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(영문) 대법원 1985. 1. 29. 선고 84다카1430 판결

[토지소유권이전등기][집33(1)민,15;공1985.3.15.(748) 360]

Main Issues

In a case where a third party refused to return a letter of agreement containing a method of attack and defense during the proceeding of a lawsuit and received a judgment of conviction, whether it constitutes grounds for retrial under Article 422(1)5 of the Civil Procedure Act (affirmative)

Summary of Judgment

If a third party refuses to return a joint opinion containing a method of attack and defense as to a case subject to review during the proceeding of the lawsuit, the so-called refusal to return is not likely to obstruct submission of the method of attack and defense, but if the person was convicted of embezzlement due to such refusal, it constitutes grounds for retrial under Article 422(1)5 of the Civil Procedure Act.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 422(1) of the Civil Procedure Act

[Judgment of the court below]

Kim Jong-won et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Defendant-Appellants Review Plaintiff

Attorney Kim Tae-tae, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Judgment of the lower court

Gwangju High Court Decision 83Da4 delivered on June 8, 1984

Text

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The court below's reasoning is that the witness of the first instance court and the second instance court (the second instance court) who adopted as evidence of fact-finding in the judgment subject to new trial was made false testimony, and the defendant was notified of a summary order of 50,000 won as of February 5, 1982, and the defendant received a certified copy of the above summary order from the Jeju District Prosecutors' Office on November 13, 1982, and therefore, the defendant was aware that the judgment of perjury against the witness of the first instance court and the first instance court was finalized at the latest. Thus, the defendant was aware that the judgment of perjury against the witness of the first instance court and the first instance court was finalized at the latest. Since it is obvious that the defendant filed a new trial suit more than 30 days after the above date, the defendant's request for new trial based on the above reason is dismissed because the period

According to the records, the defendant filed a new trial suit on September 29, 1983 due to the following causes or interference with the submission of attack and defense (Article 422 (1) 5 of the Civil Procedure Act) and filed a new trial suit on March 5, 1984 (record 348 pages) that the case subject to new trial was pending in the appellate court on January 22, 1981, which was the witness of the first instance and the first instance court, and testified to take an oath on the witness of the first instance court and the first instance court on May 15, 1975, each letter (Evidence 4) as of October 20, 1978, which was not prepared between the defendant. Since the above statements were not invalidated on May 15, 1975, the defendant's new trial office did not have the right to file a new trial for the same reasons as the above summary order on October 28, 1983, which became final and conclusive.

On February 25, 1979, the witness of the first instance court and the first instance court who reviewed the above summary order, which became final and conclusive based on the records, was punished as being a false notarial fact that the defendant made an oath at the Gwangju High Court, the first instance court and the first instance court did not say that the above facts were different from the above facts as alleged in the ground for retrial, and according to the records, the above facts cited as grounds for retrial could be forged as evidence by the criminal records invoked by the defendant, and that the above facts were proved to have been proved to have been proved to have been proved to have been proved to have been insufficient to conclude that the above facts were proved to have been proved to have been proved to have been proven by the fact findings of the judgment subject to retrial, and that the above facts, which were cited as grounds for retrial, were not proven to have been proved to have been proved as evidence by the criminal records invoked by the defendant, and that the above part of the above evidence was affixed to the judgment subject to retrial without deliberation and decision as to the above facts.

2. According to the evidence Nos. 9 (Judgment) in the latter part of the reasoning of the judgment below, the witness of the court of first instance and the court of first instance should not interpret that the act of refusing the return of the salt No. 9, which is consistent with the defendant's argument, was rejected and embezzled even after being requested by the defendant for return, or that the act of another person subject to criminal punishment under Article 422 (1) 5 of the Civil Procedure Act was obstructed by submitting methods of attack and defense, which affect the judgment, due to the act of another person subject to criminal punishment, means the case where the submission of the methods of attack and defense is directly obstructed by the party's act of attack and defense in the litigation procedure concerned. The court cannot interpret that the act of refusing the return of the salt No. 1 and the witness at the court of first instance cannot be deemed directly hindered by the defendant's submission of defense methods, and that the witness's act of refusing the return of the salt No. 11-1 through 34 of the judgment of the court below is without merit.

Upon examining the criminal judgment of the witness Eul in accordance with the record, it can be known that the witness of the first instance court and the first instance court refused to return the salt and embezzled the salt in the first instance court and the first instance court's decision. According to this, the contents of the salt certificate can only be used as an attack and defense against the present case between the above members of the first instance court and the Kim Jong-soo, such as Article 2.3.4, and agreed that the contents of the agreement between the Kim Jong-won and Kim Jong-soo, such as Article 2.3.4, should be null and void, and two copies of the salt certificate shall be prepared as a party, signed and sealed as the party concerned and signed as the witness, and all of the members of the first instance court and the first instance court who kept the salt certificate shall be kept as the witness, and therefore, it shall not be deemed that the witness of the first instance court and the first instance court refused to return the salt certificate and embezzled it. Accordingly, the court below's determination of the first instance court's conviction and defense against the above violation of the law.

Therefore, it is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating judges who decide to reverse and remand the judgment of the court below on the grounds of its reasoning.

Justices Lee Lee Sung-soo (Presiding Justice)

No signature shall be signed upon retirement of a judge of the Supreme Court;