(b) Interference with business;

2. B

3. C.

4. D;

5. E.

6. F;

7. G.

8. H;

9. I

10, J

Attorney CV (Defendant C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J)

The part of the judgment of the court below that violated the Public Official Election Act due to the publication of false facts by Defendant A is reversed. The charge that Defendant A violated the Public Official Election Act due to publication of false facts among the facts charged in the

All of the appeals by Defendant A and the Prosecutor against the crime of interference with business among the judgment below are dismissed. Defendant B, C, D, E, F, G, H. I, and the appeal by the said Defendants and the Prosecutor are all dismissed.

A. Defendant A and B

1) Defendant A and B’s assertion on the crime of interference with business

A) Defendant A and B did not agree with the person who opened the instant short-term telephone, including Defendant D, with regard to the establishment of the instant short-term telephone, conversion of call, and false entry of gender, age, etc. in the public opinion poll.

B) AX, an institution that conducted a public opinion poll at the request of Defendant A, may conduct an investigation on the schedule of the survey and the timing of the survey at the request of the requester, as well as on the size of samples, whether the results of the survey are to be published, etc. under favorable conditions to the requester. Moreover, the crime of interference with business against X is not established since X, which is a public opinion poll institution, did not raise any problem but did not interfere with business

C) The lower court cited the fact that the results of the public opinion poll in the intra-party competition for the selection of 0 market candidates for PPP candidates are reflected in the ratio of 50% on the grounds of recognizing the establishment of the crime of interference with business with the management of the PP P PP P P P P P P P P P P P. However, the public opinion poll conducted to be reflected in the intra-party competition for the selection of 0 market candidates refers to a public opinion poll separately conducted for 4 competition candidates selected according to the results of the instant public opinion poll conducted through AC, a public opinion poll. As such, the lower court erred by misapprehending the fact that the results of the public opinion poll in the intra-party competition for the selection of 0 market candidates were reflected in the ratio of 50% on the grounds of the establishment of the crime of interference with business with the public opinion poll for the P P P P P P P. Do Committee. Moreover, even if the public opinion poll conducted by AC at the request of the Committee on the Management of P PP 3,000.

2) Defendant A’s assertion on a violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the publication of false facts

A) Defendant A was unaware of the distortion of the outcome of the public opinion poll through the establishment of the instant short-term phone, and there was no awareness about the falsity of the outcome of the public opinion poll.

B) Defendant A did not order the publication of the results of the public opinion poll to BF.

C) In order to establish the crime of expressing false facts related to the intraparty competition under Article 250(3) of the Public Official Election Act, the public notice of false facts as to the place of birth, status, occupation, career, property, personality, act, affiliated organization, etc. of the competition candidate is based on the premise that the public notice of the results of the public opinion poll conducted by X is made on the premise that the public notice of the results of the public opinion poll conducted by X is made on the premise that the public notice of the results of the public opinion poll conducted by the competition candidate is made on the premise that the public notice of such false facts is made on the "career of Defendant A, who is the competition candidate". However, the public opinion poll

D) As the result of the public opinion poll conducted by X was published without any modification, it cannot be viewed as a false fact.

E) A public opinion poll conducted by X is unrelated to Defendant A’s individual request before the intra-party competition took place. As such, the act of publishing the results of the public opinion poll does not constitute a crime of publishing false facts related to the intra-party competition.

3) Claim on unreasonable sentencing

Each punishment sentenced by the court below to Defendant A and B (Defendant A: 10 months of imprisonment with prison labor for the crime of interference with business, 2 years of suspended execution, and 3 million won of fine for the crime of violation of the Public Official Election Act due to publication of false facts, and 5 million won of fine) are too unreasonable.

(b) Defendant C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J

The sentence of the lower court (Defendant C, Defendant E, and F: Imprisonment for 8 months in prison, 2 years in suspended sentence, 6 months in prison, 2 years in suspended sentence, Defendant G: fine of 4 million won in prison, Defendant H, I, and J: each fine of 2 million won in prison) is too unreasonable.

