a considerable period of time due to the occurrence of the grounds for disciplinary action against an employee, even though the Plaintiff was able to unilaterally punish the employee, and thereby preventing the Plaintiff from exercising his/her right to discipline for a relatively long period of time. In addition, the Plaintiff’s exercise of his/her right to discipline is contrary to the principle of good faith. Thus, it is against the purport that restricting the Plaintiff’s exercise of his/her right to discipline for reasons of the lapse of the period. Thus, the starting point is when the grounds for disciplinary action occurred (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Du2484, Jul. 10, 2008)

In addition, if there are different regulations that exist at the time of the occurrence of the disciplinary cause and the time of the disciplinary action, the declaration of intention of dismissal, etc. shall be made in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the personnel regulations in force at the time of declaration of intention, except in extenuating circumstances, but the decision of whether there is the right to impose disciplinary action (the grounds for disciplinary action) is a disadvantageous disposition to workers, and thus the decision should be made in accordance with the former personnel regulations in force at the time of the occurrence of the disciplinary cause in question (see Supreme Court Decisions 94Da27960, Dec. 13, 1994; 2003Du8210, Nov. 25, 2005

B) The provision on the prescription of a disciplinary action provides for whether a request for disciplinary action can be made “feasible” and there is room to regard it as a procedural provision on the conditions under which the right to disciplinary action may be exercised. However, the prescription of a disciplinary action terminates after the lapse of a certain period and prevents the progress of disciplinary proceedings more than that on the same grounds for the disciplinary action. As such, the existence of a right to disciplinary action is directly affected by the substantive law (which is closely connected with the substantive law). As such, it is distinct from the detailed method of exercising the right to disciplinary action, including the method of convening the disciplinary committee, the method of notifying attendance and the method of guaranteeing the right to make statements, and simply simple procedures that do not directly affect workers’ rights, such as the process, are different from the formal procedure, and

Therefore, it is reasonable to apply mutatis mutandis the case of the decision on the existence of the right to take disciplinary action (the grounds for disciplinary action) with respect to the statute of limitations.

2) Whether the provision of the relevant law and the prescription against the disciplinary action are retroactive

A) We examine whether the revised personnel regulations that extend the period of extinctive prescription in the instant case should be applied retroactively in the premise that it is possible to apply the statute of limitations retroactively to the disciplinary action.

B) The statute of limitations is similar to the instant statute of limitations, which is a system that makes it impossible to prosecute and punish an offender more than after the offender committed a crime for a certain period of time. The Special Act on the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes (Article 20) and the special provision on the statute of limitations ( Article 21) at the time of the amendment by Act No. 11556, Dec. 18, 2012 (Article 20) stipulate that “The foregoing provision on the statute of limitations of public prosecution shall apply to any sexual crime committed before the enforcement of the above Act even if the statute of limitations has not yet expired due to a sexual crime under Article 20 or 21,” but the above provision on the statute of limitations shall not apply to the amendment of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles from Sexual Abuse by Act No. 1108, Nov. 17, 2011 (Article 20 of the Addenda of the Special Provision).

In full view of the aforementioned Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes, the statute of limitations on the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, and the legislative details thereof, insofar as no retroactive provisions are expressly stated in the Addenda, the Special Provision on the Calculation of the Prescription for Public Prosecution of February 1, 201 under the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes and the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse can be deemed to apply only to crimes that occur in the future.

Therefore, the retroactive application of the disciplinary action similar to the statute of limitations should be equally applied or more strictly applied to the disciplinary action (in ordinary cases, the retroactive application should be more strictly applied in the case of the disciplinary action compared to the necessity of the punishment against an anti-human crime, compared to the statute of limitations related thereto). In this case where the plaintiff does not expressly state that the supplementary provision of the amended personnel regulations should be applied to the previous disciplinary action after the statute of limitations has become effective, the personnel revision provision should be interpreted to apply only to the disciplinary action after the statute of limitations has become effective.

