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red_flag_2(영문) 의정부지방법원 2014.9.1.선고 2014구단319 판결

자동차운전면허취소처분취소

Cases

2014Gudan319 Revocation of Disposition of Revocation of Driver's License

Plaintiff

A

Defendant

The Commissioner of Gyeonggi-do Police Agency

Conclusion of Pleadings

2014, 8.18

Imposition of Judgment

September 1, 2014

Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim

On February 14, 2014, the defendant revoked the revocation of the driver's license for the plaintiff.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. On August 30, 2012, the Defendant brought a lawsuit against the Plaintiff on June 24, 2012, around 16:25, the Defendant: (a) under the influence of alcohol level 0.052% from the southyang-si, B; (b) under the influence of alcohol level 0.052% from the south-si; and (c) under the influence of influence of alcohol level 0.06, the Defendant brought a lawsuit against the Plaintiff on the ground that the Plaintiff’s revocation of the Plaintiff’s driver’s license (F) was disqualified on September 28, 2012 (the date of revocation; hereinafter referred to as “the Road Traffic Act”). From the prosecution, the Defendant brought a lawsuit against the Plaintiff on the ground that the Plaintiff’s revocation of the Plaintiff’s driver’s license (the date of revocation) was 10% of the charges of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (the date of revocation 2, 2017; hereinafter referred to as “the Road Traffic Act”).

D. Afterwards, in the prosecution, the prosecution issued a disposition to revoke the driver’s license for the Plaintiff on February 14, 2014 (the disqualified period from September 29, 2012 to September 27, 2017; hereinafter referred to as “instant disposition”) to the effect that the Plaintiff violated the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes), violation of the Road Traffic Act (the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes), and violation of the Road Traffic Act (the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1, 6 through 11, Eul evidence Nos. 5 and 7 (including numbers, hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The Plaintiff filed an administrative litigation against the first disposition and received a disposition of suspension of a driver’s license for 150 days on June 24, 2012 on the drinking drinking, etc. from the court’s recommendation. The instant disposition against the same fact violates the principle of res judicata, the principle of protection of trust, the principle of equality, and the principle of proportionality, and is unlawful by abusing and abusing discretion.

B. Determination

(1) Whether the principle of prohibition against double Jeopardy is violated

As seen earlier, after the first disposition, the first disposition was taken by the prosecution for the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes), the violation of the Road Traffic Act (Aggravated Punishment, etc.) due to lack of evidence, the first disposition for the violation of the Road Traffic Act (Aggravated Punishment, etc.), the first disposition for the suspension of indictment for the violation of the Road Traffic Act (Aggravated Punishment, etc.) was taken due to the defect of the first disposition for the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Aggravated Punishment, etc.). The first disposition for the first change was changed to a disposition for the suspension of driver's license for 150 days by the mediation recommendation in administrative litigation for the first change, again, by the prosecution for the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Aggravated Punishment, etc.), the violation of the Road Traffic Act (Aggravated Punishment, etc.) and the violation of the Road Traffic Act (Aggravated Punishment). The period of the plaintiff's license was recognized as the same on September 27, 20.

In full view of the above facts of recognition, the first alteration disposition and the instant disposition are different from the grounds for it, and the first alteration disposition and the first alteration disposition cannot be deemed to have been different from those for the same reason. The first alteration disposition and the 150th driver's license disposition were included in the instant disposition, and thus, the new alteration disposition were expanded due to the same reason. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that the same disposition were made several times on the same case.

Therefore, the instant disposition cannot be deemed to contravene the principle of res judicata, and thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion on a different premise is without merit.

(2) Whether the principle of trust protection is violated

In order to apply the principle of trust protection to the acts of an administrative agency in administrative legal relations, first, the administrative agency should name the public opinion that is the object of trust to the individual, second, there is no reason attributable to the individual's trust that the individual's statement of opinion is justifiable, third, the individual must act in a similar manner as a result of the trust of the administrative agency's statement of opinion, fourth, the administrative agency's disposition that is opposed to the name of opinion of the administrative agency, fourth, the result of infringing the individual's interest is caused, fifth, if an administrative disposition is taken in accordance with the previous statement of opinion, it is not likely to seriously undermine the public interest or legitimate interests of a third party (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du13592, Feb. 24, 2006, etc.).

However, according to the above evidence and Gap evidence Nos. 4-1 and 4-2, the plaintiff can be acknowledged that the investigative agency made a statement that he/she had no intention to escape. The first change and mediation recommendation made a disposition that he/she had no intention to escape due to lack of evidence about the escape in the prosecutor's office, the suspension of indictment for the drunk driving, and the plaintiff's statement as a party to the case was difficult for the investigative agency to investigate. Thus, it cannot be said that there was no reason for the plaintiff to believe that the prosecutor's office made a decision on the escape as evidence for the reason that the investigation agency was hard to investigate. Therefore, this part of the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

(3) Whether there is deviation or abuse of discretionary power

No separate legal basis exists for an administrative agency that conducted an administrative act. Even if there is a defect in the act, the administrative agency may revoke it and take a measure that satisfies legitimate requirements. The violation of the Road Traffic Act is that the Plaintiff, while under the influence of alcohol, caused a traffic accident to D and escaped from the scene of the accident without providing rescue measures, and thus, the degree of violation of the relevant laws and regulations is no less severe. The same disposition as the first disposition in this case is identical and the driver's license is revoked, and it is no more unfavorable due to the first disposition in this case. Even if the driver's license has been suspended for 150 days, if the driver's license was revoked on September 28, 2012 and it was impossible to drive until now. Rather, since the disposition in this case is 4 months after the date of revocation, the Plaintiff could have been driving for the remainder of 150 days after being notified, and there is no need for the Plaintiff to take measures to protect the victim of the traffic accident in this case, as a result, to establish a new traffic accident and to protect the public interest.

3. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit.

Judges

Judges Bo Young-ia