(c) Prosecutors;

1) misunderstanding of facts and misapprehension of legal principles

A) As to the violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the publication of false facts related to the intra-party competition against the remaining Defendants except Defendant A, the aforementioned Defendants’ manipulation of the results of the public opinion poll is an act aimed at gathering and distributing false facts through the media to the general public that the support rate of Defendant A increases by informing the general voters of the manipulation of the results of the public opinion poll. The act of publishing the false facts in this case was combined with the act of forging false facts through the manipulation of the results of the public opinion poll and posting them on the website of the National Election Commission of Korea. The act of publishing the false facts in this case should be held liable as co-offender for the entire act if it does not deviate from the public opinion poll relationship. In full view of the fact that any of the Defendants participated in the act of publishing false facts, and did not depart from the public opinion poll relationship before the act of spreading such false facts, the remaining Defendants other than the Defendant shall be deemed to constitute a co-principal of the crime of violating the Public Official Election Act due to the publication of the false facts in this case. Nevertheless, the lower court determined that there was insufficient evidence to acknowledge that there was any false facts as to acknowledge.

There is an error of law that affected the conclusion of the judgment by misunderstanding legal principles.

B) As to the violation of the Public Official Election Act in accordance with the election campaign by telephone, this part of the indictment was prosecuted to the effect that each telephone call as stated in the facts charged was one crime and that there was an election campaign to the extent that the number of telephone calls in the election campaign office of Defendant A did not have been charged for concurrent crimes. However, since the number of telephone calls in the election campaign office of Defendant A increased by a specific day prior to the public opinion poll on the intra-party competition, the Defendants are showing the fact that the election campaign by telephone was conducted by themselves, and there was a witness’s statement that the Defendants had complied with the election campaign by telephone, it may be recognized that the Defendants had carried out an election campaign using telephone to the extent corresponding to the number of telephone calls, and such act constitutes a violation of the Public Official Election Act. Nevertheless, the lower court acquitted the Defendants of this part of the facts charged on the grounds that there is no evidence to support the fact that each telephone call recorded in the facts charged was to request support of Defendant A. Therefore, the lower

2) Unreasonable sentencing

Even if all of the facts charged are not guilty, the lower court’s punishment against the Defendants is too unfasible and unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. As to Defendant A and B’s assertion of misunderstanding of facts

1) As to the crime of interference with business

A) Whether the crime of interference with business was publicly recruited

(1) In relation to accomplices who are co-processed with two or more crimes, a statutory penalty is not required, and there is a combination of two or more persons to jointly process and realize crimes. Although there is no process of the whole conspiracy, if a combination of intent is made in order or impliedly through several persons, even though there is no process of the whole conspiracy, a conspiracy relationship is established. In addition, if the defendant denies the conspiracy, which is a subjective element of the crime, it is inevitable to prove it by means of proving indirect facts or circumstantial facts having considerable relevance to the nature of the crime, and in such a case, what constitutes indirect facts having considerable relevance should be reasonably determined by the close observation or analysis power based on normal empirical rule (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Do9721, Dec. 22, 2011).

(2) According to the evidence duly admitted and examined by the lower court, the following facts and circumstances can be reasonably inferred therefrom are revealed.

① From March 12, 2014, Defendant A and B opened a short-term telephone for the first time on April 4, 2014, Defendant C, D, E, E, F, G, H, I, J, etc., Defendant A, a member of Defendant A’s election campaign, opened a short-term telephone in order. The short-term telephone opening meeting revealed through the instant investigation process is 577 lines totaling 577 lines, and the nominal owner is 52 persons (BX, CW, a corporation established by AR, the seat of Defendant A).

It is a short-term telephone in the name.

② From among short-term telephones opened intensively in a short term, only 30 lines established under Defendant A’s name and 10 lines established under Defendant C’s name, were installed and used. The rest of the lines was turned back to the mobile phone of the founder himself/herself or the wire telephone installed at the election campaign office of Defendant A.

③ In the public opinion poll conducted by X and AC, the said short-term telephone founders responded to 117 times, and considerable number of respondents entered the age and gender in a false manner (80 times when the age was falsely entered). As above, in the case of entering a false age, the person who provided false answers was chosen to choose the age when weight is given compared to the actual age, and some of the persons who provided false answers were asked to open a short-term phone for the reasons why they provided false answers.

④ Most of the Defendants, including Defendant A and B, stated that they opened a short-term phone or requested the opening of a short-term phone according to their independent judgment in order to assist Defendant A. However, the fact that the establishment of the short-term phone was concentrated prior to each of the instant public opinion polls ( particularly from March 26, 2014 to March 28, 2014, which was X’s public opinion poll), and that a large number of respondents responded to the false age in which weight is given differently from their age cannot be deemed as a result of an incidental decision by each individual of the short-term telephone operators.