C) In addition, Article 83-2 of the State Public Officials Act (amended by Act No. 4384, May 31, 1991; Act No. 9296, Dec. 31, 2008; Act No. 11392, Mar. 21, 2012; and Article 83-2 of the Act on the Prescription of Disciplinary Action (amended by Act No. 11392, Mar. 21, 2012); each of the above Acts recognized the future effect only by specifying that it was based on the previous provision if a cause for disciplinary action occurred

In this regard, the Private School Act was amended by Act No. 7802, Dec. 29, 2005; Act No. 10871, Jul. 21, 2011; however, as the personnel regulations of this case, only stipulates that "this Act shall enter into force on the date of its promulgation," and there are no provisions on the retroactive application. However, the Ministry of Education, which is the competent administrative agency, is interpreted as having entered into force only in the future by applying the supplementary provisions of the State Public Officials Act mutatis mutandis with respect to the above provision (see, e.g., the amended Private School Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act as of Jul. 1, 2006; see, e.g., the Ministry of Education’s interpretation of civil petitions as of Jul. 1, 2006; see, e., Q&A, and at least the Ministry of Education’s reply to civil petitions, but at least the Ministry of Education’s implementation of this policy).

D) In full view of the legislative background, interpretation, etc. of other relevant laws, the personnel regulations of this case were amended in response to the amendment of the State Public Officials Act extending the statute of limitations, and there are no circumstances to deem that there was any other amendment purpose or background different from the extension of the statute of limitations period of the State Public Officials Act, the Plaintiff’s revised personnel regulations shall not apply to the disciplinary reasons that occurred prior to the enforcement of the above personnel regulations, as in the same manner as the State Public Officials Act.

(iii) the protection of the trust interest of the person to be disciplined;

In this case, where the statute of limitations has not been completed at the time of the enforcement of the revised personnel regulations for the extension of the statute of limitations for disciplinary action, the new personnel regulations are applied retroactively to the grounds for disciplinary action that occurred before the enforcement thereof, and the new personnel regulations for the public interest to be achieved through the extension of the statute of limitations for disciplinary action are justifiable.

First of all, it is important for the public interest to secure the public integrity and morality of the public service provider by extending the period of extinctive prescription. However, as shown in the developments leading up to the amendment of Article 83-2(1) of the State Public Officials Act which served as the basis of the amendment of the personnel regulations, it is sufficient to the effect that the prior preventive effect through the strengthening of the disciplinary system and the improvement of future behavior is the improvement of future behavior. From the perspective of punishment of past behavior, it is difficult to view that the public interest is serious (the strengthening of the corrective system focused on punishment may cause side effects by reducing flexibility of changes and creative reaction of the public service provider for the needs of the public. Furthermore, the punishment for past action is difficult to find more significance than that of the public interest). Rather, the benefit of protecting the trust of the intervenors would no longer be more active than that of the participants before the amendment of the disciplinary grounds, and there is no explicit provision that the previous provision on the disciplinary grounds for disciplinary action should not be applied to the Intervenor prior to the amendment of the disciplinary reasons for which the new provision was not applied.

(B) Nullity of a retroactive application without consent

1) Article 94 of the Labor Standards Act provides, “An employer shall hear the opinion of the labor union with respect to the preparation or amendment of the rules of employment, if there is a labor union organized by the majority of the workers at the business or workplace, and the opinion of the majority of the workers if there is no labor union organized by the majority of the workers: Provided, That if it is interpreted that the rules of employment are applied to the grounds for disciplinary action that occurred before the enforcement of the rules of employment disadvantageous to the workers, consent from the labor

At the time of the amendment of the personnel regulations of this case, the Plaintiff obtained consent from the labor union. Since the Plaintiff did not expressly state that the personnel regulations of this case were applicable to the grounds for disciplinary action that occurred before the amendment, the said personnel regulations are examined as to whether they violate the proviso of Article 94 of the Labor Standards Act.

2) If an employer amends the rules of employment to workers at a disadvantage, there may be questions as to whether the employer should obtain consent from the trade union after clarifying the legal effect of the rules of employment to be amended.

