B A.

2. From December 27, 2013 to the date the Plaintiff is reinstated, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the amount calculated at the rate of KRW 3,00,000 per month.

3. The costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

4. Paragraph 2 can be provisionally executed.

A. The Plaintiff is a person who served as a supervisor, etc. in the re-engineering, etc. with a certificate of qualification as electrical construction engineer, fire-fighting equipment engineer (mechanic and electricity), etc., and the Defendant is a corporation engaged in the design and supervision of electricity, machinery and equipment, fire-fighting equipment design and supervision business, etc.

B. On December 6, 2013, the Defendant sent to the Plaintiff electronic mail, a written employment contract (hereinafter referred to as “instant employment contract”) stating working conditions such as the Defendant, the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s employee, the working place, C apartment site (hereinafter referred to as “C site”), the occupational supervision (fire fighting), the period of the employment contract from December 9, 2013 to February 8, 2016, the monthly salary of KRW 3 million (annual salary formula), and six months from the date of entry into the probation period, on which the Plaintiff signed and sealed the contract and sent it to the Defendant on December 9, 2013, and the Defendant again signed and sealed the contract and sent it to the Plaintiff.

C. On December 23, 2013, the Defendant sent to the Plaintiff a certificate to the effect that: (a) the Defendant is working for the Young Technology Group (hereinafter referred to as the “Mining Technology Group”); (b) the Plaintiff did not submit employment documents; and (c) the Plaintiff’s request for the authentication of the employment contract to the Defendant; (b) the Plaintiff’s request for the authentication of the employment contract to the Defendant; (c) the Plaintiff’s termination of the employment contract with the Plaintiff as of December 26, 2013, and reached the Plaintiff around that time (hereinafter referred to as the “instant dismissal”).

[Grounds for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 1, 3, and 6 (which include Serial number; hereinafter the same shall apply), each statement, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The parties' assertion

A. The plaintiff;

On November 29, 2013, the Plaintiff received employment notification from D directors and vice-presidents at the Defendant's Busan office, and completed the instant employment contract between the Defendant and the Defendant, and worked in C on-site. The Defendant entered into an employment contract with the Plaintiff.

On December 9, 2013, the Plaintiff already designated the Plaintiff as a supervisor for a public tender on December 9, 2013 by the vice president, who is an employee of the Defendant, and submitted bid documents to another construction work and submitted them to the Plaintiff on the 27th of the same month. Thus, the Plaintiff continued to work after being notified that the Plaintiff should submit a resignation and submit job documents at the same time on the date of the above publication. The grounds for dismissal notified by the Defendant to the Plaintiff are already understood by the Defendant, which cannot be the grounds for dismissal, and the Defendant’s assertion contradicts

Therefore, the dismissal of this case is null and void as a dismissal without justifiable grounds.

On the other hand, the defendant shall hold a disciplinary committee in accordance with Article 36 of the Rules of Employment when dismissing the employee, give an opportunity to vindicate, and notify the explanation of the cause of the disciplinary action, and even if the notice of dismissal is given, the prior notice period of 30 days should be set. Thus, the dismissal in this case is unlawful as it is procedurally unlawful.

B. The Defendant sought to employ the Plaintiff to take charge of supervising the C site, but the Defendant did not submit the employment documents, and the Defendant withdrawn the employment plan since he did not retire from the Mine Technical Group to which he belongs. The Defendant did not have concluded a labor contract in a regular manner with the Plaintiff.

Article 27(3) of the Fire-Fighting System Installation Business Act prohibits dual employment of fire-fighting engineers even if the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into an employment contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant on domestic affairs. As long as the Plaintiff, a fire-fighting engineer, was in his/her employment in the Young-Tech, an employment contract entered into with the Defendant is for double employment and null

On the other hand, following the plaintiff's double employment, the fact that the labor relationship with the Young-Tech is not terminated, and that the plaintiff did not submit the employment documents to the defendant, there are justifiable reasons for the dismissal of this case. In addition, the defendant employed the plaintiff for a fixed period of six months. Article 7 of the defendant's rules of employment provides that "a new employee shall be the probation period for three months, and a person whose probation period or probation period has expired and who is deemed inappropriate to continue employment may be dismissed." Article 30 subparagraph 4 of the Rules of Employment provides that "a person who is in the probation period (within three months)" shall be subject to prior notice of dismissal. Thus, there is no procedural illegality since the dismissal of this case against the plaintiff does not require prior notice of dismissal or disciplinary procedure.

3. Determination on the claim for confirmation of invalidity of dismissal

A. Whether to conclude an employment contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant

As seen earlier, the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into the instant employment contract and the Defendant dismissed the Plaintiff. As long as the Defendant appears to have entered into the instant employment contract on the premise that the contract was entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into the instant employment contract (hereinafter referred to as “instant employment contract”) such as the content of the instant employment contract.