⑤ Defendant B, after having filed an application for 11 short-term telephone in his own name for promotion of telephone publicity, stated that Defendant A, the husband, was prohibited from installing a short-term telephone in order to promote telephone publicity. However, it is difficult to understand that Defendant B, the husband, applied for a short-term telephone opening of 11 short-term telephone without actually preparing for telephone calls, and that Defendant B, the husband, should not open a short-term telephone from Defendant A, and it is difficult to believe that it actually responded to the public opinion poll, even though considering that Defendant B was involved in the establishment of a short-term telephone in preparation for public opinion polls in preparation for public opinion polls with Defendant A.

6) Both Defendant A-type BD, A-type A-type BD (Defendant A-type CX’s wife), and Q (Defendant A-type CY’s type) opened a short-term telephone on March 24, 2014 and transferred to the call. While the above BD, AD, and Q were punished by Defendant A, they do not engage in activities for Defendant A with any position in an election campaign. These BD, AD, and Q opened a short-term telephone on the same day without the involvement of Defendant A and B, it cannot be deemed that the opening of a short-term telephone on the same day does not constitute a favorable outcome according to the independent judgment without the involvement of the Defendant A-B (BD) and was subject to independent judgment after hearing the horses on the short-term telephone at the public bath and following the solicitation of Defendant B-B, Q was admitted to the Defendant’s age, and it is difficult to view that Q, as the result of the Defendant’s invitation to open a new phone on the same day as that of Defendant AF’s phone, it was in full view that Q was opened a new.

7) AR ordered 20 short-term telephone in the name of BX to be opened in the name of BX, and 20 short-term telephone in the name of CW. PP opened 20 short-term telephone in the name of BX on March 27, 2014, and opened 20 short-term telephone in the name of CW on April 2, 2014. BP opened 20 short-term telephone in the name of CW, a company, 20 short-term telephone in the name of BX, and then called 20 short-term telephone in the name of BX, a company, and then called 20 short-term telephone in the name of A to inform the Defendant of the telephone number to be transferred to A, and it continued to have been called 30 minutes after the first answer to the said telephone. In light of the foregoing, BP was notified by the Director-General of A’s phone number to be used in the name of the Defendant’s election campaign office, and notified the Defendant’s new phone number as the Plaintiff’s phone number.

8) The number of 5,10,20 numbers and the name of a specific person are stated in the name of Eup/Myeon/Dong which is the administrative district of 0. The above number and name correspond to the short-term telephone founder as revealed in the investigation process of this case and the short-term telephone player opened by him/her. In addition, the above 10,000 households and 10,000 households and 100,000 households are stated in the above 10,000 households and 10,000 households and 10,000 households are stated in the above 10,000 households and 50,000,000 households and 10,000,000 households and 50,000 or 60,000 households and 10,000,000 won and 10,000,000 won and 10,000,000 won and 10,000,00.

As such, the fact that Defendant A entered the matters concerning the short-term telephone opening in the election campaign office was directly involved in the opening of the short-term telephone in this case.

(3) In full view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, and other circumstances, 577 short-term calls were established in each of the instant public opinion pollss immediately before each of the instant public opinion pollss, and only only part of those calls were installed. The remainder is sufficient to fully recognize the fact that Defendant A and B took part in a series of acts, including the fact that most of the false ages and gender were entered in the public opinion poll response via the short-term telephone line established, Defendant A and the person who opened the short-term phone, and the relationship between Defendant A and the person who opened the short-term phone, as above, the series of acts, which were conducted through the chain of command at an organization organized by the head of a local government election office, and the power of dominance and force through the chain of command at the organization organized by the head of a local government election office, the progress of each of the instant public opinion poll, the process of the Defendants’ statements and other related persons, and the attitude of responding and ambiguously responding to the facts unfavorable to the Defendants.

Therefore, Defendant A and B cannot be exempted from the liability of crime as joint principal offender of each of the instant interference with business.

B) Whether interference with X’s business

(1) In the crime of interference with business by fraudulent means, “the crime of interference with business” refers to using a deceptive scheme by causing mistake, dismissal, or land to the other party in order to achieve the purpose of the act. The establishment of the crime of interference with business is sufficient if the result of interference with business is not required to actually occur, and if the result of interference with business is likely to result in interference with business, not by itself, but by the case where the propriety or fairness of business is interfered (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Do8506, Mar. 25,

(2) The public opinion polls on election should be conducted in an objective and fair manner in order to ensure the credibility of the outcome of the public opinion polls, and any person shall select those to be polled in order to secure the representation of the entire subject matter of the public opinion polls. However, the short-term telephone subscribers, including the Defendants, opened a short-term telephone prior to the public opinion poll in the instant case and returned to their mobile phones or wire phones installed in the election campaign office of Defendant A, and then distorted the outcome of the public opinion poll by responding to the false age and gender in the telephone public opinion polls. This act is clear that it is an act of interfering with the public opinion poll’s business conducted for the purpose of fairly investigating the percentage of support for the candidates, and it does not change because the public opinion poll pursuant to X did not have any special problem raised as to the distorted result of the public opinion poll at the request of Defendant A or distorted from X.

