2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

With respect to a traffic accident that occurred to the defendant on October 3, 2002, it is confirmed that there is no insurance payment obligation against the defendant on July 3, 2002 by the plaintiff and the non-party 1 based on the life insurance contract (securities number omitted) for non-payment of dividends concluded on July 3, 2002.

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

The court's reasoning for this part is that "persons who feel severe pain" in the 3th 11th am of the judgment of the court of first instance means "persons who feel severe pains", and " November 11, 2006" in the 3th 15th am "on January 11, 2006", and "e.g., "g., in spine e., in spine e.," in the 8th 9th am following the judgment of the court of first instance, two or more sports types are limited to not more than 1/2 of the normal sports scope. In this case, the scope of two or more sports types means the scope according to the kind of spine movement in the AMA's guidelines for assessment of permanent physical disability." It is identical to the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance by applying the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Judgment on the parties’ assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

In the instant case, the Defendant’s injury, in particular, spine chronism was congenital or sedentary disease, as well as the Defendant’s present disability does not fall under class 3 of the disability grade stipulated in the terms and conditions of the instant insurance contract, and the Defendant’s right to claim against the Plaintiff under the instant insurance contract expired after the lapse of two years from October 3, 2002, which was the date of occurrence of the insurance accident. As such, there is no obligation to pay the Plaintiff’s insurance money to the Defendant under the instant insurance contract in relation to the traffic accident (hereinafter “instant accident”), which was October 3, 2002, as seen in the underlying facts.

B. Defendant’s assertion

The injury of this case was aggravated after the accident of this case and its surgery, and in particular, vertec vertec ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate was caused or aggravated by the escape certificate, and the present disability of the defendant constitutes class 3, class 9 (when ebrate has kept a high athletic field permanently in spine) or class 4, class 15 (in case where ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate 5), or class 4, class 16 (in case where ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate ebrate eb.).

C. Determination

(1) Article 662 of the Commercial Act provides that the right to claim the amount of insurance proceeds shall expire if it is not exercised for two years, and there is no provision regarding the starting point of the right to claim the amount of insurance proceeds. Thus, Article 166(1) of the Civil Act providing that "the extinctive prescription shall run from the time when it is possible to exercise the right." Since the right to claim insurance proceeds can be exercised from the time when the specific right is determined due to the occurrence of the insurance accident, barring special circumstances, it is reasonable to interpret that the extinctive prescription of the right to claim insurance proceeds, in principle, runs from the time when the insurance accident occurred (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Da573, 5580, Dec. 24

(2) As to the instant accident, the facts that the instant accident occurred on October 3, 2002, and the fact that the Defendant claimed insurance money to the Plaintiff on January 11, 2006, which was extremely rarely long after the lapse of two years from the date of the occurrence of the instant accident, are shown in the basic facts. Accordingly, the Defendant’s insurance claim against the Plaintiff in relation to the instant accident should have already expired due to the completion of the extinctive prescription.

(3) For this, the defendant asserts that Article 11 (2) of the Clause of the insurance contract of this case provides that where the grade of a disability is not determined within 180 days from the date of the accident, the defendant shall determine the grade of the disability as the grade of the disability which is deemed to be fixed on the basis of the diagnosis of the doctor on the date 180 days from the date of the accident. However, where the condition of the disability becomes worse during the period for which the accident can be guaranteed thereafter, the disability grade shall be determined on the basis of the aggravated disability condition. Thus, the defendant asserts that after the operation of this case was conducted on October 23, 2004, the state of disability becomes worse due to the recurrence of the disability, and thereafter the defendant was subject to the latter disability diagnosis on October 10, 206, and therefore, the defendant may exercise the insurance claim on October 23, 2004 or on January 10, 2006.

However, in light of the language and content of Article 11(2) of the above terms and conditions, the provision of the above terms and conditions is merely the scope of the insurance amount and the standard for calculating the insurance amount (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da15488, Apr. 2, 2009). Considering that the legislative intent of which the period of extinctive prescription of the insurance claim is provided for a short-term of two years is to facilitate the insurance business through prompt settlement and the termination of the insurance relationship in consideration of the special nature of the insurance system, it is difficult to conclude that the initial date of the extinctive prescription of the Defendant’s insurance claim against the Plaintiff is 180 days after the date of occurrence of the insurance accident or

(4) Therefore, in relation to the instant accident, there is no obligation of the Plaintiff to pay insurance money to the Defendant based on the instant insurance contract.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, there is no obligation of the plaintiff to pay insurance money to the defendant based on the insurance contract of this case in relation to the accident of this case, and as long as the defendant contests this issue, the plaintiff's claim of this case can be accepted as reasonable, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just in conclusion, and the defendant's appeal is dismissed as it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Jeong Jong-soo (Presiding Judge)