2. The plaintiffs shall bear the litigation costs.

A. On July 26, 1999, LA established ○ Metal Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “○○ Metal”) and purchased the entire shares issued by ○ Metal Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “instant shares”) in the name of the Plaintiffs as listed below while offering capital increase twice on September 12, 2001 and December 14, 2004.

B. The Defendants imposed each gift tax on the Plaintiffs indicated in the separate sheet on the grounds that doorA trusted the instant shares to the Plaintiffs (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

C. The Plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the disposition of the instant case and filed a request with the Tax Tribunal on December 2007, but were dismissed on July 24, 2008.

[Ground of Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, Eul evidence 2-1 through 4, Eul evidence 4-1 through 11, Eul evidence 1 and 2-11, Eul evidence 7-1 through 4, Eul evidence 8-1 through 5, Eul evidence 8-9, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the disposition is proper; and

A. The plaintiffs' principal

The LA had operated the private enterprise called the originally agreed terms, and engaged in the production business. However, ○○ Metal (referring to the ○○ Metal as an individual enterprise before the incorporation of the company), which is a competitor, was put into a financial crisis due to the entry of the low domestic product into the competing company, and established the ○○ Metal. However, the LA acquired the shares in this case under the name of the Plaintiffs, as it was inevitably likely to suffer disadvantages in the process of bidding or acceptance by disclosing that the ○ Metal was in fact identical to the ○ Metal in its own name, and thus, it is inevitable to acquire the shares in this case issued through the establishment of the ○ Metal or the offering of new shares.

In addition, the instant shares did not have been distributed once so far, and even some of the instant shares did not have been transferred to the offspring’s children, so it cannot be deemed that there was an objective of evading global income tax or gift tax; (i) the acquisition tax as an oligopolistic shareholder is not likely to be at issue to the literatureA who actually held all the shares since the establishment of the ○○ Metal; and (ii) it is difficult to deem that the ○ Metal did not have any tax delinquency and has an intention to avoid the secondary tax payment obligation to the literatureA because the financial status is very good, it is difficult to deem that the title trust of the instant shares was made not for tax avoidance but for pure management needs of the company.

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Table related statutes.

C. Determination

(1) The legislative intent of Article 45-2(1) of the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act (amended by Act No. 8828, Dec. 31, 2007) is to recognize an exception to the substance over form principle to the effect that the act of tax avoidance is effectively prevented by using the title trust system and realize the tax justice. Thus, the proviso to Article 45-2(1) is applicable only where the purpose of the title trust is not included in the purpose of tax avoidance. In this case, the burden of proving that there was no purpose of tax avoidance is the person who asserts it (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2003Du13649, Dec. 23, 2004; 2004Du1223, Jan. 28, 2005).

Here, the fact that there was no purpose of tax avoidance can be proven by means of proving that there was another purpose, other than the purpose of tax avoidance. However, as the nominal owner who bears the burden of proof, there was a clear objective of tax avoidance to the extent that there was no purpose of tax avoidance in the title trust, and if there was no tax evasion in the future at the time of the title trust or in the future by objective and conclusive evidence, it should be proved to the extent that there was no doubt (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du1220, Sept. 22, 2006).

(2) According to the evidence No. 1 No. 1 and No. 5 with respect to this case, it can be acknowledged that, even if it was established on May 9, 200, 200, it was closed on May 31, 200, when it operated an individual business entity with ○○ 1 and operated an ordinary iron manufacturing business from November 1, 1984, and it was established on May 31, 200, it is not necessary that the above ○ 1 and No. 5 were operated as an individual business entity on July 26, 199; however, in light of the fact that ○ 1 and No. 1 and No. 1 and No. 2 were operated on the basis of the fact that the actual operator of ○ 1 and No. 5 were the same as the 0-year 0-year 1 and No. 20-year 1 and no other purpose of the 0-year 1 and no other purpose of the 2-year 3-year 1 and no other purpose of the 10-year 3-year 1.

(3) Therefore, the disposition of this case is lawful.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim of this case is dismissed in entirety as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.