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(영문) 대구고등법원 1982. 7. 20. 선고 82구28 판결

[의료기관업무정지처분취소][판례집불게재]

Plaintiff

Gangwon-gu (Attorney Cho Chang-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant

Busan Special Metropolitan City Mayor (Attorney Seo-sung et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Conclusion of Pleadings

on June 22, 1982

Text

The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

Litigation costs shall be borne by the plaintiff.

Purport of claim

The disposition that the defendant rendered against the plaintiff on January 21, 1982 for the suspension of medical institution business shall be revoked.

Litigation costs shall be borne by the defendant.

Reasons

1. Determination on this safety defense

When the plaintiff raised an objection against the administrative disposition of this case against the defendant, who is the disposition authority of this case, and did not directly file a lawsuit with the Minister of Home Affairs, the plaintiff's administrative litigation of this case must be dismissed because it is illegal as it did not go through the pre-trial procedure, and the plaintiff's whole purport of the party's pleading is added to the statement of evidence No. 2-1 to No. 4 (written objection, etc.) without dispute over the establishment of the appeal, the plaintiff submitted a written objection to the defendant on January 28, 1982 that the defendant's administrative disposition of this case is illegal and unfair, and the above written objection is received in Busan City. The defendant transferred the plaintiff's objection to the Dong-gu public health clinic which is the disposition authority of this case without directly processing the plaintiff's objection, and let the head of the Dong-gu public health clinic handle it, and therefore, the defendant's written objection cannot be acknowledged as legitimate because the plaintiff's written objection of this case was not submitted to the defendant for the reason that it did not require its revocation.

2. Judgment on the merits

Considering that the plaintiff's entire purport of oral argument is 1-1 of evidence Nos. 1-2 (Administrative Disposition by 1-2), 2-1 of evidence Nos. 2 (Medical Institution Order), 2 (No. 3), 4-1 of the same evidence No. 4, 2 (Appeal Handling Following Extension of Administrative Disposition by Medical Institution), 3 (Medical Institution Order) and 4 (Medical Institution Order No. 4), the defendant opened a 1-2-day-type-type-type-specific-type-specific-type-specific-type-specific-type-specific-type-specific-type-specific-type-specific-type-specific-type-type-specific-type-type-type-specific-type-type-type-specific-type-type-type-type-specific-type-type-type-type-specific-type-type-type-type-specific-type-type-type-type-specific-type-type-type-type-type-type-type-1 of the National Armed Forces-type-type-type-2-type-type-type-type-type-18 (2).

The plaintiff asserted that the plaintiff's attorney did not have experience, and distributed the above medical treatment method to the 1st president without knowledge of violation of the Medical Service Act. The plaintiff's act of expressing the above medical treatment method to the 1st president and suspended the distribution of the 1st president. The plaintiff's medical treatment method to the 2nd director can be viewed as the 1st director's specialized department because the 1st director's surgery and the 2nd director's specialized department as the 1st director's specialized department. The plaintiff stated the 2nd medical treatment department as the 1st director's specialized department and the 1st director's specialized department. The plaintiff's 1st director's 6th director's 2th director's 7th director's 19th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 2th 2th 6th 7th 196th 2th 196th 2th 2nd 2nd 2nd 19th 2nd 3th 2nd 2nd 19.

However, Article 46 (1) of the Medical Service Act prohibits false or exaggerated advertisements concerning medical services of medical persons. Article 46 (3) of the same Act prohibits any person from advertising using printed materials with respect to the career and method of medical examination and treatment of a specific medical person. Article 33 (4) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provides that the scope of advertisements which a medical person can use as necessary for medical personnel's medical advertising shall be limited to the name, gender, and the type and department of license, the name and department of the medical institution, the name and location of the medical institution, the medical time, the date of medical examination and treatment, and the daily newspaper shall be limited to the medical professionals' name, the place of medical service, and the organ and telephone number of the research institution permitted pursuant to Article 39 (1) of the same Act. Article 30 (6) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provides that any person shall be prohibited from advertising with respect to the specialized department of medical treatment, and that any person may separately indicate the name of the specialized department of medical treatment and the name of the specialized department of medical personnel in accordance with Article 461 of the Medical Service Act.

Therefore, it is legitimate to suspend the Plaintiff’s medical service for a two-month period under Article 51 of the Medical Service Act and Article 241 of the Directive of the Ministry of Health and Welfare after the Defendant issued a ten-day grace period based on the Plaintiff’s petition, and it cannot be said that there is an error of deviation from discretionary power. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim for revocation of this case is dismissed as without merit, and the burden of litigation cost is assessed against the losing Plaintiff.

July 20, 1982

Judges Kim Jong-ju (Presiding Judge)