However, in light of the above facts and evidence, and the following circumstances acknowledged by adding the overall purport of arguments between the Plaintiff and the Intervenor, including the above provisions of the State Public Officials Act, i.e., ① extension of the prescription period, as well as obvious disadvantage to workers, and ② modification of the rules of employment disadvantageously to workers, the above provision requires the employer to unilaterally prepare and amend the rules of employment, thereby realizing the principle of determining equal terms and conditions of employment and the principle of protection of vested rights, and further, it is necessary to strictly interpret the provisions of the Labor Standards Act as it is necessary to ensure that the employer would not have any more strict legal effect on the request of the Plaintiff for the revision of the regulations of the State Public Officials Act at the time of the amendment, and thus, it is difficult to view that the revised regulations of the State Public Officials Act would not apply to the same disciplinary action than the previous regulations of the State Public Officials Act, and thus, it would be unreasonable to deem that the new regulations of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance would not apply to the disciplinary action against the Plaintiff, which would have been unfavorable to the employer.

(C) Sub-decisions

Ultimately, it is reasonable to consider that the disciplinary action against each of the instant misconduct committed by the Intervenor is three years since the personnel regulations prior to the amendment are applied. As seen earlier, each of the instant misconduct occurred between January 19, 2007 and the end of December 2007, and the Plaintiff’s request for disciplinary action was made on November 20, 201 or January 5, 201 when three years have elapsed since the Plaintiff’s request for disciplinary action was made on January 20, 201 or January 5, 2012, and thus, the Intervenor’s claim on this part is without merit.

(2) Reasons why it is impossible to request disciplinary action, and whether it violates the good faith principle

In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged as above, i.e., ① the person having authority over disciplinary action of the Plaintiff is the chief director, and the chief director, apart from the progress of audit and investigation by the Board of Audit and Inspection and the investigation agency, he appears to have been able to demand disciplinary action against the intervenors, and ② all the circumstances for which the Plaintiff cannot demand disciplinary action against the intervenors are not attributable to the intervenors, but merely the circumstances of the Plaintiff’s side (it does not mean that the Defendant 4 works as the deputy head in the audit office). In addition, it is difficult to view that there is justifiable reason for the Plaintiff at the time that it is not possible to demand disciplinary action against the Intervenor, and it cannot be deemed that the period of the statute of limitations expires because the Plaintiff did not know of the grounds for disciplinary action against the Intervenor without any reason, and thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion that there is justifiable reason or the statute of limitations has been violated by the principle of good faith is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is unfair with the conclusion different, and it is revoked, and the plaintiff's claim is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment Form 5]

Judges Jung-gu (Presiding Judge)

1) The fact that, for the purpose of promotional cases at the end of December 2007, the former president of the labor union provided Nonparty 1 with KRW 10 million and KRW 5 million to Nonparty 2 of the former president of the labor union, respectively.

Note 2) Around January 19, 2007, the former president of the Trade Union provided Nonparty 1 with KRW 20 million along with promotion solicitation.

Note 3) On August 28, 2007, to the Intervenor Intervenor 4, who served as the Secretariat of the Trade Union around August 28, 2007, provided KRW 3 million for promotional example, etc.

Note 4) Around August 28, 2007, received KRW 3 million from the Intervenor’s Intervenor 3 to the Intervenor around August 28, 2007

5) The requirements for a resolution of dismissal, which is a kind of disciplinary procedure, shall also have a direct impact on the disciplinary action, so it should be interpreted in the same way as the period of prescription (the requirements for a resolution of dismissal under the collective agreement at the time of occurrence of the grounds for disciplinary action, "all members consent" or the requirements for a resolution of dismissal under the amended collective agreement at the time of the disciplinary action, "all members present at the meeting and consent of a majority majority", and in the case of a case where there is no provision recognizing the retroactive effect to the amended rules of employment or there is no future effective provision, although the provisions on the requirements for a resolution of dismissal are modified to the extent that the provisions on the disciplinary procedure or the revised contents are likely to directly affect the existence of the right of disciplinary action, so the provisions on the requirements for a resolution of dismissal are disadvantageous to workers, so the same as the decision on the existence of the right of disciplinary action (see,

