(b)the starting point for the acquisition by prescription, where the ownership has been registered under another person's name while possessing the real estate under its own possession;

B. The starting date of the acquisition by prescription shall be the date of commencement of possession, and it shall not be determined by the person claiming the acquisition by prescription at his/her own discretion, but the possession of real estate owned by another person where the transfer of ownership is registered in another person's name under the possession of real estate under his/her own possession cannot be deemed as the possession based on the acquisition by prescription, and only when there is a change in ownership, the possession based on the acquisition by prescription begins. Therefore, if the possession is possession frequently, the starting date of the acquisition by prescription

The part of the judgment of the court below concerning the conjunctive claim shall be reversed, and that part of the case shall be remanded to the Jeonju District Court Panel Division.

With respect to the first and second points:

According to the statement of Gap evidence No. 1, which has no dispute over the establishment, the fact that the registration of transfer of ownership was completed in the name of the defendant on the ground of sale on March 9, 1950 by the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Transfer of Land Ownership (hereinafter "Special Measures"), on June 30, 1965, pursuant to the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Land Ownership (hereinafter "Special Measures"), the ownership transfer registration of the land of this case is presumed to have been completed lawfully, and it cannot be said that the defendant was less than nine years of age at the time of March 9, 1950, on the ground that he was under nine years of age at the time of March 9, 1950.

In addition, comparing the reasoning of the judgment below with the records, we affirm the court below's decision that the defendant did not recognize the plaintiff's assertion that he would have completed the registration of ownership transfer of the land of this case by obtaining a letter of guarantee and written confirmation under the Act on Special Measures by fraudulent means, and the court below's fact-finding did not err in the rules of evidence. On the other hand, if the registration of ownership transfer under the Act on Special Measures is completed, the registration is presumed to have been completed lawfully, and if the registration is completed under the Act on Special Measures, the other party who asserts it should prove it with the reason. In this case, the court below did not clarify the reasons why the court below did not request the plaintiff to transfer the land of this case, the reason why the registration of ownership transfer was completed under the Act on Special Measures in the name of the defendant, the reason why the plaintiff did not request the transfer of the

With respect to the third point:

The theory is that the transfer registration of ownership under the Act on Special Measures is applied only to the general land as stipulated in Article 2 of the Act on Special Measures, or there is no change in the ownership in the land register from July 28, 1953 to the filing date of the application for registration. However, the court below's decision that the transfer registration of ownership in this case is presumed to have been completed lawfully, and it is not recognized that the defendant's assertion that the registration of ownership transfer in this case will be completed by obtaining a letter of guarantee and a written confirmation from a fraudulent method is not recognized. If the facts are the same, it cannot be said that the court below's decision that the registration of ownership transfer in this case in the name of the defendant is legitimate is erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles as

With respect to the fourth point:

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, since the plaintiff purchased the land of this case from the non-party on February 10, 194 and occupied it with the intention to own until now, the court below rejected the claim from the plaintiff for the preliminary claim that the acquisition by prescription was completed on June 30, 1965, which was 20 years since June 30, 1965, which was 20 years since the registration of ownership transfer was completed under the name of the defendant, where the possession, which was the basis of the acquisition by prescription, continues to be more than the statutory period, the starting date of the commencement of possession on the basis of the prescription period, and it is presumed that the claimant for the acquisition by prescription cannot arbitrarily choose the starting date, and that even if the plaintiff received the registration of ownership transfer on the land of this case on June 30, 1965, the court below rejected it

On the other hand, the starting date of the acquisition by prescription should be the date of commencement of the possession, and the person claiming the acquisition by prescription shall not be free to determine the starting date of the acquisition by prescription, but in case where the transfer of ownership is registered in another person's name while he occupies the real estate under his own possession, and if the possession is an independent possession, the starting date of the acquisition by prescription shall be the date of change in ownership (the date of registration of ownership transfer). This is because the occupancy of the real estate under his own possession cannot be deemed as the possession on the basis of the acquisition by prescription and only if there is a change in ownership,

Therefore, the court below should further determine the legitimacy of the plaintiff's conjunctive claim by examining whether the plaintiff continued possession as alleged by the plaintiff, and whether the possession is independent possession. The court below's failure to reach this point shall be deemed to have led to the failure to conduct an examination by misunderstanding the starting point for acquisition by prescription. This is reasonable as it affected the conclusion of the judgment.

Therefore, the plaintiff's appeal as to the main claim is dismissed, and the costs of appeal as to the dismissal of the appeal are assessed against the plaintiff, and the part concerning the conjunctive claim is reversed and remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Young-ju (Presiding Justice)