기타(금전)
1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.
1. The reasons for this court's acceptance of the judgment of the first instance are as follows: 3. Judgment on the merits
C. 1) Inasmuch as the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as that of the corresponding part of the judgment except that the corresponding part, such as the “(B) extinctive prescription defense, etc.” as stated in Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act is cited.
1) The Defendant asserted that the Defendant’s defense of extinctive prescription had expired due to the lapse of the five-year commercial statute of limitations prior to the filing of the instant lawsuit, i.e., the Plaintiff’s claim to return deposit upon the rescission of the instant lease agreement.
A person who prepares for a business before commencing a commercial activity which is the object of the business is to realize an intention to engage in a commercial activity, so he/she is qualified as a merchant at the time he/she performs such preparation. In addition, preparing for a business is an act for business purposes and becomes the first ancillary commercial activity.
In addition, such an act of preparing business opening does not necessarily need to be an act of generally and externally expressing business intention through trade name registration, opening business advertisement, or attaching signboards, but if the other party can objectively recognize the business intention in light of the nature of preparation, such as the purchase of a store, acquisition of a business, and employment of a trade employee, the preparation act is an auxiliary commercial activity, and the provisions of the Commercial Act governing commercial activities are applicable thereto (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 201Da104246, Apr. 13, 2012). Meanwhile, the right to recover from cancellation of a contract which is a commercial activity is subject to the extinctive prescription for commercial activities under Article 64 of the Commercial Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Da21569, Sept. 14, 1993). Since the Plaintiff entered into the instant lease contract with the Defendant for the purpose of packaging business, the Plaintiff is deemed to have obtained the qualification of a merchant engaging in packing business.
In addition, the object of the instant lease contract is business facilities for food sale.