[2] The case reversing the judgment of the court below that the prescription period for acquisition of the register was completed on the ground that there was no negligence in the commencement of possession with no explanation as to the commencement of possession with a certain title

[3] The case holding that the successor cannot be deemed to have commenced his own own possession with a new title in case where he succeeded to the possession following the change of an administrative district

1. Fact-finding and judgment of the court below

(a) Basic facts;

(1) In the course of liquidation in Gyeonggi-do, it is the land for which the Plaintiff’s franchisium 623 forest and 11,712 forest and 68 forest and 29,600 forest and 68 forest and 68 forest and 29,600 forest and 600 forest and 623 forest and

(2) On February 15, 1983, the liquidation area in the above liquidation area was incorporated into the Socheon-gun, which became the land in the annexed Table 1, while the two sides of the above Enforcement Decree was the land in the annexed Table 2 following the process of division and registration conversion.

(3) On April 18, 1968, Lee Jong-young died and jointly succeeded to her wife's path, son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's son's

(4) As of the land listed in the attached Table 1 as of April 27, 1966, the registration of ownership transfer was completed under the name of the Republic of Korea (the Ministry of National Defense as of October 24, 1986), and the registration of ownership transfer was completed as of November 21, 1989. As to the land listed in the attached Table 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6, the registration of ownership transfer was completed under the name of the Ministry of National Defense (the Ministry of National Defense) of the Republic of Korea as of November 24, 1986. As to the land listed in the attached Table 2, the registration of ownership transfer was completed under the name of the Ministry of National Defense (the Ministry of National Defense as of October 24, 1986), and as to the land listed in the attached Table 2, the registration of ownership transfer was completed under the name of the Ministry of National Finance and Economy of the Republic of Korea as of November 6, 1979.

B. The court below accepted the defendants' assertion on the following grounds that each of the above registrations was a valid registration that conforms to the substantive relationship with the completion of the prescription period, and rejected the plaintiff's claim against the defendants for cancellation of each of the above registrations. The court below rejected the plaintiff's claim against the defendants on the ground that each of the above registrations was a valid registration that conforms to the substantive relationship with the acquisition of prescription period as follows.

(1) As to the attached Table 1’s land

In full view of the adopted evidence, the court below acknowledged the following facts: (a) on the land of the annexed Table 1, which is a forest of 1938 when it was a certain era, the Macheon-gun mobilized the employees of the Myeon Office and the residents on the land of the annexed Table 1, which is a forest of 1938; (b) carried out a large-scale afforestation project; (c) on around 1970, mass night trees and pine trees were prohibited from felling; and (d) on around 1986, the tombate of the above land was designated as the Gyeonggi-do local genetic title 1 and managed it; and (e) thereafter, the court below determined that the registration of the possession of the above land was valid for at least 10 years by the completion of the registration of the possession of the above land; and (e) on the grounds that the registration of the possession of the above land was completed under the name of the Macheon-gun-gun, a cultural heritage of Macheon-gun, a cultural heritage of Macheon-gun-gun-gun-gun, and its replacement.

(2) As to the land of [Attachment 2] Nos. 1 through 6 of the annexed Table 2

In full view of the adopted evidence, the court below found that the defendant Republic of Korea opened an emergency road for a military unit on each of the above lands in around 1978 and occupied and used it as a de facto road site and managed it as idle property after disuse in 192 due to the relocation of a military unit, construction of a new road, etc., ② as to the land in the attached Table 2 List 4, 5, 6, from July 12, 1990, the land in the attached Table 4, 4, and 5 was leased as farmland for farming from the time of July 12, 1990 to the 1985, and since the land in the attached Table 6, from January 1, 1991, the fact that each of the above lands was leased as land for farming purposes to the 1985, and that each of the above lands was leased as land for farming purposes. Since the Republic of Korea is presumed to have occupied, performed in good faith, and the above registration was completed at the expiration of each of the effective period of prescription.

2. Judgment of the Supreme Court

However, it is difficult to accept the judgment of the court below on the completion of the statute of limitation for each of the above lands for the following reasons.

A. In the case of Defendant Spocheon-si and Defendant Republic of Korea

(1) The acquisition by prescription of registry requires that there was no negligence in the commencement of possession, and the burden of proof is against the claimant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da13052, Jun. 25, 2004). The negligence here refers to that there was no negligence in believing that the possessor is his own ownership.

(2) If so, the court below should have further deliberated on the land in the attached list No. 1 and whether the defendant Republic of Korea occupied the land in the attached list No. 1 through No. 6 of the attached list No. 2 by each title, and should have determined whether there was negligence in the commencement of each possession. However, the court below should have determined that the defendants had no negligence in the commencement of possession on the sole basis of the facts stated in the reasoning of the court below's decision merely because the defendants did not explain the commencement of possession with any title. The court below erred by misapprehending the facts against the rules of evidence or by misapprehending the legal principles on the acquisition of the period of prescription for the acquisition of the register, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, the ground of appeal

(b) In the case of Defendant Socheon-gun:

(1) As acknowledged by the court below, if the defendant Socheon-gun succeeded to the possession of the land in the attached Table 1 from Socheon-gun as a result of the change of administrative district, the defendant Socheon-gun cannot be deemed to have commenced its own possession by a new title, barring any special circumstance. Thus, the defendant Socheon-gun cannot be deemed to have commenced its own possession by leaving the possession of Socheon-gun, and it is not possible to assert its own possession only. Therefore, in the case of the acquisition by prescription for the registration of the defendant Socheon-gun, the defendant Socheon-gun did not have been negligent at the

(2) Thus, as long as the judgment of the court below that there was no negligence in the commencement of possession of the land in the annexed Table 1 annexed hereto, it is erroneous in the judgment of the court below that there was no negligence in the commencement of possession in the annexed Table 1, and therefore, it is also erroneous in the judgment of the court below that there was no negligence in the commencement of possession in

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Young-ran (Presiding Justice)