(b) The time of determining which property devolvingd belongs to any enterprise;

B. Even if a lease contract is concluded and any other contract is made, a person who fails to use the leased property by neglecting the right to use the leased property without taking de facto or legal measures despite the fact that it may actually possess the leased property, and thus, has no preferential right to purchase it.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

However, even after examining the records in detail, it is not recognized that the judgment of the court below is not well-founded to fact-finding by misunderstanding the value judgment of evidence, and it is not thought that the court below erred the plaintiff's assertion, and it cannot be deemed that the plaintiff Jeong Ho-jin purchased the real estate externally on November 18, 1950 on the ground of the facts duly admitted by the evidence, and the sales contract on March 14, 1957 with the meaning of supplementing the real estate omitted in the sales contract on November 18, 1950 is null and void in the meaning of supplementing the above real estate.

The decision of August 24, 4287 and January 21, 4288 on the ground of appeal No. 2 is that the person who arbitrarily occupies or uses the reverted property without the approval of the administrative authority shall not be deemed to be a good relative under the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging only to that fact. This possessor, even if he concludes a lease contract, etc. with the administrative authority and actually occupies or uses it lawfully, shall be a good relative, and the court below has rejected the argument that the former plaintiff Jeong-jin has a legitimate preferential right to purchase the real estate. Thus, the decision of the original judgment does not err in the misapprehension of precedents or interpretation of statutes, nor in the arguments.

As to the ground of appeal No. 3

However, even if a lease contract is in effect concluded, a person who did not take any action or legal measures to occupy and use the leased property, but did not use it, shall be deemed to have waived the right to use it by other acts as stated in the judgment of February 14, 4289. Thus, the court below is justified in holding that the court below did not have a preferential right to purchase the leased property, since it is clear that the court below acknowledged the fact that the real estate was occupied and used by a third party and it was neglected even after he became the lessee, based on evidence, since it is clear that the plaintiff Jong Jin-jin had been the previous owner of the Gyeong-jin's occupation factory, and it is the purport that he did not occupy and use it even after he became the lessee. Therefore, the court below did not err by law such as the theory of lawsuit.

As to the ground of appeal No. 4

However, the original judgment on the argument of the lawsuit is a lease contract under the premise of the preferential purchase right of the real estate in this case, but the plaintiff is disqualified as the preferential purchase right holder, unless the possession situation, such as the former recognition, does not continue to exist. Therefore, since there was no cancellation of the above lease contract, which is the requirement for the acquisition of the preferential purchase right, it cannot be said that there was a complaint on the validity of the sales contract on the real estate between the defendant and the supplementary intervenor, the allegation that the sale to the supplementary intervenor without cancelling the lease contract is illegal is groundless. It is clear that there is no deviation from any judgment, and the judgment of January 31, 4289 at this point is unlawful without cancelling the lease contract with the lessee who has the preferential purchase right and the third party without cancelling the lease contract with the lessee who has the preferential purchase right, and therefore, it cannot be said that the above judgment of the court below does not conflict with the above original decision.

As to the grounds of appeal No. 5, however, the time to determine which vested property belongs to an enterprise shall be the time when the property belongs to the enterprise to which such property belongs, and the view that it should be based on the Japanese business situation prior to the piracy is only the exclusive body, and there is any error of fact-finding in the original judgment in the point of the theory of lawsuit. Therefore, it is groundless to discuss the point of view.

As to the ground of appeal No. 6

However, the agreement with Eul evidence No. 3 cannot be deemed to be merely a formal example, and the court below held that the defendant's disposition of selling real estate in this case against the defendant's intervenor joining the defendant is lawful and that the disposition of selling the real estate to the plaintiff's Jeong-jin was unlawful, and it cannot be deemed that there was an error of law such as the theory of lawsuit

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against all participating judges by applying mutatis mutandis Articles 89 and 95 of the Civil Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Cho Jin-man (Presiding Judge) of the Supreme Court Decision 2011Hun-Ma148 delivered on August 1, 201