[2] The legislative intent of Article 6-2 (1) 3 of the former Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers stipulating that "where a user company continues to use temporary agency workers for more than two years, the relevant temporary agency workers must be directly employed."

[3] In a case where Gap company's employees who entered into a contract for manufacturing and selling cars, etc. with Gap company and Eul et al. who worked in the research institute of Gap company sought confirmation of workers' status against Eul company, the case affirming the judgment below holding that Eul et al. was in a worker dispatch relationship after employed by the cooperation company and dispatched to the research institute of Gap company and under the direction and order of Gap company under Article 6-2 (1) of the former Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers, and that Gap company is obligated to bear a direct employment obligation for Eul et al. from the day following the second-year period from the beginning date of each temporary agency worker dispatch work of Eul et al. under Article 6-2 (1) of the former Act,

[4] The effective scope of interruption of extinctive prescription where a lawsuit is filed against only a part of one claim

1. As to the grounds of appeal on whether workers are dispatched and on the legal effect of the direct employment obligation

A. According to Article 2 subparag. 1 of the former Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers (amended by Act No. 11279, Feb. 1, 2012; hereinafter “former Dispatch Act”), “temporary placement of workers” means that a temporary work agency employs a worker and has him/her engage in work for a user company under the direction and order of the user company in accordance with the terms of the contract on temporary placement of workers while maintaining the employment relationship. In cases where a user company allows a certain employee to engage in work for a third party, whether the legal effect of a temporary placement of workers subject to the former Dispatch Act is not attributable to the name or form of the contract attached by the party, but is not attributable to the third party. Whether a third party is practically incorporated into a third party’s business, such as providing a binding order on the performance of his/her work directly or indirectly, whether the relevant worker can be deemed as having been placed in the work of the third party, whether the worker can be placed in the work of the Plaintiff or workers, whether the work of the worker is performed independently and specifically.

Meanwhile, Article 6-2(1)3 of the former Dispatch Act provides that “If a user company continues to use temporary agency workers for more than two years, the user company shall directly employ the relevant temporary agency workers.” This provision establishes the legal relationship and the legal effect arising between the user company and the temporary agency worker by imposing a user company a direct employment obligation on the user company separate from administrative supervision or criminal punishment on the continuous use of temporary agency workers in violation of the restriction on the period of secondment. The legislative purpose of the aforementioned provision is to prevent commercialization and long-termization of temporary agency workers and promote employment stability of the temporary agency workers (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2013Da14965, Nov. 26, 2015; 2017Da219072, 21989, 21096, 2196, 2102, 2191; 219, 2191, 21926, 2193, etc.).

B. Based on the evidence adopted, the lower court acknowledged the facts as indicated in its reasoning. The Plaintiffs, as employees of the Defendant’s ○○ Research Institute, participated in part of the production process of automobile workers in accordance with the Defendant’s work hours, and relatively simple and repetitive work is conducted in accordance with the Defendant’s production plan. As such, there was no difference between the Defendant’s individual orders for work volume, work methods, order of work, work time, etc., and the Defendant’s regular employees changed work methods from time to time, and notified the subcontractor’s employees of the work contents to be handled urgently. The Plaintiffs were virtually not allowed to refuse the request of the subcontractor or the subcontractor’s work discretion in the process of carrying out the instant painting work. The Plaintiffs did not have any specific work to be carried out by the Defendant’s ○○ Research Institute as a means of conducting research and development of the instant painting work, etc., and determined that the Defendant’s work was relatively closely related to the Defendant’s work and development, including the Defendant’s work to be conducted under the Defendant’s own name and order of work to be conducted under the Defendant’s own name.

Then, the lower court determined that the Defendant is obligated to pay the Defendant the amount of damages equivalent to the wages arising from nonperformance of the duty of direct employment, on the ground that the Plaintiffs, who were dispatched, are obligated to pay the direct employment liability to the Plaintiffs from the day immediately following the expiry of the two-year period from the starting date of each temporary agency work of the Plaintiffs pursuant to Article 6-2(1) of the former Dispatch Act, on the ground that the Plaintiffs, as the temporary agency worker, have continuously worked for more than two years from the date when the Plaintiffs were

In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, or by misapprehending the legal principles as to the requirements for temporary placement of workers or the criteria for distinguishing them from internal contracts, allocation of burden of proof, and the legal nature of the provision on

2. As to the ground of appeal on interruption of extinctive prescription

In a case where a lawsuit is instituted by clarifying the purport that a judgment is sought only for a part of one claim, the interruption of extinctive prescription by the lawsuit shall take effect only for that part, and the remainder shall not take place. However, even in a case where only a part of the claims is claimed, if it is interpreted to seek a judgment on the whole claim in view of the purport thereof, the claim amount shall be deemed the whole of the claim, and in such a case, the interruption of prescription shall take effect within the scope of the identity of the claim (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da43695 delivered on April 10, 1992, etc.

The court below rejected the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription based on the ground that the interruption of extinctive prescription becomes effective for all the quoted claims, on the ground that the claim amount by the plaintiff is three million won in the complaint submitted by the plaintiffs, but it clearly stated that only a part of the total claim is to be paid, from the time of the lawsuit in this case, on the premise that the extension of the claim in the future is sought.

In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on extinctive prescription or the interruption thereof, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Noh Tae-tae (Presiding Justice)