1. The issue of whether a certain act of an administrative agency can be a subject of appeal cannot be determined abstractly and generally. In specific cases, an administrative disposition is a law enforcement with respect to a specific fact conducted by an administrative agency as a public authority, which directly affects the rights and obligations of the people, with the mind that it is an act that directly affects the rights and obligations of the people. The decision should be made individually by taking into account the content and purport of the relevant Act and subordinate statutes, the subject, content, form, and procedure of the act, the actual relation between the act and disadvantage suffered by interested parties, such as the other party, and the principle of administration by the rule of law and the attitude of the administrative agency and interested parties related to the pertinent act (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision

Meanwhile, according to Article 41 of the Administration and Treatment of Correctional Institution Inmates Act (hereinafter “Act”), prisoners may meet with outside persons in principle (Paragraph 1), but the head of a correctional institution may have a correctional officer listen to, record, record, record, or video record the contents of meeting of prisoners when there is a concern that they may destroy evidence of a crime or commit an act contrary to criminal law (Paragraph 2 Subparag. 1), when it is necessary for prisoners’ edification or sound rehabilitation into society (Paragraph 2 Subparag. 2), when it is necessary for prisoners’ edification or sound rehabilitation into society (Paragraph 2 Subparag. 3) or when it is necessary for the security and maintenance of order of a correctional institution (Paragraph 2 Subparag. 3).

Comprehensively taking account of the adopted evidence, the lower court acknowledged the following facts: (a) the Plaintiff was sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment on May 28, 2009 for the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement) and 1 year of imprisonment for the violation of the Public Official Election Act; (b) was sentenced to imprisonment for the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement); and (c) was confined to an inmate in a astronomical prison from July 14, 201; (d) the Defendant designated the Plaintiff as “person subject to participation in the meeting” when the Plaintiff was confined to a astronomical prison; and (e) accordingly, the Plaintiff participated in the meeting at all times by the correctional officer and listen to and record the contents of the meeting, and recorded and video recorded the details

Furthermore, the lower court determined that, in full view of the following: ① the Defendant’s designated act as seen above, the Defendant’s participation in correctional officers imposing restrictions on the right, such as privacy, and hearing, recording, recording, and video recording of the contents of meetings, such designated act has the nature of a public authority fact-finding act that the Defendant unilaterally forces the Plaintiff, who is a prisoner, in its superior position; ② such designated act is not once more effective, but has continued until February 13, 2013, which is after the first instance judgment was rendered, and has the same nature as compelling the Plaintiff to recognize it; ③ when cancelling the act of public authority with continuity, it is deemed that the aforementioned designated act would benefit from remedying the fundamental rights of the convicted prisoner from infringement of fundamental rights, which may not be done in the future. Such designated act is an act of public law of the administrative agency which directly changes the specific rights and duties of the convicted prisoner, and constitutes an “disposition” subject to an appeal litigation.

In light of the above legal principles, legal provisions, and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as alleged in the grounds for appeal.

2. The lower court, on February 12, 201, determined that the instant lawsuit still has a legal interest on the ground of the circumstances indicated in its reasoning, such as that even though the Defendant, on February 12, 2013, released the Plaintiff from “persons subject to correctional officer participation in the event of recording, recording, and meeting,” following the pronouncement of the first instance judgment, it is anticipated that the Plaintiff might be subject to the comprehensive restriction on meeting, such as the aforementioned designation act (hereinafter “instant disposition”). Furthermore, the lower court rejected the Defendant’s defense on the ground that it was difficult to view that the Plaintiff was aware of the instant disposition on July 16, 201 and around the 18th day of the same month, and that the period of filing the lawsuit is excessive.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below on this part is just and acceptable. There is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as asserted in the grounds for appeal.

3. As seen earlier, Article 41 of the Act permits a prisoner to meet with an outside person, in principle, and the head of a correctional institution can have a correctional officer listen to, record, record, record or video record the contents of meeting of prisoners only in certain cases.

However, in rendering the instant disposition, the Defendant did not assert or prove the circumstances that there are grounds for Article 41 subparag. 1 (when it is likely to destroy evidence of a crime or to commit an act in conflict with criminal law) or subparag. 2 (when it is necessary for the edification of sentenced persons or their sound rehabilitation into society) of the Act. As the lower court properly determined, it is difficult to deem that there exist grounds for the above subparag. 3 (when it is necessary for the safety of facilities and the maintenance of order) solely for the circumstances alleged by the Defendant in the lower court. Accordingly, the instant disposition is an illegal disposition that did not meet the requirements

Although the lower court’s explanation of this part of its reasoning is somewhat inappropriate, the conclusion that the instant disposition should be revoked as an unlawful disposition is acceptable. In so doing, it cannot be said that there is an error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as asserted in the grounds for

4. The appeal is dismissed by the assent of all participating Justices, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Chang-suk (Presiding Justice)