2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants.

The Plaintiff: (a) Defendant 1 performed the procedure for registration of cancellation of the registration of the establishment of a neighboring land, which was completed on June 18, 1997 by the Jung-gu District Court No. 4093, Jun. 18, 1997, with respect to the registration of cancellation of the establishment of a neighboring land, which was completed on June 18, 1997 by the Jung-gu District Court No. 4093, Jun. 18, 1997; and (b) Defendant 2 performed the procedure for registration of cancellation of the establishment of a neighboring land, which was completed on June 18, 1997 with respect to the (number omitted) forest No. 84,198 square meters, which was completed on June 18, 1997 by the Jung-gu District Court No. 40933, Jun. 18, 197; and (c) the Defendants performed the procedure for registration of establishment of a superficies with respect to the establishment of a neighboring land (number omitted omitted).

【Purpose of Appeal】

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

The court's reasoning concerning this case is the same as the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance except for the following additional parts, and thus cites this case in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act

2. Parts to be removed or added;

○ The following shall be added to the third third third sentence of the first instance court:

“(3) In addition, Nonparty 1 signed and sealed two copies of the loan repayment agreement in blank (hereinafter “instant loan repayment agreement”) with respect to the above loan amount, interest, due date, etc. from the Defendants, and signed and sealed it on the debtor column, and Nonparty 2 signed and sealed it on the joint and several sureties column and delivered it to the Defendants.”

○ From the fourth nineth decision of the first instance court, the fourth decision will be followed as follows.

In the event a promissory note has been issued with a blank maturity in relation to the payment of existing debts, the interpretation of the intent between the parties to whom the promissory note has been given shall be deemed to have been deferred with the maturity of the existing blanksory note as of the following day, barring any special circumstance (Supreme Court Decision 89Meu32606 delivered on June 26, 190, etc.).

According to the facts of the above recognition, the registration of creation of a new mortgage of this case No. 1 is aimed at securing the above loan obligation of the non-party 1 against the defendant 1, and since a promissory note was issued in blank in relation to the payment of the above loan obligation, the payment date of the above loan obligation was issued. Thus, the above loan obligation of the above blank promissory note jointly issued by the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 was due on December 19, 197, which was filled by the payment date.

Therefore, since the above loan obligation on December 19, 2007, past 10 years from that time, expired due to the completion of prescription, the registration of creation of mortgage of this case No. 1 shall be cancelled due to the extinguishment of the secured obligation.

3. Determination as to the defendants' additional assertion

(1) The Defendants asserted to the effect that, in preparation for cases where a promissory note cannot be claimed upon expiration of the short-term extinctive prescription, the statute of limitations has not yet expired since the Defendants prepared and received a written agreement on the repayment of the loan in this case from the Plaintiff and subsequently supplemented the due date under the instant agreement on the repayment of the loan in this case, and exercised their rights before ten years have elapsed

The fact that the Defendants received a written agreement on the repayment of the instant loan from the Plaintiff in blank is recognized as above, but as long as it is deemed that the due date has arrived by supplementing the due date of a blank promissory note in order to secure the obligation of the instant loan, the due date of the debt shall be determined. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that the due date has changed because the Defendants entered the due date after the due date in blank.

Therefore, we cannot accept the Defendants’ above assertion that the statute of limitations will run from the time when the repayment period is supplemented in the loan repayment agreement of this case.

(2) In addition, the Defendants asserted to the effect that the Plaintiff’s assertion of extinctive prescription constitutes an abuse of rights when filing the instant lawsuit, as the Plaintiff did not complete the inheritance registration intentionally and did not contact with the Defendants, and the auction of the real estate owned by the Defendants took place.

The exercise of the obligor's right of defense based on the statute of limitations is also governed by the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our Civil Act. Thus, in special circumstances where the obligor acted to make it impossible or considerably difficult for the obligee to exercise the obligee's right or the interruption of prescription before the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where the obligee objectively obstructed the obligee from exercising his right, or the obligor has failed to invoke the statute of limitations after the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where the obligor has made the obligee trust it, or where the obligor has shown the same attitude that the obligor would not invoke the statute of limitations after the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where some of the obligees of the same condition requires to protect the obligee significantly unfair or unfair, the obligor's assertion for the completion of the statute of limitations cannot be allowed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Da8266, Jun. 10, 2010).

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court of first instance is justified, and the appeal by the defendants is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Park Jong-nam (Presiding Judge)