Therefore, this part of the defendant A and B's assertion is without merit.

C) Whether business activities are interfered with by the Committee on Management of Public Works for the Gyeongcheon-do Office of Pound-do

The Defendants pointed out that public opinion polls conducted to reflect the rate of 50% in the intra-party competition for the selection of candidates for the PP market is conducted separately from the public opinion poll of this case conducted through AC. However, the public opinion poll related to the election should be conducted objectively and fairly in order to secure the credibility of the results thereof. When conducting public opinion polls, any person is required to select those to be polled who are to be polled so as to secure the representation of the entire results of the public opinion poll as seen above. In collusion with the Defendants A and B set up a short-term telephone prior to the public opinion poll in collusion with other Defendants, set up a short-term telephone prior to the public opinion poll in collusion with them, set up a false age, gender response, and distorted the results of public opinion poll in the public opinion poll at the election campaign office of their own mobile phones or Defendant A, and based on this, it is clear that the act of interfering with the competition management business of the PGyeongbuk-do Election Commission, which intended to select a candidate for the intraparty competition. Thus, even if there is no possibility that the act of interference with business in this case is no possibility of interference with business.

2) As to the violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the publication of false information

A) Summary of this part of the facts charged

Defendant A registered as a preliminary candidate for the 0th simultaneous local elections held on June 4, 2014 and applied for the 0th simultaneous elections at P, Defendant A’s spouse; Defendant B was an election campaign manager of Defendant A’s election campaign office; Defendant C was in charge of general affairs management; Defendant D was in the office of Qgu head of Qgu head of the above election campaign office as an elementary school unit of Defendant A; but, from the beginning of March 2014, R, who was working as the general head of the headquarters at the office of Korea, did not perform his overall election organization on behalf of R, and Defendant A was in charge of overall election organization; Defendant B was in charge of election campaign at the 6th simultaneous local elections held on the 0th simultaneous local elections held on June 4, 2014; Defendant B was in charge of election campaign at the 0th election campaign office; Defendant B was in charge of election campaign at the 0th regular election campaign office; Defendant C was in charge of election campaign at the 1st election campaign office’s direction of Defendant Qgu head of Defendant Q.

From December 2, 2013, the Defendants: (a) from the office of the organization called V, which advocates the regional salary-class organization, Defendant A’s preparation for the publication commemorative meeting, recruitment of members of the election organization, and development of election pledge; and (b) since the establishment of an official election campaign office on February 1, 2014, the Defendants took place on the election campaign since they moved to 7th floor of W building on the beginning of February 2014; (c) however, (d) there was a possibility of limiting the rate of support for the competition candidate to 2 or 3rd in the field of the public opinion poll; (b) there was a big gap between A’s support rate of 1 and 2, and (c) there was a stable difference between the support rate of the candidates and 3rd in the field of the public opinion poll, and (d) there was no possibility that the selection of the competition candidate scheduled on April 19, 2014 may be distorted to 10%, and (e) there was a high possibility that the result of the public opinion poll and 50% of the result.

The Defendants subscribed to multiple short-term excursion ship calls per capita (short-term excursion ship calls are ordinarily used for event, with a period of time from one month to three months; hereinafter referred to as "short-term telephone"), and subscribed to the short-term phone of a specific person or election campaign office to the mobile phone or the wire telephone of an election campaign office to increase the rate of receipt of the public opinion poll and response to the public opinion poll by Defendant A, with a high age limit of 20 to 30, in response to the same public opinion poll, by a person who answers or answers a false answer at the age limit of 20 to 30, with a high age limit of 577, including the Defendants, in the name of 577 short-term telephone, as indicated in the annexed list of crimes, and subsequently, agreed to operate the rate of support of the public opinion poll of Defendant A to be calculated differently from the actual ones. < Amended by Act No. 12517, Mar. 12, 2014>

The Defendants, as above, opened a short-term telephone of 3 to 20 units per 1 candidate, and thereafter, opened a public opinion poll of 1 X at the request of Defendant A, from April 3, 2014 to April 4, 2014, and entered the age group of 74 times as stated in the public opinion poll, thereby raising the response rate and weight of those who support Defendant A, 143 [26 persons who falsely responded to 20 x 6 x 29 x 36 x 44 x 5 x 5 x 10 x 4 x 4 x 10 x 4 x 4 x 5 x 4 x 5 x 4 x 4 x 5 x 4 x 4 x 5 x 4 x 4 x 5 x 5 x 4 x 5 x 4 x x 5 x 1 answers.