(6) The Plaintiff asserts that the revised personnel regulations should apply to the instant disciplinary action, since the provision on the facts that are currently pending in connection with the statute of limitations. However, in light of Article 21 and Article 7(2)5 of the Police Officers Act, which is subject to a suspended sentence of qualification or heavier punishment, was newly established on December 31, 1982 by Act No. 3606 of December 31, 1982, the aforementioned provision of the new law shall apply only to a person who is under the suspended sentence only after being sentenced to a suspended sentence of qualification or heavier punishment after the enforcement of the new law. The above provision of the new law shall apply to a person who was rendered a judgment of suspended sentence at the time of the enforcement of the former law and became final and conclusive but is still under the period of the suspended sentence at the time of the enforcement of the new law, it would be unfair to be subject to an unfavorable disposition by the retroactive legislation (Supreme Court Decision 84Nu374 delivered on July 23, 1985). Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion cannot be accepted.

7) The Criminal Procedure Act was amended on December 21, 2007 by Act No. 8730 on December 21, 2007 to extend the statute of limitations, and the Addenda of the Criminal Procedure Act stipulates only the future effect with regard to crimes committed before this Act enters into force.

8) On the premise that there is no transitional provision regarding the retroactive application of the statute of limitations extended to the State Public Officials Act, the Ministry of Security and Security seems to have made a family inquiry on the premise that there is no transitional provision concerning the retroactive application of the statute of limitations extended to the State Public Officials Act, and that the revised personnel regulations and the revised Criminal Procedure Act should be applied (Article 14-1, 2). However, it is difficult to view that this is significant as a response to a family question.

9) In the instant decision on reexamination, the Plaintiff determined that the Plaintiff did not have a transitional provision on the prescription period of the grounds for disciplinary action under the Addenda to the personnel regulations, and in a broad sense, the instant amendment to the personnel regulations does not constitute an assertion that the instant amendment is null and void because it did not constitute an unfavorable amendment to the rules of employment without the consent of the trade union. Therefore, it cannot be deemed an addition or amendment to the grounds for

10) The former Southern Regional Labor Relations Commission and the Gyeonggi Regional Labor Relations Commission shall apply the former personnel regulations, and the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission shall apply the amended personnel regulations, and the National Labor Relations Commission shall finally determine that the former personnel regulations should be applied, and there are different opinions for each Labor Relations Commission. Therefore, it is difficult to view that the trade union at the time recognized the retroactive application of the amended personnel regulations.

11) If an employer amends the rules of employment with the consent of the employee group without clarifying what the terms and conditions of employment are to be modified disadvantageously to the employees, there is an unreasonable situation in which the content of the pertinent rules of employment should be accepted as one of the working conditions, without recognizing that the content of the employment contract was modified disadvantageously.

12) The Ministry of Strategy and Finance, as stated in the instant personnel regulations, amended the statute of limitations from three to five years, with respect to the grounds for disciplinary action that occurred prior to the amendment, provided that the civil petitioner’s inquiry as to whether the said provision is applied, and that the Ministry of Strategy and Finance’s legal affairs officer did not have any transitional provision such as the Addenda to the State Public Officials Act, was a simple omission that occurred due to the failure to sufficiently review the provisions and the purport of the amendment, and that retroactively applying the former provision to the grounds for disciplinary action that occurred prior to the amendment violates the principle of protection of trust (B)

13) In light of the fact that it is necessary for the plaintiff to apply the revised personnel regulations to the preceding facts at the time of the enforcement of the amended personnel regulations, if there is an intention to apply them to the preceding facts, it seems that the transitional provisions have been separately stipulated in the Addenda (see the amended on April 22, 1985, the amended on March 17, 199, the amended on March 2, 2006, the amended on July 31, 2008, and the amended on July 31, 2008).