1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the following facts based on the macro evidence: the building in this case owned by the plaintiff was registered as a house on the public account books such as the registry and the copy of the building management ledger among the land in this case, and the building in this case (hereinafter referred to as the "building in this case") is actually being used as commercial buildings such as a printing office, automobile parts sales office, literary driving school, and infant driving school, etc. before the plaintiff's acquisition of the building in this case, and it is not used as a residential building. In light of the legislative purpose of the law and the principle of substantial taxation, it is reasonable to view that the building in this case does not fall under the housing stipulated in Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the Act, and therefore, it does not fall under the housing site subject to the law, and therefore, the defendant's disposition of taxation in this case is unlawful.

2. However, as recognized by the court below, if the building of this case is actually used as commercial building even though it was registered as a house on the public register of the registry and the building management ledger, it shall be deemed that the building which was permitted to be used for the original residential purpose is used for other purpose than a house without due process of change of use, and if the building constructed for the original residential purpose and registered as a house for the original residential purpose is used for other purpose without due cause, barring special circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the site of the building still falls under the site subject to the regulation of the law, regardless of the subsequent illegal change of use (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Nu1688, Mar. 25, 1994; 94Nu1968, May 10, 1994; 94Nu10528, Dec. 23, 1994; see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Nu10528, Dec. 23, 1994>

In addition, as long as a building permitted to be used for residential purposes is used by illegally altering its use at the beginning, such interpretation does not change the above interpretation that the time of change of use should be regarded as a site for the building because the time of change of use is promulgated, enforced, or the Plaintiff’s transfer to the acquisition of the building.

On the other hand, the judgment of the party members cited by the court below (Supreme Court Decision 93Nu21941 delivered on February 22, 1994) was newly constructed with permission for business use and neighborhood living facilities from the original point of time, and used for the original purpose. However, it is related to the case where only the building management ledger is a building and the purpose of use is a house, and thus, it is inappropriate to invoke the case in this case.

3. Nevertheless, under the premise that whether it falls under a housing site under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (a) of the Act, regardless of the purpose entered in the public register, the court below, however, should be determined on the basis of its substance, regardless of whether it is a housing site as stated in the public register, and the part of the site of the building in this case which is actually used as commercial building does not constitute a housing site. Thus, it cannot be said that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the housing site under the Act, and there is a reason to point this out.

4. Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)