B. Determination on the invalidity of the instant employment contract

Article 27(2) of the Fire-Fighting System Installation Business Act provides that no fire-fighting engineer shall lend his/her qualification certificate (referring to a qualification pocketbook for recognition of fire-fighting technology in cases of a person recognized as a fire-fighting technology career, etc. under Article 28) to any third person; and no fire-fighting engineer shall be employed at the same time by at least two enterprises: Provided, That the foregoing shall not apply to cases where a fire-fighting engineer engages in any type of business other than fire-fighting system business to the extent that it does not affect the duties of a fire-fighting engineer under paragraph (1). Article 37 of the same Act provides that “each of the foregoing provisions shall be punished by a fine not exceeding three million won.”

The purpose of Article 27(3) of the Fire-Fighting System Installation Business Act is to ensure public safety from fire and to contribute to the national economy by comprehensively developing fire-fighting systems and promoting fire-fighting technology by prescribing matters necessary for the construction of fire-fighting systems and the management of fire-fighting technology by prescribing whether a labor contract entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is null and void as it goes against Article 27(3) of the same Act. The purport of Article 27(3) of the same Act is to prohibit any overlapping employment of fire-fighting engineers is to prevent any defect in fire-fighting system installation works by serving at least two enterprises at the same time, and to ensure public safety.

However, the above provision does not separately provide for the validity of double employment when prohibiting an actor who is a double employment of a fire protection engineer. However, considering the fact that there is only a penal provision under Article 37 of the same Act, the dual employment of a fire protection engineer cannot be deemed to have significantly anti-sociality and anti-diversity to the extent that it should be denied the validity of the relevant private law, and the purport of the above provision is not to prohibit the fire protection engineer from providing labor and receiving wages through double employment, it is reasonable to view that the above provision is not an effective provision, and it is merely a regulatory provision.

Therefore, even if the labor contract of this case violates the above provision, it does not affect its judicial effect, and on different premise, the defendant's assertion on this part is without merit.

C. Determination on the legality of the dismissal of the instant case

1) Whether the instant employment contract was concluded with a fixed period of management

According to the results of the fact-finding on Gap evidence 4, Eul evidence 2, and Eul evidence 4, and the fact-finding on this court's chemical fire report, the plaintiff sent an electronic email to the defendant on December 24, 2013 as to the dismissal of this case, and the defendant's D director, who is an executive officer of the defendant, in relation to the details of the non-submission of the employment documents, will make a contract notarial in December, 2013. The defendant's oral employment document was not submitted, but the defendant's employment contract was not submitted, but the defendant's employment document was submitted when considering the results of December 27, 2013. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 24770, Dec. 7, 2013; Presidential Decree No. 20770, "the newly employed person for three months or more; Presidential Decree No. 2060, Mar. 3, 2013; Presidential Decree No. 2000, Feb. 3, 2019>

12. From September 2 to February 8, 2016, the facts set forth in (26 months) are as seen earlier, and (4) The fact that the Plaintiff worked at C site from December 9, 2013 to the 26th of the same month does not conflict between the parties.

In other words, the defendant, even though he was in office in the Young-Tech, was deceiving the defendant and entered into the labor contract of this case between the defendant and the defendant.

The argument to the purport does not exist, and the defendant submitted evidence to recognize that the Young Technology Group reported the plaintiff as a supervisor and participated in the bidding. The defendant has already known that the plaintiff was not terminated the employment relationship with the Young Technology Group, and that the Young Technology Group reported the plaintiff as a resident supervisor before entering into the labor contract of this case and submitted a bid to other construction works. Nevertheless, it appears that the plaintiff would allow the plaintiff to carry out supervision services in the field C, and that the contract of this case is ‘six months from the date of entry into the employment contract of this case', but it is printed in the same letter and is stated in the labor contract of this case by agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant (from December 9, 2013 to February 2, 2016).

8. In light of the following: (a) it is inconsistent with the Rules of Employment for up to 26 months; (b) it does not coincide with the probation period of three months under the Rules of Employment; and (c) it is difficult to deem that the Plaintiff is an expert who has been engaged in the electrical construction or fire-fighting system installation supervision business for a long term of 60 years, and is required to undergo the probation period in light of the fact that the Plaintiff did not receive any separate education from the Defendant, and immediately carried out the business as C at C, it is difficult to deem that the Defendant, after employing the Plaintiff as a probationary employee, did not conclude the instant employment contract with the intent to employ the Plaintiff for a certain period of time, rather than concluding the instant employment contract with the intent to determine whether to employ the Plaintiff; (b) it is reasonable to deem that the Defendant concluded the instant employment contract

The provision of disciplinary proceedings in a collective agreement, rules of employment, or disciplinary regulations based on the collective agreement has an important meaning as it aims to secure the fair exercise of the right to disciplinary action and promote the rational operation of the disciplinary system. If a disciplinary action is made in violation of the disciplinary procedure despite the provision that a person to be disciplined has been given an opportunity to attend the disciplinary committee and provide statements and supporting materials, such exercise of the right to disciplinary action shall be deemed null and void as an action contrary to the justice in the procedure regardless of whether the grounds for disciplinary action are recognized (see Supreme Court Decision 90Da8077 delivered on July 9, 191, etc.).

