[범죄단체조직][집28(2)형,26;공1980.10.15.(642),13129]
Property jurisdiction of a criminal organization or organization for habitual special larceny
A single judge of a district court shall judge in accordance with the case of habitual special larceny, which is the purpose of organizing or joining a criminal organization for the purpose of habitual special larceny.
Articles 114, 331, and 332 of the Criminal Act; Article 29(1)3 of the Court Organization Act
Defendant 1 and three others
Prosecutor
Gwangju District Court Decision 78No1817,1017,179 Decided April 24, 1979
The appeal is dismissed.
We examine the prosecutor's grounds of appeal.
For points 3 to 9:
The lower court acquitted the Defendants of the violation of the Criminal Organization’s criminal organization, on the ground that the Defendants’ organization of the criminal organization in question was organized by retailing, and there was no other evidence to prove the facts charged by the organization of the criminal organization in question.
In light of the records, the judgment of cooking evidence belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of the fact-finding court, and it cannot be recognized that there is a violation of the rules of evidence against the rules of evidence in the original judgment, even in light of the records, since this was attached to the assertion of mistake of facts, this case did not constitute a legitimate ground of appeal in the original judgment and examined the records in comparison with the original judgment, and there was no error of law such as lack of reason or omission of judgment due to insufficient deliberation in the original judgment which acquitted the defendants about the violation of
The issue is groundless.
With respect to the First Ground:
In criminal proceedings under the main sentence of Article 2 of the Act on Special Measures for Criminal Procedure, the court of first instance shall pronounce a judgment within four months from the date on which the appeal or final appeal was filed in the appellate court and the final appeal court within six months from the date on which the public prosecution was instituted. However, the above provision is not stipulated as a mandatory act of the court.
With respect to the second ground:
A person who forms or joins an organization aimed at committing a crime under the main sentence of Article 114(1) of the Criminal Act provides that a person who forms or joins such an organization shall be sentenced to the punishment prescribed for the intended crime. Since the Defendants organized a criminal organization for the purpose of habitual special larceny, the facts charged of this case are as follows: (a) a person who forms or joins a criminal organization for the purpose of habitual special larceny; and (b) a person who forms or joins such organization; and (c) a statutory penalty for the above is imprisonment with prison labor for not less than one year for
However, according to the proviso of Article 29 (1) 6 of the Court Organization Act, cases falling under Articles 331 and 332 of the Criminal Act shall be excluded from cases subject to a judgment by a collegiate panel, and shall be subject to a judgment by a single judge. Article 114 (1) of the Criminal Act provides that "a person shall be subject to punishment prescribed for the intended crime" shall be subject to a judgment by a single judge. The purport of Article 114 (1) of the Criminal Act is that a case of an organization of a criminal organization for habitual special larceny shall be interpreted to be subject to a judgment by a single judge corresponding to the case
Thus, the court below's decision that judged the defendant's case of the crime organization of this case for habitual special larceny is legitimate.
In addition, the paper is groundless.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Yu Tae-hee (Presiding Justice)