According to the original judgment, the court below determined that the defendants applied for permission to operate the workplace under the name of E (including permission to manufacture food among them) and obtained the permission, and that the defendants' act constitutes Article 2 (1) 1 or 2 of the Act on Special Measures for the Control of Public Health Crimes (hereinafter referred to as the "Special Measures"), Article 9 (111) of the Enforcement Decree of the Food Sanitation Act, Article 23 of the Food Sanitation Act.

However, according to Article 10 of the above Act, livestock products for which permission was obtained for manufacturing or processing under Article 4 of the Processing of Livestock Products Act shall be governed by the above Act, namely, this Act, according to the examples of food under the Food Sanitation Act. Therefore, in this case, it shall be deemed that the act of the defendants manufacturing the modified milk similar to the permitted raw milk after obtaining permission for the management of the workplace under Article 4 of the Processing of Livestock Products Act also constitutes Article 2 (1) 1 or 2 of the above Act, the same act of manufacturing the altered milk similar to the foods for which permission for business under Article 23 of the Food Sanitation Act was granted under Article 10 of the above Act.

Even though the court below did not state Article 10 of the Act on the Special Measures, the purport of the judgment is not to apply Article 23 of the Food Sanitation Act and Article 2 (1) 1 or 2 of the above Special Measures Act pursuant to Article 10 of the above Special Measures Act, but to apply Article 2 (1) 1 or 2 of the above Special Measures Act. In addition, in the context of the explanation or application of the General Protection Clause that food manufacturing permission includes food manufacturing permission in the workplace under the original judgment, it is nothing more than an unnecessary statement, that is, the argument about this point is that Article 9 (11) of the Enforcement Decree of the Food Sanitation Act is just.

(2) Determination as to the first ground of appeal Nos. 2 and No. 1 in the grounds of appeal No. 2 by an attorney-at-law

The court below legitimately recognized the fact that the defendants manufactured the cryp milk which is modified similar to the cryp milk permitted by mixing 25% of water instead of 27% of water in violation of permission, and held that the defendant's act constitutes a person who alters similar to the already permitted food under Article 2 (1) of the Act on Special Measures for the Development of Agricultural and Fishing Villages, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles of alteration.

This paper is groundless.

(3) Judgment on the fifth ground of appeal by attorney B

The measures taken by the court below to include the detention days prior to the imposition of sentence in imprisonment is just and there is no illegality.

(4) Determination as to the ground of appeal by a public defender D, Defendant A’s ground of appeal, and Plaintiff B’s ground of appeal

In light of the records, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the rules of evidence or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations in the original judgment, even in light of the records, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the facts due to the failure to exhaust all necessary deliberations. The arguments are groundless.

All appeals are without merit. Therefore, all appeals by the Defendants are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges pursuant to Article 390 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Justices Lee Byung-ho (Presiding Justice)