B) Determination

According to the statement in Eul evidence No. 2, Article 35 of the defendant's rules of employment may be subject to disciplinary action against the defendant's employee through a resolution of the committee. Article 37 of the defendant's rules of employment provides that "the disciplinary committee shall give written notice to the member subject to disciplinary action, and shall secure sufficient evidence, such as documents investigating the grounds for disciplinary action, evidentiary materials, and statements of the parties, and shall provide the member with an opportunity to vindicate."

As seen earlier, the Defendant’s dismissal against the Plaintiff constitutes a so-called disciplinary dismissal. Therefore, in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is reasonable to deem that the Defendant violated this provision even though it had been dismissed in accordance with the disciplinary procedure stipulated in the above rules of employment.

Therefore, the dismissal of the Defendant against the Plaintiff is null and void because it did not comply with the disciplinary procedure under the rules of employment.

3) Legal principles as to the existence of justifiable grounds

A disposition of dismissal is justified when there is a reason for an employee to the extent that the employer cannot continue the employment relationship. Whether it is impossible to continue the employment relationship with the employee under the generally accepted social norms should be determined by comprehensively examining and determining various circumstances, such as the employer’s business purpose and nature, workplace condition, status of the employee and job in charge, motive and circumstance of the act of misconduct, influence on the company’s business order such as the risk of disturbing the company’s deceptive order, and attitude of work in the past. In addition, if there are several kinds of disciplinary charges against the employee, whether the disciplinary dismissal disposition is appropriate or not should be determined with one or some of the grounds, but should be determined with the responsibility of the employee to the extent that the employer is unable to continue the employment relationship in light of social norms (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du979, May 28, 2009, etc.).

On the other hand, in a case where the grounds for disciplinary dismissal against workers under the collective agreement or rules of employment are restricted, disciplinary dismissal cannot be made for reasons other than those listed as such (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da27556 delivered on September 8, 192, etc.).

B) Determination

According to the statement Eul evidence No. 2 and the fact-finding results of this court's fact-finding with respect to the Mine Technology Group, the plaintiff received monthly pay from July 14, 2010 to March 27, 2014, and submitted a resignation certificate to the Mine Technology Group on March 27, 2014, and the plaintiff submitted the resignation certificate to the Mine Technology Foundation. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 25077, Mar. 27, 2014>

9. The fact that the Plaintiff was to work at C site and to work at C site on the 26th of the same month is as seen earlier, and the fact that the Plaintiff did not submit documents, such as a letter of personal records and a letter of self-introduction, to be submitted at the time of dismissal pursuant to the Defendant’s rules of employment, does not conflict between the parties.

Meanwhile, according to the evidence evidence Nos. 2, Article 35 of the defendant's rules of employment can be acknowledged that the defendant's employment rules lists those who were employed in the manner of i) fraud or falsity, ii) those who caused damage to the company by divulging occupational secrets or secrets, iii) those who interfered with the company's business reputation or credit, iv) those who interfered with the company's business operation, vi) those who carried out the company's goods and money without any justifiable reason, vii) those who violated the company's rules of employment, i) those who violated the company's rules of employment, ii) those who violated the company's rules of employment, i) those who violated the company's rules of employment, ii) those who violated the company's rules of employment, ii) those who did not comply with the order of workplace due to other acts corresponding thereto, and the defendant did not submit employment documents, iii) that the plaintiff did not have been dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff did not have been dismissed on the job of this case.

According to the above facts, since the plaintiff was aware of the fact that he was in office in the Mine Technology Foundation, the reason that the plaintiff is in office in the Mine Technology Foundation does not constitute "a person employed by fraudulent or other means, which is a cause for disciplinary action under Article 35 Item 1 of the defendant's rules of employment," and further does not constitute "a person who disturbs order in the workplace due to other reasons listed above and other equivalent acts." In addition, the reason that the plaintiff did not submit the job documents does not constitute any of the reasons listed in Article 35.

Ultimately, the grounds cited by the defendant as the grounds for the dismissal of this case are all reasons not falling under the grounds for disciplinary action under the rules of employment of the defendant. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem the dismissal of this case as null and void as a dismissal without justifiable grounds

4) Sub-decisions

Therefore, the dismissal of this case violates the disciplinary procedure, and the reasons for the dismissal are also null and void due to the absence of the grounds for the disciplinary action, and as long as the defendant contests the legitimacy of the dismissal of this case, the plaintiff has the interest to seek confirmation

4. Determination on the claim for wages

As seen earlier, the dismissal of the Defendant against the Plaintiff is null and void, the Defendant is obligated to pay wages until the Plaintiff is reinstated.

The facts that the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into the instant employment contract by setting the monthly salary of three million won from December 9, 2013 to February 8, 2016 are as seen earlier. According to the evidence Nos. 3 and 5, the Defendant paid KRW 1.8 million to the Plaintiff on December 9, 2013 to December 26, 2013. According to the above facts of recognition, the Defendant is liable to pay the Plaintiff wages of KRW 3 million per month from December 27, 2013 to the Plaintiff’s reinstatement.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified, and all of them are accepted, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Gyeong-tae

Judges Jeong-won