[2] Where a tax statute was amended disadvantageous to a taxpayer, the requirements to apply the previous provision favorable to a taxpayer for the purpose of protecting the taxpayer's rights to obtain a license or trust

[3] The case holding that in the case of farmland transferred after January 1, 1999 by the Special Act on the Restriction of Special Taxation enforced, the previous provisions on the exemption of capital gains tax for self-arable farmland do not apply

A. Article 5 (1) 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 5584 of Dec. 28, 1998) provides that income accruing from the transfer of land which is subject to farmland tax as prescribed by the Presidential Decree shall be exempted from capital gains tax under the conditions as prescribed by the Presidential Decree. Article 54 (2) 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14869 of Dec. 30, 1995) provides that the former Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1996 of Dec. 16, 200) provides that "the former Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14869 of Dec. 30, 1995)" shall be one of the residents residing in the seat of the farmland for 8 or more years, and Article 23 (2) 2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 19406 of the same Act).

B. As such, in the case of a specialized amendment of the amended Act, it is the same as the repeal of the existing Act and the enactment of the new Act, and therefore, all of the provisions of the Addenda of the previous Act shall be deemed null and void, barring any special circumstance (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du1168, Jul. 26, 2002). Meanwhile, in the case where a tax statute was amended disadvantageous to a taxpayer, the former provisions are applied to a taxpayer for the purpose of acquiring rights or protecting trust of the taxpayer based on the transitional provisions, such as Article 9(2) of the Addenda of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act, even if the former provisions, which were effective at the time of the act causing the cause before the establishment of the tax liability, are met based on the act causing the tax exemption, and thus, it shall not be deemed that the former provisions of the Special Provisions on Taxation, even if a taxpayer trusted tax exemption, etc. based on the act causing the tax exemption, and thus, it shall not be deemed that the former provisions on the exemption of tax exemption, exemption, or postponement, etc.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation of transitional provisions as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

Therefore, this part of the ground of appeal is without merit.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its judgment. Since the Daejeon-gu, which started to reside from March 23, 1990, was an autonomous Gu adjacent to the Daejeon-gu, where the land of this case was originally located, and the Seo-gu was newly established following the administrative district reorganization on January 1, 1988, and thus, it was not an autonomous Gu adjacent to the Daejeon-gu, and thus, since it was not adjacent to the Daejeon-gu, the administrative district reorganization, the above administrative district reorganization had been completed, the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff who owned the land of this case from around January 1, 1980, should be treated as an autonomous Gu adjacent to the Daejeon-gu, Daejeon-gu, Daejeon-gu, Daejeon-gu, which was not an autonomous Gu adjacent to the Sungsung-gu, Daejeon-gu, Daejeon-gu, Daejeon-gu, Daejeon-gu, and therefore, in determining whether the plaintiff's residential condition of this case was met, it could not be viewed that it could not adjoin the Daejeon-gu, Daejeon-gu.

In light of the relevant laws and records, the above judgment of the court below is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to Si/Gun/Gu adjacent to them, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

Therefore, this part of the grounds of appeal is without merit.

3. As to the third ground for appeal

The court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff had been living in the Daejeon Pyeong-dong from June 1990 to June 200, since the time he transferred only his resident registration to Daejeon-dong, by deeming that there is no evidence to acknowledge it. In light of the records, the court below's measures such as the above are just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the facts against the rules of evidence.

The ground of appeal on this part is without merit.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Hong-hoon (Presiding Justice)