B) The judgment of the court below

The lower court found Defendant A guilty of this part of the facts charged on the ground that X’s results of the public opinion poll were false answers by telephone subscribers or election campaign workers, etc. of this case, distorted by multiple answers, and thus cannot be deemed to conform to the truth (the remaining Defendant except the Defendant A was acquitted on the grounds that there is no evidence to acknowledge that the said Defendants participated in the publication of the results of public opinion poll by X).

C) The judgment of this Court

Article 250 (1) of the Public Official Election Act provides that "a person who publishes or makes another person publish false facts (including a case where he/she is not published in the manner provided for in Article 64 (1) in cases where he/she publishes academic background) with respect to property, personality, act, organization to which he/she belongs, etc., such as the place of birth, status, occupation, career, etc. of a candidate, his/her spouse, lineal ascendants or descendants or siblings, or his/her affiliated therewith, in favor of a candidate (including a person who intends to become a candidate; hereafter the same shall apply in this Article) by means of a speech, broadcast, newspaper, communication, magazine, poster, propaganda document, or other means for the purpose of being elected or making another person be elected, and a person who holds a false fact for the purpose of distributing a propaganda document stating false facts shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or by a fine not exceeding 30 million won" in Article 250 (3) of the Public Official Election Act.

On the other hand, this part of the facts charged is the crime of publishing false facts related to the intra-party competition under Article 250 (3) of the Public Official Election Act on the premise that the result of public opinion polls distorted by the opening of the instant short-term phone and the conversion of call and the aforementioned short-term phone calls constitutes false facts about the 'career of the competition candidate for the 0 market competition for the PP.'. The act of registering the results of the public opinion poll on the website of the Central Committee for Deliberation on Public Opinion polls on Election of North Korea and reporting them to the local media companies, such as the current and current newspaper

However, "career, etc." under Article 250 (1) of the Public Official Election Act refers to a candidate's career, academic background, and degree punishment (Article 64 (5) of the Public Official Election Act), and "career" refers to a matter that affects the fair judgment of electors by recognizing the candidate's performance and ability as the candidate's behavior or private affairs. Therefore, whether an organization or elector supports or recommends a specific candidate is not a matter concerning the candidate's behavior or private affairs, and thus, it is not included in the facts concerning "ordinary ability" as mentioned above, and it is not permissible to interpret a different interpretation contrary to the principle of no punishment without law because it excessively expands penal provisions and excessively expands criminal regulations (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Do16942, Mar. 10, 2011).

Defendant A and other Defendants, including Defendant A, opened a short-term telephone for 577 short-term calls from the short-term telephone subscribers or election campaign offices to start to the short-term telephone subscribers, and followed false answers to age and gender in the public opinion poll conducted by X, which is an institution conducting the public opinion poll, and thereby distorted the results of such public opinion poll as mentioned above. The results of such public opinion poll do not coincide with the actual support rate (the result of public opinion poll conducted in a fair and fair manner) of electors for those who filed an application for public opinion poll as a candidate for the market. However, the results of the public opinion poll of this case are calculated by using statistical methods, such as degree of support for voters' candidates and those who were actually subject to the public opinion poll (1,090 electors) from among the electors of the market election, which is the public opinion poll, and the contents of the public opinion poll of this case include 50,000 applicants for the public opinion poll of each candidate including Defendant A, and thus, it cannot be found that there were no errors in the public opinion poll or the aforementioned facts.

B. As to the prosecutor's assertion of mistake

1) As to the violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the publication of false facts related to the intraparty competition against the remaining Defendants except Defendant A, this part of the facts charged constitute a case where there is no proof of a crime as seen earlier. The judgment of the court below on this part is different from the judgment of this court in its reasoning, but its conclusion is justified in that it constitutes a case where there is no proof of the crime, and thus, it constitutes

Therefore, we cannot accept the prosecutor's argument on this part.

