When the defendant fails to pay the above fine, the defendant shall be confined in the workhouse for a period calculated by converting 50,000 won into one day.

In order to order the provisional payment of an amount equivalent to the above fine.

The Defendant, around May 29, 2010, at the guest room of the “W hotel” located in the Seoul Special Metropolitan City, Gwangjin-gu square, he again thought that the above Nonindicted Party 1 “I am again about I,00,000,” and thus, the above Nonindicted Party 1 refused to use “I am Maz who does not me me me me me me me see,” and around May 30, 2010, the Defendant again had the above Nonindicted Party 1, “I am me me me me me me us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us us we us us us us us we us us us...........

1. Legal statement of Nonindicted 1’s witness

1. Statement of the protocol concerning the suspect interrogation of the accused in the prosecution (including the part concerning the statement made by Nonparty 1);

1. Statement made by the police on Nonindicted 1

1. Each written diagnosis, each record, each copy of each medical record, and each statement of a reply to fact-finding in the Gangnam-gu Synish Hospital;

Articles 269(1) and 31(1) of the Criminal Act

1. Detention in a workhouse;

Articles 70 and 69(2) of the Criminal Act

1. Order of provisional payment;

Article 334(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act

The defendant and his defense counsel asserted to the purport that the defendant's expression about the fetus to non-indicted 1 does not obstruct abortion, but merely presented or recommended the defendant's opinion about the fetus. The non-indicted 1's receipt of abortion as stated in the facts charged is voluntarily intended, or it is inevitable for the fetus to undergo abortion in the state of mooring or miscarriage at the time. Thus, the defendant's act does not have a causal relation with the abortion of this case.

2. Determination

A. We examine whether the defendant's act constitutes an aiding act under Article 31 (1) of the Criminal Act.

Article 31(1) of the Criminal Act provides, “A person who has instigated another person to commit a crime shall be punished by the same punishment as the person who has committed the crime.” The term “abetting another person” refers to having another person pass a resolution to commit a specific crime, and if the act is suitable to cause a resolution to commit a specific crime to another person, it does not place any restriction on the means and method of such act, such as order, threat, deception, suspicion, suspicion, suspicion, appearance, pets, pets, and provision of profits. According to each of the above evidence, the fact that the defendant tolds the non-indicted 1 about abortion as mentioned in the facts charged, at the time and place. In light of the above legal principles, the defendant’s act stated in the above facts charged constitutes an act of aiding and abetting the defendant and his defense counsel under Article 31(1) of the Criminal Act, since it constitutes an act of aiding and abetting the defendant and his defense counsel.

B. We examine whether, at the time and place of the charge, Nonindicted 1 had already been in a state of mooring or miscarriage at the time when the fetus was to undergo abortion.

According to the above evidence, 1) Nonindicted Party 1 was treated with an emergency hospital in Gangnam-gu 712 on June 3, 201, because it was difficult to find that the number of the fetus was located at the time of 00,000 so that it was difficult for Nonindicted Party 1 to view it as a 13 times per minute, and there was no possibility that it would be natural heritage at the time of 10,000, and that it was difficult for Nonindicted Party 1 to find it difficult to view it as a 10,000 per minute of 2,000,000,000 0,000,0000,000 was 1,000,000,000,0000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00,000.

C. We examine whether Nonindicted 1’s receipt of abortion as stated in the facts charged was based on the Defendant’s voluntary will, not the Defendant’s act of instigating.

According to each of the above evidence, Non-Indicted 1's unilaterally notified the defendant of the revocation of marriage in addition to the above acts of aiding and abetting the defendant, and considering such judgment, it cannot be said that there is no probability that the defendant would be subject to abortion as stated in the above facts charged. However, since the teacher of the crime committed the crime, it is not the only condition that the principal offender committed the crime. Thus, as long as the principal offender was resolved through the act of aiding and abetting another cause, it does not affect the establishment of the principal offender even if the principal offender committed the crime due to other cause and the act of aiding and abetting the principal. (See Supreme Court Decision 91Do542 delivered on May 14, 191). Thus, even if there are other causes such as the judgment of Non-Indicted 1 that the defendant could not be married, it is reasonable to view that the defendant and his defense counsel resolved that the crime of abortion was committed by Non-Indicted 1 by the above act of aiding and abetting as seen above.

Judges Jo Jae-ho