2) According to the evidence duly admitted and examined by the court below as to the violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the election campaign by telephone, the court below acknowledged that there was a number of telephone calls as mentioned above using wire phones installed in the Defendant’s election campaign office on each day specified in this part of the facts charged. Meanwhile, according to the prosecutor’s written statement of each protocol of examination of suspect suspect about AY, AY made a statement to the effect that “AY visited A’s election campaign office around April 2014, and two female volunteers visited A, who served as a professor of the Local Administrative Training Institute at the time of the market election, and asked A to support” (the investigative record 2281, 3648, 3649).

However, considering that Defendant A’s telephone calls were related to election campaign, and in particular, there is no evidence to recognize that two female volunteers witness A and B were involved in election campaign [this case’s short-term telephone opening and transition, etc. are true from the beginning of investigation, Defendant J stated that the election campaign was not carried out by the head of the office or the head of the situation office without permission (201 pages of investigation records), and CM also, who was in charge of election campaign or sending text messages at the election campaign office of Defendant A, stated to the effect that “the election campaign is not carried out by a party member of the same political party” and “the election campaign is not carried out by a party member of the same political party” under the main sentence of Article 58(1) of the Public Official Election Act and “the election campaign is not carried out by a party member of the same political party” and “the election campaign is not carried out by a party member of the same political party” and “the election campaign is not carried out by a party member of the same political party” (hereinafter referred to as “the election campaign of this case”).

According to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below, Defendant A sent a text message to the effect that Defendant A was 1 to 2's cell phone numbers of 1 to 4, and that it was called "the phone number of 1 to 4, and the phone number of 1 to 2's cell phone numbers installed at the election campaign office was called "the phone number of 1 to 4," and Defendant F was called "the phone number of 2 to 4,00's cell phone numbers during the election of 2 to 4,00,000 and the volunteer was 1 to 4,000's cell phone number of 1 to 4,000,000, 1 to 4,000,000 and 1 to 4,000,000,000 won and 1 to 4,000,000,000 won and 1 to 4,000,000,000 won and 4,000,00.

However, the following circumstances acknowledged by each of the above evidence, i.e., ① even if the act of transmitting text messages for the election of the intraparty competition against the general voters, it cannot be evaluated as an election campaign with the intention of promoting the election of the electors in the election of the intraparty competition without considering the motive, time, place, method, etc. of such act, and ② Defendant A et al. has the primary objective of recommending candidates for the intraparty competition in light of the regional characteristics of 00 times. ③ Even if the number of telephone calls for the intraparty competition campaign installed in the election campaign office of Defendant A are followed, it is reasonable to view that such act was conducted for 10 days immediately before and after the date of the intraparty competition campaign, and immediately after the date of the second party competition campaign and the date of the second party competition campaign, if the above act was conducted for 40 days after the date of the election of the intraparty competition campaign, and there is no reason to acknowledge that the above act was conducted for 14 days after the date of the election of the candidate for the intraparty competition campaign.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below that acquitted Defendants on the violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the election campaign by telephone is justifiable in its conclusion, but there is no error of law that affected the conclusion of the judgment by mistake of facts as argued by the prosecutor. The public opinion poll on each of the allegation of unfair sentencing by Defendants and public prosecutors became one of the important procedures to realize representative democracy in modern society. The crime of this case, which distorted the result of public opinion poll by systematically and systematically participating in the process of public opinion poll, goes beyond impeding public opinion poll institutions and political parties, is ultimately an infringement on the fairness of election by affecting the citizens’ right decision-making or judgment. This act of the Defendants, which led to the promotion of the public interest right holder of a political and fair election. Meanwhile, there is a great negative effect in that Defendants A, who revealed the crime of this case before the selection of candidates by resignation from the competition candidate, did not have an influence on the result of the public prosecutor’s primary election, and there is no reason to consider the circumstances such as age and character of the Defendants, the Defendants’ environment, the degree of participation and responsibility of each of the Defendants, etc.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal by Defendant A and the Prosecutor against the part on the crime of interference with business of Defendant A among the judgment below is without merit, and all appeals by the Prosecutor and the appeal by the Prosecutor against the above Defendants are dismissed pursuant to Article 364(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Since the appeal by Defendant A against the violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the publication of false facts by Defendant A among the judgment of the court below is with merit, it is reversed, and it is again decided as follows through pleading pursuant to Article 364(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The summary of the facts charged as to the violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the publication of false facts by Defendant A is identical to the above 2-A as stated in Article 325(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. As seen earlier, this part of the facts charged falls under a case where there is no proof of crime

Judge Gyeong-man

Judge Gratuitously